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ABSTRACT 
 
The Price of Prosperity: 
Inflation and the Limits of the New Deal Order 
 
by  
 
Samir Sonti 
 
 This dissertation examines the politics of price inflation in the United States from the 
1930s through the onset of the crisis of stagflation in the 1970s. During this period, which 
encompassed the rise and fall of what historians have called the “New Deal Order,” inflation 
stood as one of the most contentious economic issues, affecting agricultural, industrial, and 
financial policymaking. While much scholarly attention has been directed at the resolution of 
the crisis of stagflation in the late 1970s, few have explored how political struggles over the 
issue shaped the contours of liberalism in the United States in the preceding decades. By 
placing inflation at the center of the debate over the character of the New Deal Order, this 
study seeks to enrich our understanding of the structural tensions that beset that reform effort 
from the outset. 
 In particular, the dissertation traces the career of a tradition that emerged out of the 
left of the New Deal and which offered an analysis of inflation that emphasized the 
importance of corporate power over the investment and price-making functions. Blending 
older insights from institutional economics with theoretical innovations associated with 
 xi 
Keynes, this tradition can be called Institutional Keynesianism. Institutional Keynesianism 
was born in the early New Deal Department of Agriculture, and its adherents went on to play 
significant roles elsewhere in the federal government and in the industrial union movement. 
In contrast to the “commercial Keynesians” who have loomed large in the historiography on 
twentieth-century U.S. history, the Institutional Keynesians sought to equip macroeconomic 
theory with empirically sound micro-economic foundations. This attentiveness to economic 
structure enabled the Institutional Keynesians to identify fundamental contradictions in 
corporate capitalism, including its tendency towards both price inflation and economic 
stagnation, and led them to propose broad social democratic reforms. Recovering this 
forgotten left-liberal tradition can add texture to our understanding of the fate of the New 
Deal Order, as well as the origins of what displaced it.  
 xii 
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 1 
Introduction: Class Struggle and the Politics of Inflation 
WHAT DO WE MEAN when we speak about prices? To begin with there is the question of 
what prices we are speaking about. Take two examples: a laptop computer and a college 
education. Computers have in recent years fallen in price, while tuition and fees have spiraled 
out of control. Is there any relationship between the two, any way to reconcile the divergent 
trends? An economist might say that there is, and that it lies in the timeless and universal 
principles of supply and demand. And this, to be sure, may be part of the story. Advances in 
the production of laptops have made it easier for firms to crank them out, leaving each one 
less expensive for a consumer to buy. As increasing numbers of people have come to see a 
college degree as the ticket to an economically secure life, moreover, one could plausibly 
claim that “demand” for higher education has surged. But this view barely scratches the 
surface. How exactly have the corporations that sell computers been able to make more and 
charge less? What toll has this taken on the people who do the work? And why are colleges 
and universities operating like businesses and peddling a commodity called education in the 
first place? 
 Economists typically avoid these questions, but historians cannot. And while the 
historical process behind the declining price of consumer electronics and the rising cost of 
post-secondary education is not as simple as the economists’ models would suggest, it is 
comprehensible. A few decades of trade liberalization and deregulation have allowed 
international investors to take capital around the world in search of locales where labor 
standards are lax and environmental oversight nonexistent. These relocations, as many 
scholars have demonstrated, often came after workers in prior locations had succeeded in 
organizing and asserting themselves at the bargaining table, yet the moves were both more 
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traumatic and more contingent than a microeconomics textbook can ever depict. Devastated 
post-industrial communities in the United States and dystopian manufacturing complexes 
overseas are no small part of the price we pay for cheap screens. And the trip from Camden 
and Schenectady to Ciudad Juárez and Zhengzhou was not simply an economic expression of 
Newtonian gravitational pull. Government policy in the United States, Mexico, China, and 
elsewhere made it possible, and certain class interests have had greater influence over the 
shape of that policy realm than on others.1 
 A similar dynamic is behind the exorbitant cost of college. Into the early 1970s, 
government allocations to public colleges and universities accounted for well over 80 percent 
of institutional expenditure on instruction, leaving students and their families with less than a 
fifth of the bill. In some places, such as the University of California and City University of 
New York systems, students did not pay at all. During that time, moreover, most of the 
instructional work was done by full-time, tenure-track faculty. The ivory tower was turned 
upside down in the four decades that followed. In the name of fiscal responsibility state after 
state moved away from a commitment to provision of public goods like higher education, a 
steady slide that intensified during those spurts of austerity which have accompanied each 
recession in memory. Today, students and their families pay more than half the cost of 
instruction, and members of a generation and counting now find themselves saddled with the 
																																																						
1 Jefferson Cowie, Capital Moves: RCA’s Seventy-Year Quest for Cheap Labor (New York: The New Press, 
2001); Pun Ngai and Jenny Chan, “Global Capital, the State, and Chinese Workers: The Foxconn Experience,” 
Modern China 38, no. 4 (2012): 383-410; Kate Bronfrenbrenner, “Organizing in the NAFTA Environment: 
How Companies Use ‘Free Trade’ to Stop Unions, New Labor Forum 1, no.1 (1997): 50-60. See also, Barry 
Bluestone and Bennett Harrison, The Deindustrialization of America: Plant Closing, Community Abandonment, 
and the Dismantling of Basic Industry (New York: Basic Books, 1982); Jefferson Cowie and Joseph Heathcott, 
Beyond the Ruins: The Meanings of Deindustrialization (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003); Thomas 
Sugrue, The Origins of the Urban Crisis: Race and Inequality in Postwar Detroit (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1996); Robert Self, American Babylon: Race and the Struggle for Postwar Oakland 
(Princeton: PUP, 2003). 
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lifelong burden of indebtedness. And even as they fork over all that money, academic 
working conditions have deteriorated. Underpaid part-time faculty teach the overwhelming 
majority of college courses.2 
 Computers could be compared to clothing or cars, higher education to healthcare or 
housing. Taken together, it is clear that since the 1970s something like this has been 
happening: global changes in the production and distribution of consumer goods have left 
those things cheaper while government retrenchment has curtailed the availability public 
goods. Finance has loomed large through this transformation from top to bottom, facilitating 
exchange at the global level, encouraging greater privatization of the public sphere, and 
penetrating almost all aspects of everyday life.3 Through it all, the rich have gotten richer and 
nearly everyone else has been trapped in slack labor markets which yield stagnant wages and 
steady anxiety. The soaring level of economic inequality in the United States and around the 
world is the defining feature of this political economic era, which has now lasted as long as 
the one that preceded it from the 1930s to the 1970s. That earlier era, in contrast, was marked 
by an expanding public sector and a well organized working-class capable of forcing a 
downward transfer of income, a regulated financial sector and chronic consumer price 
inflation. How did we get from there to here? The history of how we think about prices and 
the changing politics and power relations they represent can help to answer that question. 
 
																																																						
2 Robert Samuels, Why Public Higher Education Should be Free: How to Decrease Cost and Increase Quality 
at American Universities (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2013). 
3 Judith Stein, Pivotal Decade: How the U.S. Traded Factories for Finance in the 1970s (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2010); Leo Panitch and Sam Gindin, The Making of Global Capitalism: The Political 
Economy of American Empire (London: Verso, 2012); Greta Krippner, Capitalizing on Crisis: The Political 
Origins of Modern Finance (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011); David Harvey, A Brief History of 
Neoliberalism (Oxford: OUP, 2007); Randy Martin, Financialization of Daily Life (Philadelphia: Temple 
University Press, 2002). 
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IN THE 1970s no one doubted that prices were political. Through that decade, the annual 
rate of consumer price inflation galloped at a pace not seen before in the United States. In the 
fifteen years following the Korean War, the annual inflation rate averaged 1.7 percent, and in 
the thirty years since 1986 it has been at 2.7 percent. Between 1970 and 1982 it averaged 7.8 
percent. For five of those years it hovered around or above 10 percent, and once it even 
touched 14 percent. At the same time, industrial capitalism showed signs of stagnation. 
Growth sputtered as the economy fell into two recessions, and the extraordinary rise in 
productivity over the previous century slowed markedly (see Figures 1 and 2). 
Unemployment climbed from below 4 percent in the late 1960s to above 10 percent in the 
early 1980s, averaging just shy of 7 percent for the decade as compared to a little under 5 
percent during the previous twenty years. Median household income stopped rising, and it 
has stayed flat ever since. In the context of a blazing inflation, this structural downturn 
amounted to the worst economic crisis since the 1930s. Contemporary observers called it 
“stagflation.”4 
 Through Watergate, the Iran hostage situation, and Reagan’s national ascendance, 
stagflation stood as the political economic backdrop, and at the end of this turbulent decade 
Jimmy Carter summed up the national mood in a word: malaise.5 The domestic legacy of the 
War in Vietnam along with what working-class people of color and their allies saw as the 
manifest limitations of the mid-1960s civil rights reforms left many progressives searching 
for a world more fulfilling than the one made by industrial capitalism. Just at that moment,  
																																																						
4 Unless otherwise specified inflation data refers to that presented in the Bureau of Labor Statistics, “Consumer 
Price Index – All Urban Consumers.”  
5 Jimmy Carter: "Address to the Nation on Energy and National Goals: "The Malaise Speech"," July 15, 
1979. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=32596. 
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FIGURE 1 
 
Source: Chart assembled by author with data from Bureau of Labor Statistics, “Multifactor 
Productivity Measures for Major Sectors and Manufacturing,” available at: 
http://www.bls.gov/mfp/mprdload.htm. 
 
FIGURE 2 
 
 
 
Source: Chart assembled by author with data from Bureau of Labor Statistics, “Major 
Productivity and Costs: Labor Productivity (output per hour),” available at: 
http://data.bls.gov/timeseries/PRS85006092 
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the material conditions that had underlain their earlier struggles disintegrated. Two OPEC 
embargos during these years convulsed the global economy and made for endless lines at gas 
stations and skyrocketing fuel prices.6 City and state officials found themselves mired in 
fiscal crises and held hostage by creditors who demanded austerity measures in exchange for 
their help with future bond issues. The near-miss bankruptcy episode in New York City, 
which ended with the introduction of tuition at CUNY, was a preview of the kind of shock 
therapy that the financial sector would ferociously apply to revenue starved governments in 
the years to come.7 Militant workers did what they could to shelter themselves from the 
frightening economic storm, and the intensity of workplace struggle in the early 1970s 
rivaled that of any previous era.8 But in the hostile political climate that prevailed by the 
early 1980s – especially after Reagan broke the air traffic controllers’ union –  their 
organizations became shells of their former selves.9 
 Scholars have concluded, then, that the 1970s was a “pivotal decade,” the years when 
what Steve Fraser and Gary Gerstle called the “New Deal order” finally fell.10 Fraser and 
Gerstle meant by that formulation the ensemble of forces – intellectual and institutional, 
																																																						
6 Meg Jacobs, Panic at the Pump: The Energy Crisis and the Transformation of American Politics in the 1970s 
(New York: Hill & Wang, 2016). 
7 Kim Moody, From Welfare State to Real Estate: Regime Change in New York City, 1974 to the Present (New 
York: The New Press, 2007); Joshua Freeman, Working-Class New York: Life and Labor Since World War II 
(New York: The New Press, 2000); Mason Williams, City of Ambition: FDR, LaGuardia, and the Making of 
Modern York (W.W. Norton & Co., 2014). See also James O’Connor, The Fiscal Crisis of the State (New York: 
Monthly Review Press, 1973). On “shock therapy,” see Naomi Klein, The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster 
Capitalism (Toronto: Knopf, 2007). 
8 Jefferson Cowie, Stayin’ Alive: The 1970s and the Last Days of the Working Class (New York: The New 
Press, 2010); Aaron Brenner, Robert Brenner, Cal Winslow, eds., Rebel Rank and File: Labor Militancy and 
Revolt from Below During the Long 1970s (London: Verso, 2010); Joseph McCartin, “‘A Wagner Act for 
Public Employee’s’: Labor’s Deferred Dream and the Rise of Conservatism, 1970-1976,” Journal of American 
History 95, no. 1 (2008): -148; Land Windham, “Signing Up in the Shipyard: Organizing Newport News and 
Reinterpreting the 1970s,” Labor: Studies in the Working-Class History of the Americas 10, no. 2 (2013): 31-
53. 
9 Joseph McCartin, Collision Course: Ronald Reagan, the Air Traffic Controllers, and the Strike that Changed 
America (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011). 
10 Steve Fraser and Gary Gerstle, eds., The Rise and Fall of the New Deal Order, 1932-1980 (Princeton: PUP, 
1989); Stein, Pivotal Decade. 
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cultural and political – that coalesced around the Democratic Party and which during the 
middle half of the twentieth-century provided the electoral foundation for a hegemonic 
liberal governing regime. And although their goal was to complicate that notion, to assess its 
coherence from the vantage point of the post-Reagan era, and in spite of subsequent 
scholarship demonstrating the long history of conservative opposition to it, the New Deal 
order framework still figures prominently in both the historical literature on and the popular 
memory of the twentieth century United States.11 
 But our commitment to this periodization does put us at risk of missing the broader 
sweep of history within which this New Deal order rose and fell, a limitation reflected in the 
historical literature on the displacement of the liberal regime by its “neoliberal” successor. 
The basic storyline runs like this: stagflation discredited Keynesianism, the dominant 
economic paradigm of New Deal liberalism, and paved the way for a conservative backlash. 
Keynesianism, in this telling, was a macroeconomic theory of growth, meaning it operated at 
the level of aggregates – and the most important aggregate of all was demand. High demand 
meant strong growth and low unemployment, low demand the opposite. But aggregate 
demand also bore directly on the aggregate price level. When demand was high, prices would 
rise – growth, that is, came with inflation. Put another way, these Keynesians believed that 
there was an inverse relationship between inflation and unemployment, and they built their 
policy repertoire on the assumption that those two variables moved in opposite directions. 
																																																						
11 See Alan Brinkley, The End of Reform: New Deal Liberalism in Recession and War (New York: Knopf, 
1994); Ira Katznelson, Fear Itself: The New Deal and the Origins of Our Times (New York: Knopf, 2013); 
Jefferson Cowie, The Great Exception: The New Deal and the Limits of American Politics (Princeton: PUP, 
2016). On conservativism, see Kim Phillips-Fein, Invisible Hands: The Making of the Conservative Movement 
from the New Deal to Reagan (W.W. Norton & Co., 1999); Angus Burgin, The Great Persuasion: Reinventing 
Free Markets since the Depression (Cambridge: HUP, 2012); Elizabeth Tandy Shermer, Sunbelt Capitalism: 
Phoenix and the Transformation of American Politics (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013); 
Lisa McGirr, Suburban Warriors: The Origins of the New American Right (Princeton: PUP, 2001). 
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Their economic recovery measures were inflationary, and their inflation control measures 
were contractionary. So when confronted by stagflation, they had no answers.12 
 While the Keynesians lay paralyzed by this paradox, a conservative group of 
economists was on the march. As their name suggested, the “monetarists,” led by Milton 
Friedman of the University of Chicago, argued that inflation was, had been, and would 
always be a strictly monetary phenomenon. The rate of inflation was a direct reflection of the 
amount of money in circulation. Deficit spending by governments to boost consumer demand 
and thus reduce unemployment flooded the system with money, and a central bank 
deferential to political officials exacerbated the problem by periodically resorting to the 
printing press to lubricate those frictions that threatened growth. The economy had been 
made sick by too much spending, they held, and it needed a heavy dose of austerity to 
cleanse it of its New Deal malady. The monetarists proposed that the Federal Reserve 
contract the money supply and that the federal government slash its budget, two actions that 
would induce a recession through which unemployment might stabilize at a non-inflationary 
level. In his 1977 Nobel Prize acceptance speech, Friedman called this the “natural rate of 
unemployment,” and it was soon incorporated by the discipline as the non-accelerating 
inflation rate of unemployment (NAIRU).13 Naturalizing unemployment, almost literally, 
was a precondition for price stability. 
																																																						
12 The classic account of the rise of such “commercial Keynesianism” is Alan Brinkley, The End of Reform. For 
competing perspectives, see Theodore Rosenof, Economics in the Long Run: New Deal Theorists and their 
Legacies, 1933-1993 (Chapel Hill: UNC Press, 1997); Robert Collins, More: The Politics of Economic Growth 
in Postwar America (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000); Judith Stein, Running Steel, Running 
America: Race, Economic Policy, and the Decline of Liberalism (Chapel Hill: UNC Press, 1996) and Pivotal 
Decade. The literature on “stagflation” is immense, but contemporary accounts that remain among the most 
valuable are the essays in John Goldthorpe and Fred Hirsch, The Political Economy of Inflation (Cambridge: 
HUP, 1978) and Leon N. Linberg and Charles Maier, The Politics of Inflation and Economic Stagnation 
(Washington D.C.: Brookings, 1985). 
13 James Forder, “Friedman’s Nobel Lecture and the Phillips Curve Myth,” Journal of the History of Economic 
Thought 39, no. 4 (2010): 329-348. See also, Milton Friedman, “Nobel Lecture: Inflation and Unemployment,” 
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     The monetarist eclipse of Keynesianism can be dated quite precisely to when 
Jimmy Carter appointed Paul Volcker to lead the Federal Reserve. The story of the “Volcker 
Shock” that followed has been well told, but in summary the new Fed Chairman followed 
Friedman’s lead. He took the unprecedented move of shrinking the money supply, and it had 
its predicted effect. A deep recession followed, one from which the manufacturing core 
would never recover, and soon thereafter Ronald Reagan won the presidency and began his 
frontal assault on the New Deal order. By the mid-1980s, inflation had been tamed, and it has 
stayed in the bag ever since. Prices ceased to function as a political issue, as plentiful 
consumer credit and bargain basement retail outlets provided working people with the means 
to hold on to at least a semblance of the living standards they had previously enjoyed, even as 
their wages were stuck in the mud.14 These contradictions came to a head in 2008, although 
most accounts of that crisis pointed to short-term financial malfeasance rather than the 
longer-term structural trends.15 
 The shortcoming with this narrative is that this version of Keynesianism and 
monetarism were by no means the only two available perspectives on the dual problems of 
stagnation and inflation, or on the making of prices as a general matter. Throughout the 
twentieth century, indeed going back even further, a number of intellectual traditions and 
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policy alternatives had emerged to deal with these issues. The idea of a formal tradeoff 
between inflation and unemployment, which these aggregate-centric Keynesians and 
monetarists alike accepted, albeit in different ways, only gained real currency in the 
economics profession by the late 1960s. The history of the assumption dates to a 1958 paper 
published by the Australian economist, A.W. Phillips, which demonstrated an inverse 
relationship between money-wage rates and unemployment in Britain from the mid-
nineteenth to the mid-twentieth centuries. Graced as the “Phillips Curve,” the results of this 
empirical study became the conceptual basis for the policies that a group of Keynesians – 
especially those surrounding MIT economist and famed textbook author Paul Samuelson – 
would advocate through the 1960s. Through applied research into the Phillips Curve, the 
Samuelson-wing of Keynesians felt they could offer a “menu” of inflation and 
unemployment rates from which policymakers might choose as per their appetite for one or 
the other. Friedman and the monetarists, for their part, revised the Keynesian Phillips Curve 
by arguing that expectations of inflation pushed the graph outwards: that is, the more people 
anticipated inflation, and hurried their buying to get ahead of it, the more unemployment it 
would take to exorcise it. The tradeoff, in the monetarist view, was not static but always 
moving. Still, they too saw a tradeoff.16 
  One goal of this dissertation is to demonstrate the historical specificity of the tradeoff 
between inflation and unemployment. This concept did come to set the terms of debate on 
economic questions in the 1970s, but, again, that was only in the 1970s. To see the fate of the 
New Deal order as hinging on that debate is to start the story where it ends. No doubt almost 
																																																						
16 See James Forder, Macroeconomics and the Phillips Curve Myth (Oxford: OUP, 2014); Robert Leeson, “The 
Political Economy of the Inflation-Unemployment Trade-Off,” History of Political Economy 29, no.1 (1997): 
117-156. I will treat the Phillips Curve in greater depth in Ch. 4. 
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everyone understood that under certain conditions inflation and unemployment would move 
inversely. Prices would probably stabilize or fall during a bad recession, as they did in the 
early 1980s, and robust growth, like that seen during wartime, would push prices up. Marx 
had contended, and every worker had long understood, that the size of the “reserve army of 
labor” had a regulating effect on wage rates and prices, and the historian of economic thought 
Robert Leeson has seen versions of that argument as far back as the eighteenth century work 
of David Hume.17 But there was a lot of space in between the peak and the valley, and the 
question of how exactly inflation and unemployment would relate to one another in that vast 
middle ground was much contested throughout the twentieth century. Before wading into that 
history, however, we need to define with greater precision what we mean by these numbers 
themselves. As the example of the computer and the college education indicated, this is not at 
all straightforward. 
 
*** 
 
MODERN STATISTICS EMERGED along with modern nation states. And as was the case 
with everything involved in that process, the numbers produced by statisticians were 
politically contested. A few modest adjustments to the calculation of unemployment or 
growth rates could nudge those figures up or down and thereby affect public perceptions and 
policies towards a problem that has not fundamentally changed at all. Given the share of 
																																																						
17 Leeson, “The Political Economy of the Inflation-Unemployment Trade-Off.” See also Leeson, “Early Doubts 
about the Phillips Curve Trade-Off,” Journal of the History of Economic Thought 20, no. 1 (1998): 83-102 and 
“Keynes and the ‘Keynesian’ Phillips Curve,” History of Political Economy 31, no. 3 (1999): 493-509. 
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government expenditures that are indexed to inflation, we could quickly be talking about 
billions of dollars going one way or another.18 
  Censuses were the products of the first substantial commitments by public authorities 
to the assembly and analysis of demographic data, but formal statistical practice in the United 
States only cohered in state-level commissions on labor statistics during the latter half of the 
nineteenth century and especially with the creation of the national Bureau of Labor Statistics 
in 1884. Establishment of a federal agency devoted to the production and dissemination of 
official labor statistics had been a principal demand of the rising trade union movement, and 
that the BLS today provides in depth monthly reports on subjects such as occupational health 
and workplace safety stands as one important legacy of this history. But from the outset the 
most important bit of data the federal government produced was its estimates of the cost of 
living. At the turn of the century, this figure was presented as the amount of income that a 
household needed to survive, and progressives demanding a living wage as well as 
businesses hoping to keep wages low had a clear interest in where it was set.19 
 As the historian Thomas Stapleford has shown, the government production of cost of 
living statistics was most politically fraught from the founding of the BLS through World 
War II. In 1946, the BLS rechristened the figure as the “Consumer Price Index,” an important 
departure from the presumption informing the earlier generation of cost of living data. The 
point was no longer to determine how much money was needed to survive at a socially 
acceptable standard of living, but rather to calculate the amount by which the price of a 
																																																						
18 Thomas Stapleford, The Cost of Living in America: A Political History of Economic Statistics, 1880-2000 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009); Theodore Porter, Trust in Numbers: The Pursuit of Objectivity 
in Science and Public Life (Princeton: PUP, 1995); J. Adam Tooze, Statistics and the German State, 1900-1945: 
The Making of Modern Economic Knowledge (Cambridge: CUP, 2001). 
19 My interpretation has been informed by Thomas Stapleford, The Cost of Living in America. 
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“market basket” of goods and services moved in a given period. Measurement of price 
movements does not, however, tell us anything about who can afford what in the first place. 
And while the question of who could afford what did not go away, fewer and fewer social 
scientists inquired into it as the movement of the CPI was reified as the basis for indexing the 
rate of inflation in the postwar period. Yet perhaps the remarkable ascent of the CPI in the 
1970s had something to do with the old formulas used to calculate it. And maybe not 
everyone felt the effects of that rising CPI in the same way.  
 Take the “market basket” that served as composite of necessary household 
expenditures. What belongs in it? If its contents were meant to include social necessities, 
could the meaning of social necessities not change over time? Should something like access 
to healthcare be considered a necessity, or were necessities only the minimal amounts of 
food, clothing, and shelter required to reproduce a worker from one shift to the next? The 
quality of goods changed with time, as economists in the twentieth century did not hesitate to 
point out, and perhaps so too should political understandings of what all were thought to 
deserve. And there are practical challenges beyond these normative considerations. Say 
housing prices surge, but only as a result of an increasing rate of home ownership, which 
means that a decreasing share of the population is affected by rising rental costs. Is the cost 
of a roof going up or down? What if that pattern of homeownership is racialized, and the 
fewer people whom those rising rental prices affect are disproportionately low income people 
of color trapped in municipalities with a collapsing tax base due to capital flight? How, in 
that vein, should the availability of public goods figure into the calculation? And what about 
the value of unremunerated labor performed by women in the home? How seriously can one 
take a measure of prices or the cost of living that fails in a fundamental way to account for all 
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the work involved in reproducing society itself? The questions could go on and on, but by the 
1970s few professional economists or policymakers paused to reflect upon them.20 
 There was still another layer of complication. If there were unsettled questions about 
how to calculate a price index, there was no agreement at all as to where “inflation” came 
from. Was inflation simply a monetary phenomenon, as Milton Friedman and his associates 
incessantly asserted? What role did government budgetary deficits play? Did they artificially 
expand the money supply as the monetarists claimed? Did they risk overheating demand and 
thus fanning the flames of inflation, as many Keynesians worried? Did they do both, or 
maybe neither, depending on circumstance? Or did inflation grow out of institutional 
dynamics inherent in corporate capitalism itself – whether through monopolistic or 
oligopolistic pricing, high wages secured by trade unions, or some combination of the two? I 
will refer to these three broad classes of interpretations as the monetary, fiscal, and structural 
theories of inflation. The first two have received significant scholarly attention; the third has 
not. Each gained and lost traction in various quarters at various times, and this dissertation 
traces how and why that happened when it did. 
 But underneath these multiple scales and cross-cutting conceptual dimensions, the 
politics of inflation were at the same time quite simple. As the retired Cambridge economist 
Joan Robinson noted in 1976, inflation “is an expression of class struggle.”21 Around the 
same time, the British sociologist John Goldthorpe put it this way: “the current inflation 
derives ultimately from changes in the form of social stratification, giving rise to more 
																																																						
20 Some economists did see the commodity shocks – energy and food – of the 1970s as constituting a different 
kind of inflation. One perspective distinguished between this an and underlying “core inflation.” See Otto 
Eckstein, Core Inflation (New York: Prentice Hall, 1981). As I discuss in Ch. 4, Eckstein served in Lyndon 
Johnson’s Council of Economic Advisers, and his work for the Paul Douglas Chaired Joint Economic 
Committee in 1959 influenced Kennedy administration inflation policy. 
21 Joan Robinson, “Michal Kalecki: Neglected Prophet,” New York Review of Books (1976). 
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intense and equally-matched social conflict than hitherto.”22 And building on both Robinson 
and Goldthorpe, the German economic sociologist Wolfgang Streeck more recently 
elaborated upon the point:  
[I]nflation can be described as a monetary reflection of distributional conflict 
between a working class, demanding both employment security and a higher 
share in their country’s income, and a capitalist class striving to maximize the 
return on its capital. As the two sides act on mutually incompatible ideas of 
what is theirs by right, one emphasizing the entitlements of citizenship and the 
other those of property and market power, inflation may also be considered an 
expression of anomie in a society which, for structural reasons, cannot agree on 
common criteria of social justice.23 
 
The history of the twentieth century United States bears these points out. Chronic inflation as 
a political problem emerged with the New Deal order and disappeared with it too.  
 Prior to the 1930s, the politics of prices were animated by deflation, and indeed 
inflation – or more precisely inflationism – was conceived as a welcome antidote to the price 
contractions that weighed so heavily on farmers in particular. And since the 1980s inflation 
has simply not been an issue. The half century during which inflation figured significantly in 
U.S. politics was also the only half century during which economic inequality was 
systematically reduced. That alone testifies to the salience of the points made by Robinson, 
Goldthorpe, and Streeck. But the domestic distribution of income was not the only terrain 
upon which the politics of inflation developed in the mid-twentieth century. It had global 
dimensions too. And because the international monetary system erected in the wake of World 
War II placed the dollar at its foundation, the politics of inflation in the U.S. had global 
																																																						
22 John Goldthorpe, “The Current Inflation: Towards a Sociological Account,” in Goldthorpe and Fred Hirsch, 
eds., The Political Economy of Inflation (Cambridge: HUP, 1978). The Goldthorpe and Hirsch volume is a 
tremendous resource for contemporary social scientific and historical perspectives on stagflation. See also Leon 
Lindberg and Charles Maier, eds., The Politics of Inflation and Economic Stagnation: Theoretical Approaches 
and International Case Studies (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1985) and Charles Maier, In Seach of 
Stability (Cambridge: CUP, 1971).  
23 Wolfgang Streeck, “The Crisis of Democratic Capitalism,” New Left Review (2011), 11-12. 
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reach. If inflation correlated with working-class power at home, it also threatened U.S. 
financial might abroad. 
 But, of course, inflation did not exist in the abstract. When Robinson noted that the 
politics of inflation were a form of class struggle she also announced that there were 
historical actors waging it. And understanding how those actors navigated these complex 
politics of inflation requires consideration of the frameworks through which they made sense 
of the world when the problem arrived on the scene. Most immediately they had lived 
through what Eric Hobsbawm has called the “age of catastrophe” from 1914-1945, and as the 
politics of inflation first took shape just after World War II the collective fear of those three 
decades from hell cast a long shadow. But those catastrophic decades were shaped by even 
larger historical forces. The economist Robert Gordon has recently placed all the events thus 
far discussed in the context of what he calls the “special century” that ran from 1870 to 1970. 
Marked by remarkable improvements in industrial productivity and economic development 
that were grounded in major technological innovations, he argued, that century was an epoch 
of growth that could not have come before and cannot be repeated. Without subscribing to 
Gordon’s prophesies about the future, one can agree that the expansion experienced by the 
industrial world through advances in gross domestic product growth during that century was 
unprecedented. It created the context within which the New Deal order rose and fell.24 And it 
did so by introducing a new type of capitalist organization that in short order remade the 
world. 
																																																						
24 Robert Gordon, The Rise and Fall of American Growth: The U.S. Standard of Living since the Civil 
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*** 
 
THE RISE OF THE CORPORATION, first in the United States and then elsewhere, was a 
principal reason why the century between 1870 and 1970 was so special. In the fifty years 
after the Civil War, this new form of business organization superintended a world historic 
transformation of production, distribution, and communication systems. The social division 
of productive labor stiffened while the household burdens of reproductive labor shifted. And 
ownership of the means of production concentrated in fewer hands. All the while, the 
demographic scale tilted from country to city. In 1860, more than 80 percent of the U.S. 
population lived on farms. By the end of World War I less than half did.25 These were the 
structural manifestations of what Martin Sklar called the “corporate reconstruction of 
American capitalism,” and capitalism in the United States needed to be reconstructed in the 
first place because the competition encouraged by laissez-faire turned out to be self-
destructive, catastrophically so. But if new worlds are born out of the ashes of the old, that 
never happens overnight. The transition to corporate capitalism took time, and in the 
interregnum new ways of looking at the world emerged, as did new methods for struggling to 
make it more livable.26 
 This was especially so given how volatile that transition was. The rise of the most 
highly capitalized industry to that date, the railroads, with their insatiable demand for both 
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people and things, propelled the proliferation of capital goods firms which churned out the 
bars, beams, and machine tools from which modern society was built. Cutthroat price wars 
between these upstarts recurrently liquidated the less solvent among them, and the periodic 
financial crises that resulted from the fantastic degree of speculation on the railroads – in 
1873, 1882, 1893 – punctuated that process of creative destruction with credit crunches even 
more acute. The consequence was a “long downturn” from the mid-1870s to mid-1890s, one 
marked by a grinding deflation that took its greatest toll on those whose ability to subsist was 
hitched to the plummeting prices agricultural commodities fetched on the world market.27 
 But if the trains stopped at the edge of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, the crisis did 
not. It ramified across the world. Indeed, corporate capitalism and the “age of empire” grew 
up together.28 The rising U.S. elite along with those atop the older European colonial regimes 
spent these decades carving up the rest of the globe in a relentless quest for materials and 
markets to fuel their productive engines and to absorb its surplus product. From its inception, 
that is, corporate capitalism drew its lifeblood from the subjugation of people living in what 
we now call the Global South, and from the forcible “underdevelopment” of their collective 
economic capacities. Still, imperialism did serve its intended purpose, for a time. During the 
two or so decades before World War I, the nation states constituting what radical theorists 
came to call the “core,” some of them brand new, experienced a period of relative economic 
prosperity. But the good times ended in flames, first in 1914 and yet again in the 1930s.29 
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 Corporate capitalism was more successful at home, at least if success is to be 
measured by effectiveness at meeting its inventors’ original objectives. In those sectors 
where these industrial titans established themselves and secured enough of the market share – 
first in capital goods, then in consumer durables, and only much later in retail – the price 
level stabilized, and it stayed that way for decades to come. That, above all, had been their 
purpose: to put an end to competitive price chiseling and the resultant cycles of recession and 
deflation by fostering cooperation, or collusion. If these firms looked, smelled, and sounded 
like monopolies, in other words, they did not always act the way that their populist 
contemporaries assumed they would. In general, their pricing strategy was directed more 
towards achieving predictability than short-term profitability, and this took sound 
management just as much as it depended upon power. Corporatization in this way spawned 
professionalization, and during this period there emerged educational and social institutions 
designed to acculturate a stratum of workers – some would call it the “middle-class” – to 
their new white collars and to place them in administrative occupations devoted to 
supervision and coordination of the burgeoning industrial order.30 
  But the tide of professionalization did not touch only the ranks of corporate middle 
management. As well, it served to overhaul the schools at which these managers studied. 
Mid-nineteenth century higher education occurred in a patchwork of land-grant colleges and 
northeastern private universities – the latter of which are probably better described as elite 
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social clubs, and at which course offerings included theology, the law, and not much more. 
This mélange turned within a few decades into the premier higher education system in the 
world. The disciplines as we now know them, in both the social and the natural sciences, 
took shape in this context, and their earliest practitioners worked assiduously to demarcate 
their intellectual jurisdiction and to standardize the process of credentialing within it. For 
many entrants into this new higher education labor market, the prestige, potential security, 
and even modest degree of influence that came with an academic affiliation was an end in 
itself. In the social sciences especially, these types ranged from passive stewards to outright 
ideologists for the bourgeoisie, and then as now they served a function in the establishment. 
But many others in this new cohort of academic workers gravitated to the universities with 
the honest hope of making sense of the unprecedented changes unfolding around them, and 
maybe even of finding ways to mitigate the suffering they saw. The opposition they 
confronted whenever their search for answers took them to radical conclusions was stiff, and 
those adverse conditions gave way to some of the earliest struggles for academic freedom. 
Yet if the universities were sites of critical inquiry, it was always an uphill battle to take that 
criticism off campus and put it into practice.31 
 Many of those who tried worked as what we generally classify as progressive 
reformers. Historians have long struggled to define progressivism, but most accept that there 
was enough ideological and strategic coherence among its advocates to consider it as 
defining of an era. Through city-based settlement houses and the networks of social work 
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activists and intellectuals who floated through and around them, state government and public 
university partnerships like that associated with Robert LaFolette and John Commons in 
Wisconsin, and national-level pressure groups like the National Consumers’ League (NCL) 
and the American Association for Labor Legislation (AALL), one current of progressivism 
matured into a leading edge of the protean ideological formation that came by the depression 
era to be called liberalism.32 To be sure, this movement was not without contradictions. The 
“middle class” sensibility with which progressivism emerged in tandem informed the way 
many of these reformers responded to the social question, and their proposed solutions were 
often dripping with mainstream prejudices. It was no coincidence that “race science” came 
out of this milieu; the fetish of scientific precision together with a reluctance to challenge the 
socially powerful can breed morbid symptoms. Yet it is the case that the New Deal could 
only come after the Progressive Era.33 
 
ONE IMPORTANT INTELLECTUAL LEGACY of progressivism was what the social 
scientist Walton Hamilton in 1918 called the “institutional approach to economic theory.”34 
Many historians of economic thought have seen the long downturn of the late nineteenth 
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century as an incubator of the “marginal revolution” in economics, through which the now 
dominant neo-classicism and its theory of utility maximizing rational economic agents 
displaced classical political economy and the labor theory of value upon which it was 
founded.35 But the economics profession in the United States did not travel in a straight line 
from the early neo-classicists, J.B. Clark and Irving Fisher, to Milton Friedman. Indeed, the 
methodological, epistemological, and ideological centers-of-gravity in the discipline were 
highly contested from the 1885 founding of the American Economics Association (AEA) 
until at least World War II. Alongside the static, deductive, and self-contained neo-classicism 
there developed a rival tradition that saw economic development in evolutionary terms, 
trusted mainly in inductive reasoning, and drew ecumenically on new scholarship in 
philosophy, psychology, sociology, and law.36 As Malcolm Rutherford, the leading historian 
of institutional economics, has described this approach, it included “the adoption of a central 
focus on institutions, process, social control, new psychological foundations, and empirical 
and instrumental ‘scientific’ investigation.”37 Its practitioners, that is, denied the existence of 
immutable economic laws; they saw the economy as constructed by humans and as a part of 
history. Its workings could be understood as conditioned by time and place, and maybe even 
changed for the better. 
 Given the historical context in which their field developed, one institution in 
particular preoccupied these progressive economists: the corporation. This is not to say that 
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they approached their subject matter myopically. The range of issues that drew the attention 
of the founding generation – Thorstein Veblen, John Commons, and Wesley Mitchell – 
testifies to the breadth of this branch of inquiry. Veblen elaborated an evolutionary 
interpretation of economic change, and his analysis of the role of technology in ushering in 
new institutional configurations and of psychology in guiding the behavior of both worker 
and businessman was largely qualitative and schematic. Commons drilled down into specific 
institutions – the law, the labor movement, public utilities – and drew on the German 
historical tradition in explaining their trajectory. A reformer as much as an academic, his 
work shaped the pioneering social insurance programs in Wisconsin, and his legacy loomed 
large in the New Deal. Mitchell, finally, was the first quantitative economist in the United 
States. His famous studies with the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) on 
business cycles assembled some of the first robust economic data sets and thereby helped to 
make possible the econometric modeling that would later take over the discipline. In spite of 
their differences, however, these figures knew each other and read one another’s work, and 
they all started with a similar question: how had the transition to corporate capitalism 
reshaped the plane of economic activity?38 
 The structural change effected by that transition worked by the end of World War I to 
focus institutional economists’ research agendas onto a few key issues. Most important of all 
was their concentration on the making of prices, and here the war itself was a trigger: it led to 
a tremendous expansion in U.S. agricultural output as American farms fed and clothed the 
combatant nations. While the carnage in Europe progressed, indices of production such as 
acres harvested and livestock slaughtered hit a crescendo, as did, of equal consequence, 
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tables of credit dispensed and prices fetched. Yet when world markets recovered upon the 
cessation of hostilities and those prices began to fall, U.S. farmers’ productive capacity and 
debt levels would not follow. The always tenuous dance between these three variables – 
prices, production, debt – then collapsed most violently on the growing number, at that point 
the vast majority, of rural Americans who owed liabilities exceeding the value of their assets 
(which in more and more cases were none). Falling prices meant falling incomes, which, for 
debtors, meant bankruptcy, foreclosure or worse, an intensified rerun of the long deflation of 
a generation prior. And, to underline the maddening cruelty of the whole thing, the 
unprecedented productive capacity of U.S. agriculture meant that crop prices would only 
continue to fall.39 
 While they fell, however, industrial prices remained stable. Compared to a 1910-1914 
benchmark of 100, the ratio of agricultural to industrial prices had by 1929 dropped to 89, 
and with the Depression it fell off a cliff, plunging to 55 by 1932.40 The purchasing power of 
rural incomes, that is, had been cut in half in twenty years. And the aggregate figure obscures 
just how bad this was for some: to those at the bottom of the agricultural class hierarchy, the 
swelling number of tenant farmers who by the mid-1930s came to account for almost half of 
all white and more than three-quarters of African American farmworkers, the situation 
bordered on the apocalyptic.41 Nor, moreover, were the consequences limited to the 
countryside. The disappearing agricultural income registered in reduced demand for 
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manufactured products – think purchases of tractors and other fruits of the growing fossil fuel 
economy –  and contributed to the declining rate of profit that afflicted industrial 
corporations in the years immediately preceding the great crash.42 
  
THE AGRICULTURAL-INDUSTRIAL price disparity was but one numerical illustration of 
the traumatic demographic shift that had been unfolding for more than a half century. And 
because that shift was tied to the rise of corporate capitalism, that development was what 
institutional economists focused on, often to radical effect. Rexford G. Tugwell, who during 
the New Deal served as Assistant Secretary of Agriculture and acted as one of the senior 
members of Franklin Roosevelt’s “brains trust,” became among the most influential 
institutional economists. And he exemplified the postures of the group’s left-wing.43 The 
yawning gap between agriculture and industry, Tugwell believed, was an expression of a 
larger imbalance between consumption and production: social capacity to produce was high 
but ability to consume was low. In this incongruence the crisis consisted, and on this point 
almost everyone could agree.  
 The question became what came first, high production or low consumption? Herbert 
Hoover, the Chamber of Commerce, and the corporate liberals in that orbit saw the 
intractability of the Great Depression as stemming from a crisis of overproduction – just as 
their predecessors had diagnosed the long downturn of the late nineteenth century. They 
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proposed as a solution suspension of antitrust laws and permissive business cooperation in 
setting prices and production levels as the solution. Tugwell saw it the opposite way. The 
problem was not that cooperation among business had failed. It was that it had succeeded 
famously but without any accountability to the public.44 
 Tugwell spelled out the point a year before Roosevelt’s election, and he began by 
treating nothing less central to capitalism than the profit motive itself. To begin with, 
Tugwell held that the presumption that only self-interested pursuit of profit could motivate 
anyone to do anything, an idea upon which both classical and neo-classical thought had 
rested, was irreconcilable, not only with “even an amateurish contact with modern 
psychology,” but also with the facts of modern economic life. Thanks to “the growing 
average size of our industrial organizations,” Tugwell noted, “fewer persons all the time are 
profit-receivers in any direct sense.” Indeed, “how many railway men, steel workers, or even 
central office employees, have any stake in company earnings? We know that there are 
almost none.” Workers, who constituted the overwhelming share of participants in the 
economy, toiled for wages. Whatever, beyond survival, motivated each of them, it was not 
profit. And the “truth is that if industry could not run without this incentive it would have 
stopped running long ago.” Anticipating an argument that his Columbia colleagues Adolph 
Berle and Gardiner Means would popularize with their publication the next year of The 
Modern Corporation and Private Property, Tugwell added that because of the “growing 
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separation of ownership and control” in modern industry, and because “profits only go to 
owners,” one also had to conclude that managerial “control is effectively separated from its 
assumed motive.” There was plenty of reason to believe, that is, that the modern industrial 
economy could run on a profitless basis.45 
 In fact, the only thing the pursuit of profit did for the economy, Tugwell charged, was 
“produce insecurity.” Thirst for it bred speculation, a tendency “to allocate funds where we 
believe the future price situation will be favorable” rather than where capital would be 
needed. These decisions “have a considerable effect on the distribution of capital among 
various enterprises” but a “little effect in actually inducing or in supporting productive 
enterprises.” The result was irrational unevenness and instability. Used to create 
“overcapacity in every profitable line,” poured into “money market operations in such ways 
as to contribute to inflation,” and, “most absurdly of all,” invested in “securities of other 
industries,” Tugwell concluded that it “would be difficult to devise a mechanism less relevant 
to the social purpose of capital” than the profit motive.46 
 Tugwell’s idea of the social purpose of capital was simple: to bring consumption and 
production into balance. He determined that only national economic planning could achieve 
that goal, and his definition of planning was as bold as they got. “[T]here is no way of 
accomplishing this,” Tugwell proclaimed, “except through control of prices and profit 
margins.” Planning, that is, meant “that profits must be limited and their uses controlled” and 
that “an integrated group of enterprises run for its consumers rather than for its owners.” By 
the “uses of profits,” Tugwell was referring to investment, and his basic view of the 
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“principles of planning” can be summarized like this: regulation of prices with socialization 
of profit and the investment function.47 
 Planning, Tugwell then had to admit, “amounts, practically, to the abolition of 
‘business.’” And he did not take the point lightly. In a planned society, Tugwell cautioned, 
“the few who fare so well as things are now, would be required to give up nearly all the 
exclusive perquisites they have come to consider theirs of right,” and “these should be in 
some sense socialized.” Few “understand that fundamental changes of attitude, new 
disciplines, revised legal structures, unaccustomed limitations on activity, are all necessary if 
we are to plan,” and he felt it incumbent upon himself to unambiguously set forth the stakes. 
But Tugwell also considered the tradeoffs worthwhile, and his eloquent argument for why 
merits quoting at length: 
To take away from business its freedom of venture and of expansion, and to 
limit the profits it may acquire, is to destroy it as business and to make of it 
something else. That something else has no name; we can only wonder what it 
may be like and whether all the fearsome predictions concerning it will come 
true. The traditional incentives, hope of money-making, and fear of money-
loss, will be weakened; and a kind of civil-service loyalty and fervor will need 
to grow gradually into acceptance. New industries will not just happen as the 
automobile industry did; they will have to be foreseen, to be argued for, to 
seem probably desirable features of the whole economy before they can be 
entered upon.  
 
That something else may have had no name, but Tugwell did identify a model from which 
his AEA colleagues might take inspiration: “the institutions of the new Russia of the 
Soviets.” There, in his roseate view, was an example of society moving forward under a 
“profitless regime.” The Soviets no doubt faced “numerous difficulties” and “plenty of 
chances for failure,” he acknowledged, “but the failure of non-commercial motives cannot 
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honestly be said, at this late date, to be one of them.”48 This man was about to become one of 
the president’s closest advisers. 
 Few institutional economists went so far as to advocate for the Soviet model, but 
most agreed with Tugwell’s general diagnosis. A more mainstream thesis, and one that 
gained traction as Depression deepened, was that the economy suffered from a crisis of 
under-consumption. Production and consumption were out of balance because the masses 
were too poor to consume. And like Tugwell, the under-consumption theorists took this back 
to the corporation. Power, they had argued, enabled the corporate elite to keep prices and 
profits high, wages low, and investment and production levels wherever they liked. They 
controlled the market. Thorstein Veblen had first expounded upon this idea in The Theory of 
Business Enterprise published in 1904, and by the early 1930s institutional economists were 
bringing innovative theoretical and statistical methods to bear on the question. Some came to 
see government spending as a mechanism by which purchasing power might be boosted, and 
a prescient institutional literature on deficit spending emerged in these years. From another 
angle, many came to see strong trade unions as a useful vehicle for effecting a redistribution 
of income from profits to wages, and their proposals became the basis for Section 7(a) of the 
NRA and later the Wagner Act, the first federal laws protecting workers’ right to collective 
bargaining. John Maynard Keynes’s 1936 publication of The General Theory provided the 
most sophisticated presentation of the case for increased government intervention in the 
economy to raise purchasing power, but institutional economists had for years pushed for 
public policies of the kind that Keynes’s classic work endorsed, and in some ways even 
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anticipated his key conceptual insights.49 It was Roosevelt and not Keynes who put them on 
center stage. 
 
MY OBJECTIVE in this study is to shed light on the central role this left-wing of 
institutional economists played in the politics of inflation from the 1930s until its fall in the 
1970s. These figures did much to shape the character of “Keynesianism” as it developed in 
the United States and the New Deal order in which it existed. Their analysis started with the 
assumption that corporate power had transformed the world and the belief that those public 
consequences warranted government intervention into business operations. The most 
immediate of the public consequences was the ongoing crisis of under-consumption, and 
through their analysis of that problem the institutional economists wedded a focus on the 
corporation with a macroeconomic interpretation of the Depression as stemming from 
insufficient aggregate demand. In this sense, they blended an older institutional tradition with 
the best of what came to be called Keynesianism. 
 Although few would have identified their approach such, I refer to this New Deal left 
tradition as “Institutional Keynesianism.”50 Two positions in particular defined Institutional 
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Keynesianism. First, again, was the idea that corporations were social institutions, and that 
therefore national economic planning through direct federal intervention in their pricing, 
wage-setting, profit-making, and investing functions was needed to stabilize the industrial 
economy and to ensure an equitable distribution of the income it produced. They proceeded, 
that is, from what Alfred Eichner later called a theory of the micro-foundations of macro-
dynamics.51 The relationship between pricing power and economic stagnation was a key 
insight, and in this way Institutional Keynesians from the outset developed a conceptual 
framework that accounted for those phenomena that more orthodox thinkers saw as 
paradoxical: stagflation chief among them. Indeed, they believed that without rigorous 
planning such an outcome was likely, if not inevitable. 
 The second important feature of Institutional Keynesianism was its adherents’ 
commitment to popular struggle for democratic reform from below. The planning wing of the 
New Deal was not composed of “high modern” technocrats dismissive of ordinary peoples’ 
voices. Rather, it contained some of the strongest supporters of workers’ struggles to 
organize, from the fledgling industrial unions to the most marginalized agricultural laborers 
in the South.52 Several of them joined the staff of the industrial unions after the CIO made its 
breakthrough in 1937. Planning, the Institutional Keynesians understood, would not just 
happen. It challenged the most deeply held values of the most powerful people in the world, 
and figures from Rexford Tugwell on down knew full well that only a mass movement could 
create the conditions under which senior policymaking officials would consider moving in 
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that direction. They therefore came to see as their overriding priority the task of building a 
popular farmer-labor alliance, like the Farmer-Labor Party in Minnesota and the rural-urban 
working-class coalition which would soon build a social democracy in Sweden. Bringing 
production and consumption into balance, in other words, was not possible without solidarity 
between working people in the city and the countryside during what was sure to be an epic 
class struggle. Recalling the challenges that Institutional Keynesians faced on this front can 
be useful for thinking through the great rural-urban political divide that prevailed by the end 
of the twentieth century.53 
  The Institutional Keynesians, of course, did not succeed in making a durable social 
democracy in the United States. And it is true that their influence peaked during the 
Roosevelt years. But they did not simply disappear after that. The founders of Institutional 
Keynesianism, who came together around Tugwell in the New Deal USDA, and especially 
the younger generation of activist-intellectuals they trained, continued on as the left wing of 
the New Deal order in the decades to come. They lost many more battles than they won, but 
like their predecessors in the first third of the twentieth century they made themselves heard 
and functioned as a counter-weight to the more conservative “commercial Keynesians” that 
scholars have seen as hegemonic in the postwar period. Yet it is the case that when the next 
crisis arrived in the 1970s they could not prevail. The short answer to why is that the 
corporate class they challenged was too powerful. The long answer, following the evolution 
of this and competing national policy discourses, is the subject of this dissertation. 
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 Chapter 1 uncovers the origins of Institutional Keynesianism in the New Deal 
Department of Agriculture. Through the 1930s, the USDA was the epicenter of the New Deal 
left. Rexford Tugwell was the central figure here, but even after he left government in 1937 
his legacy persisted. The chapter focuses in particular on the Consumer Counsel Division of 
the Agricultural Adjustment Administration (AAA), which became home to a cadre of 
activist-intellectuals who elaborated and popularized the first articulation of Institutional 
Keynesianism. Chapter 2 moves into World War II and the immediate postwar period, and 
examines what I see as the three major defeats suffered by the Institutional Keynesians 
during these years. The defeats map on to what Karl Polanyi called in his famous 1944 book, 
The Great Transformation, the fictitious commodities of labor, land, and money: the 
termination of the wartime Office of Price Adminsitration (OPA), the failure of the full 
employment act, and the privatization of collective bargaining; the demise of the Brannan 
Plan to overhaul agricultural policy; and the 1951 Federal Reserve-Treasury Accord, which 
re-established an independent central bank. These were defeats from which Institutional 
Keynesianism would never recover. 
 But they were not a death knell. Chapter 3 explores the ways Institutional Keynesians 
functioned during the chilly 1950s, when red-baiting and a Republican presidential 
administration put their larger ambitions on hold. In particular, I assess the politics 
surrounding the strange recession of 1957-58, during which inflation and unemployment rose 
in tandem and which in this sense served as a prelude to stagflation. The steel industry 
became the site of the most intense struggle, and I analyze the political effects of a late-1950s 
and early-1960s investigation into industrial pricing power conducted by Tennessee Senator 
Estes Kefauver and his Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly. The Kefauver Committee 
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sought to demonstrate how corporate profits were to blame for inflation, and the politics 
surrounding the probe pushed industrial leaders to search for a new pricing strategy. 
 If it seemed like the Institutional Keynesians were on the cusp of a resurgence, 
however, the cause for optimism was fleeting. Chapter 4 shows how the Kennedy 
administration brought with it a different style of liberalism that displaced the Institutional 
Keynesians during the 1960s. Specifically, they replaced the earlier concern with profits with 
an emphasis on productivity. Productivity, in their view, could cut through all the distributive 
challenges presented by the politics of inflation. But as we have seen, productivity was on the 
cusp of slowing. Chapter 5 treats Richard Nixon’s ill-fated attempts to reconcile the 
contradictions that began to swirl just as he took office. Nixon was a conservative, but he was 
also made by New Deal world, and his approach to the politics of inflation testified to that 
tension. He became the first president to introduce “peacetime” wage and price controls – 
though people in Southeast Asia may have disputed that description – but this was no OPA. 
The Nixon controls program was built upon the logic that came out of the Kennedy 
administration, and it failed for the same reason. The economy was not what it had been 
during the special century.
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Chapter One: Cultivating Institutional Keynesianism in the New Deal Department of 
Agriculture 
 
TIMES WERE UNCERTAIN in 1937. In the middle of that year, Chicago police opened fire 
on a group of striking workers at the Republic Steel plant on the city’s south side. Ten 
unarmed civilians died with dozens more injured, and the workers, whose action was inspired 
by the breakthrough CIO victories at General Motors and U.S. Steel earlier that year, 
returned to their jobs soon thereafter, still without a union. In mid-1937, every economic 
indicator that had shown improvement since early in the New Deal reversed course. The 
Roosevelt administration had balanced the budget the year before, and the consequence was 
yet another bout of brutal recession. In mid-1937, Japanese troops launched a major invasion 
of China, and the next year Hitler annexed Austria. Fascism was on the march, and global 
war was around the corner. And in mid-1937, Rexford G. Tugwell was hopeful about the 
prospects for social democracy in the United States. 
 If scholars have seen 1937 as the year when New Deal reform ended, that is, Tugwell 
did not know it.1 This is not to say that he thought that capitalism in the United States was 
destined to be eclipsed. The boundary of the politically possible, Tugwell understood, would 
only be as far out as social struggle pushed it. And he had an idea about where that social 
struggle might come from: a “farmer-labor alliance.” None of this, of course, would happen 
overnight. Political openings like that which appeared in 1932 were not in sight – they would 
arrive “possibly beyond the next war, probably beyond the next depression, certainly beyond 
the next election.” But whenever the opportunity came, it would be up to popular forces to 
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take advantage. Only if “there were enough thunder on the left to drown out the publishers on 
the right,” Tugwell emphasized, would working-people finally “be able to push the 
Democrats around,” especially those reactionary ones from the South.2 That the New Deal 
had not resolved the contradictions besetting the U.S. political economy Tugwell knew full 
well, but he did not expect it to. The purpose of the great social reforms of the Roosevelt 
presidency, in Tugwell’s mind at least, was to establish a plane upon which future social 
movement organizing could develop. And he was not just pontificating. Tugwell had played 
a central role in pushing the New Deal in that direction. 
 In 1933, Tugwell became Assistant Secretary of Agriculture, and through Roosevelt’s 
first term and into the second he stood as a leading figure of the famous “Brains Trust” and 
he embodied the New Deal left. This chapter explores the origins of “Institutional 
Keynesianism” in the Tugwell-wing of the 1930s U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), 
and it does so in two ways. First, it highlights the existence and influence of a left in the 
USDA, especially in the Legal Division and the Consumers’ Counsel of the Agricultural 
Adjustment Administration (AAA). Most histories of the AAA see the famous 1935 “purge” 
of the radicals, when Secretary of Agriculture Henry Wallace summarily fired AAA general 
counsel Jerome Frank and others, as a turning point in U.S. agricultural policymaking. This 
chapter seeks to complicate that narrative by demonstrating the persistence of a left current in 
this capacious administrative body. Second, it traces how this USDA left – which had been 
reared in the institutional tradition – reacted to the policy-intellectual consequences of the 
1936 publication of John Maynard Keynes’s General Theory. This chapter attempts to show 
																																																						
2 R.G. Tugwell, “Is a Farmer-Labor Alliance Possible?” Harper’s Magazine (May 1937). 
 37 
that what has been called institutionalism and Keynesianism should not be understood as 
opposed to one another, but rather as complementary. 
 The chapter begins by assessing the competing perspectives in the New Deal USDA, 
and clarifying what was distinctive and indeed radical about the institutionalists on the left. 
In short, a fault line emerged between those committed to the over-production and under-
consumption theses. Under-consumption theorists in the Legal Division and the Consumers’ 
Counsel understood that the agricultural crisis extended beyond the farm, and they sought to 
use their positions in government to facilitate organizing that could lead to the kind of 
farmer-labor alliance that Tugwell had imagined. Struggles over two commodities in 
particular consumed much of their attention: cotton and milk. And in grappling with them, 
these New Deal leftists were forced to confront a number of challenges that would nag 
progressives in the decades to come: race, especially in the South; household work performed 
by women who managed family budgets and interfaced with the market as consumers; the 
conditions of industrial labor and the income it generated; and, ultimately, the question of 
ownership of socially necessary industries and, by extension, the investment function.  
    The chapter then examines the opportunities afforded by changing economic 
conditions in the years just before U.S. entry into World War II and the Keynesian 
ascendance. Institutional Keynesianism was born in this milieu. For the first few years of its 
publication, which began in 1933, the tagline of The Consumers’ Guide – prepared by the 
AAA Consumers’ Counsel – was “the purpose of production is consumption.” By 1939, it 
was instead promoting “maximum production” and “full employment,” one of the earlier 
usages of that term. This was not, however, simply a turn from the micro to the macro. To 
make that point, the chapter chronicles the development of the Food Stamp Plan, 
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implemented by the USDA between 1939 and 1943. On its face, the program could seem to 
exemplify all that would become “commercial Keynesianism” – the idea was to subsidize 
spending by low income groups in private grocery stores.3 But as we will see, those behind 
the program saw this as just a first step. Their intended to use the program as an opportunity 
to do political education and thereby to build popular support for a distinctly Institutional 
Keynesian national agricultural policy. 
*** 
 
UNDERSTANDING THE HISTORY of the radical promise of the New Deal requires first 
understanding just how much was stacked against it. Individuals, ideas, and institutions were 
all arrayed in opposition.4 Plastic as both the AAA and the NRA were designed to be, these 
twin pillars of the early New Deal were built upon a shared assumption about the character of 
the Great Depression, one towards which the Institutional Keynesians would grow more and 
more opposed as the Roosevelt years progressed.5 In a word, it was overproduction. 
Unbridled competition resulted in cutthroat races for profit; cutthroat races for profit resulted 
in over-investment in some lines and price slashing in others; and over-investment and price 
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slashing were rather circularly taken to imply the existence of too much supply for the level 
of demand, which resulted in declining profitability and economic crisis. The solution, then, 
was to limit competition and allow businesses, whether industrial or agricultural, to regulate 
supply so as to generate stable returns. Corporate capital was not the problem. The antitrust 
laws were. 
 From the Institutional Keynesian perspective, the overproduction reasoning seemed 
not only unsound but also mean-spirited. National Farmers’ Union leader John Simpson’s 
remark that the only things in overproduction during the Depression years were “empty 
stomachs and bare backs” got to why.6 The real pathology, these critics argued, was not 
overproduction but its inverse: under-consumption. Limiting production would do nothing to 
address the growing industrial and agricultural price divergence, but it would intensify the 
already catastrophic rate of joblessness that was sapping demand. A better way forward was 
to increase production while controlling prices and profits. That is, to plan. This under-
consumption thesis would serve as the intellectual foundation of a formidable working-class 
consumer movement, one allied with trade unionists and Institutional Keynesians in 
government, that emerged during the 1930s. Still, it must be noted that the gap separating 
proponents of the overproduction and under-consumption theses was not static. It grew and 
became more pronounced over the course of the Depression, but only with the help of 
hindsight can one discern the earlier genesis of two discrete ideological formations which, as 
it would happen, informed two distinct perspectives on reform. In the 1920s, one could 
plausibly have one foot in each camp, supporting associationalism in one context and 
																																																						
6 Quoted in David Eugene Conrad, Forgotten Farmers: The Story of Sharecroppers in the New Deal (Urbana: 
University of Illinois Press, 1965), 28. 
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planning in another. Only the struggles of the 1930s would sharpen the contradictions 
between them.7 
 Moreover, different people and organizations had different ideas about how to put 
these competing analyses into action. Inside the USDA, one of the most influential 
viewpoints came from what was referred to as the Farm Bloc. Its leading force was the 
American Farm Bureau Federation (AFBF), a national body representing the largest 
agricultural interests that was organized along state lines, with branches reaching down to the 
county level. By the 1930s, the AFBF had developed close institutional and personnel 
linkages with the leaderships of state land-grant colleges as well as the vast Extension 
Service maintained by the USDA, so much so that the boundaries separating the three were 
often indistinguishable. This was the agrarian establishment.8 
 Among the Farm Bloc’s chief legislative goals in the 1920s, one that in spite of two 
vetoes by Calvin Coolidge continued to shape their agenda into the Roosevelt era, was the 
McNary-Haugen bill. The proposal was first advanced by George Peek, head of the Moline 
Plow Company who would in 1933 take his sympathies for agricultural processors and 
implement manufacturers to Washington as the first Director of the AAA.9 It began with the 
idea that the U.S. agricultural woes began abroad. There was indeed too much supply in the 
country, Peek held, but that was because the domestic market enjoyed no protection from 
foreign dumping. Something like a tariff on agricultural goods, like the one on industrial 
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wares, would limit supply and help to realign the agricultural-industrial price disparity 
without necessitating statist controls. The bill itself would have identified a reasonable price 
level and established a government corporation to purchase whatever surplus agricultural 
production could not be sold at that rate and then to unload it on the world market. Whatever 
loss the government incurred would be recoverable through an “equalization fee” on 
beneficiaries of the program. For commercial agriculturalists wary of state coercion but in 
need of relief, the McNary-Haugen bill seemed an ideal stopgap measure.10 
 A competing proposal came from what the rural sociologist Jess Gilbert has called the 
“agrarian intellectuals” in the USDA. Led by figures trained early twentieth century 
Midwestern land-grant colleges – like Henry A. Wallace, M.L. Wilson, and Howard Tolley – 
their vision for agriculture evinced the two dimensions of their Progressive educations: 
ecological conservation and economic exactitude. The real source of the intractable 
agricultural deflation, the agrarian intellectuals held, was the irrational and anarchic way land 
was put to use in the U.S. They called, in turn, for a kind of planning, but not the kind 
Tugwell had envisioned. Agricultural distress in their view stemmed less from power 
imbalances between classes than from ignorance among all. Education, then, was the answer, 
and the agrarian intellectuals saw research into both the optimal uses of land and advanced 
statistics as central to that project. Armed with reliable information, farmers, with help from 
the government, could cooperate to rationalize the nation’s agricultural system. The agrarian 
intellectuals were sincere in their democratic principles, as Gilbert makes clear in his 
important study of their efforts in the late 1930s and early 1940s, but, in the face of the 
																																																						
10 See David E. Hamilton, From New Day to New Deal: American Farm Policy from Hoover to Roosevelt 
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Parity (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1954). 
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growing class antagonisms in the U.S. countryside (and especially in the South), the 
voluntarism animating their politics should have seemed hopelessly naïve. That Henry I. 
Harriman was an enthusiastic supporter might have indicated something.11 
 The agrarian intellectuals’ main policy legacy was the “domestic allotment plan,” 
through which agricultural producers would limit production in exchange for a subsidy from 
the federal government, to be financed through a tax on corporate processors of food and 
fiber.12 And although the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 left room for both this and the 
McNary-Haugen idea, and in spite of George Peek’s appointment as AAA head, 
operationally New Deal agricultural policy was the domestic allotment plan in action. Still, 
the AAA could not run without support from Peek and his commercial agriculturalist allies, 
and this wing – who thought more like big businessmen than farmers – would be well 
represented in the Administration’s various commodity divisions. On whether production 
cuts, which would increase the price of food, made any sense when so many had so little, and 
on whether the program might intensify the hardship already endured by the poorest 
agricultural workers, the agrarian intellectuals, in contrast to George Peek, were not 
dismissive of the planners’ concerns. These were real risks, and it might be necessary for 
administrators to adopt mitigating measures as issues arose. But the emergency was acute, 
and the domestic allotment plan could immediately get at its root and begin to lift prices. 
That argument, the need for some action to meet the emergency, was enough to convince 
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enough planners in the USDA to go along with it – not that they had much choice in the 
matter.  
 Important among them was Mordecai Ezekiel, an author of the farm bill and also a 
clear example of the relationship between professionalizing agricultural economists, state 
capacity, and the nascent Institutional Keynesianism. Born outside Washington D.C. in 1899, 
Ezekiel at nineteen completed a Bachelor’s degree in agriculture at the Maryland 
Agricultural College, a land-grant institution, and began a career in the federal government, 
first with the Census Bureau and then as an economist in the USDA Division of Farm 
Management. During those years he took courses at the USDA Graduate School and the 
Brookings Graduate School in Economics and Government, earning a doctorate from the 
latter institution in 1926. The USDA program had a strong statistical focus, and when Ezekiel 
published his first book in 1930, Methods of Correlation Analysis, he established himself as 
one of the world’s leading statisticians. He was also quite the economist, utilizing both 
quantitative and institutional methods. Price making was, no surprise, a principal interest, and 
Ezekiel brought a rigorous approach to data together with a Veblenian analytic in studying 
the issue, something that he passed to many students as an instructor in the USDA Graduate 
School. But he was also concerned with the issue of economic growth, or, more precisely, its 
inverse – stagnation. He spent most of the 1920s in the Bureau of Agricultural Economics 
(BAE), where by 1933 Ezekiel was anticipating Keynes’s insights, calling for deficit 
spending on a robust public works agenda, an argument he expanded upon in his two books 
published during the New Deal. Appointed Economic Adviser to the Secretary of Agriculture 
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that year, he would be a leading Institutional Keynesian in the Department throughout the 
New Deal.13 
 The planners in the BAE, including Ezekiel’s close associate, Louis Bean, would also 
play an important role in the coming struggle over social reform. As Ellis Hawley has 
observed, the staff of the BAE, the most robust social scientific research center in the federal 
government, “became engaged not only in using their skills to provide informational services 
but also in developing their discipline and expanding the frontiers of knowledge.”14 The 
historian of economic thought Malcolm Rutherford has seconded this assessment and 
contended that the researchers with the BAE, as well as those who taught at the USDA 
Graduate School (to no surprise there was tremendous overlap), with their particular style of 
quantitatively informed institutionalism, deserve to be placed at the center of the story of the 
American economics profession in the twentieth century.15 And one of their most important 
contributions, again, was to highlight how the relationship between agriculture and industry 
affected production, prices, profits, and purchasing power in general. Louis Bean was 
exemplary in this regard. His work on the dynamics between the steel industry and 
agriculture, which he continued into the Truman administration, would serve as fodder for 
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industrial unions’ public relations campaigns and bargaining efforts during the war and 
after.16 
 Not all Institutional Keynesians in the USDA were men. Around the same time Henry 
C. Wallace established the BAE, he created a Bureau of Home Economics (BHE) to help 
households navigate the welter of new consumer goods they confronted in the marketplace. 
The field of home economics paralleled agricultural economics: it emerged through the 
USDA, both in Washington and in local communities through the Agricultural Extension 
service; it gained a foothold among progressive intellectuals in the universities and in many 
places became established as its own department; and its practitioners were mainly concerned 
with the relationship between agriculture and the rest of the economy. From 1923 until 1943, 
the BHE was led by Louise Stanley, a 1911 Yale PhD in biochemistry and a member of the 
Department of Home Economics faculty at the University of Missouri. At the BHE, she hired 
more female professionals than any other federal agency, and as the historian Carolyn 
Goldstein has shown, their “approach to the home would prove to be wide ranging, covering 
issues of production, distribution, and consumption of foods, clothing, and household 
equipment.”17 During the New Deal, activist-intellectuals in the BHE used their positions as 
spokespersons for “housewives” as an opportunity to articulate under-consumptionist and 
planning arguments that aligned with those coming from the BAE. The mere presence of 
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women, however, would not change the fact that virtually all New Dealers thought about 
production and consumption in terms of the family-wage. And the women in the BHE were 
not exactly a representative sample. Still, if by the end of the twentieth century just about 
everyone had come to see home economics as an artifact of a bygone era, in the 1930s the 
profession played a progressive function even though it should not be remembered as a 
feminist one. 
 A figure who did little to account for gender but much to shape the character of 
Institutional Keynesianism was Gardiner Means, who joined Ezekiel in the Office of the 
Economic Advisor to the Secretary of Agriculture. Means would become among the most 
important figures in the Institutional Keynesian tradition for his articulation, in an internal 
report later published by the Senate, of a simple principle long recognized by many 
institutional economists, as well as almost every consumer: the theory of administered prices. 
Whereas economic orthodoxy held that prices were constantly “made in the market as the 
result of the interaction of buyers and sellers,” Means began that famous paper, administered 
prices were “rigid, at least for a period of time, and sales (and usually production) fluctuate 
with the demand at the rigid price.”18 The implied peril was grave – in the face of low 
demand, administered prices may remain stable or even rise while production fell. These 
were conditions that could result in simultaneous stagnation and price inflation.19 And he 
showed how industries with high levels of concentration had behaved just that way during 
the depths of the Depression. But the practice, Means admitted, was not necessarily 
pernicious. It stemmed from the “shift from market to administrative coordination of 
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Sess. (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1935), 1. 
19 Ibid, Industrial Prices, 8. 
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economic activity,” one that “made possible tremendous increases in the efficiency of 
industrial production” but which also “by its nature destroyed the free market and disrupted 
the operations of the law of supply and demand in a great many industries and for the 
economy as a whole.”20 As a result, Means observed, “a major part of American economic 
activity” occurred not in response to the market, but at the will of those “great administrative 
units – our great corporations.”21 
 This was all familiar enough to those on the USDA left. But context mattered more 
than content in making Means’s 38-page paper, the glamorously titled Industrial Prices and 
their Relative Inflexibility, a success – although the pithy formulation he introduced in it 
surely did not hurt. Though he had published drafts of the study as early as 1933, the Senate 
edition was released only in 1935, just as the Supreme Court struck down the NRA and 
appeared poised to do the same to the AAA. With the centerpieces of the New Deal tottering 
and the Depression grinding into its fifth year, popular sentiment towards big business hit a 
nadir, a turn to which Berle and Means’s own book, The Modern Corporation, had 
contributed at least in part. The so-called “Roosevelt Recession,” which began in 1937 and 
had by 1938 erased most of the gains achieved by the early New Deal, only added to the 
widespread frustration. To address this growing concern, Roosevelt established the 
Temporary National Economic Committee, a body that for the next three years would study 
and issue reports on corporate power in a number of industries, becoming the most extensive 
federal inquiry on that question to date. Scholars have with some cause characterized the 
TNEC as a last gasp of the New Deal anti-trust impulse – certain old-school populists were 
behind its creation, like Wyoming Senator Joseph O’Mahoney, and its investigations 
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dovetailed nicely with Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust Thurmond Arnold’s 
crusading efforts around the same time.22 But the principal inspiration for the TNEC was 
Means’s administered price thesis, and, as he had stressed all along, “[a]dministered pricing 
should not be confused with monopoly.” “Few realize the extent to which it would be 
necessary to pulverize industry,” he observed, nor appreciate “the loss of efficiency which it 
would entail,” to break up the great corporations.23 To Means, the answer laid, as it did for 
Tugwell, in planning. He would spend the rest of the decade at another center of the New 
Deal planning impulse, the National Resources Committee, which became the NRPB, to do 
just that.24 
 
*** 
 
INSTITUTIONAL KEYNESIANS in the New Deal Department of Agriculture did not just 
write about the need for planning. They also sought to educate ordinary people about their 
findings, and at times even to organize around them. Indeed, efforts by USDA officials to 
facilitate self-activity among rank-and-file workers and consumers – and to draw on their 
collective power – established a template for what Meg Jacobs has in reference to the 
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wartime Office of Price Administration (OPA) called “state building from the bottom up.”25 
Together with the tremendous authority granted the Department from above – which among 
other things provided the capacity for the first time since Reconstruction to reach deep into 
the South – this “democracy in action,” to borrow M.L. Wilson’s term, threatened to 
destabilize all manner of hierarchies. And by serving to unite such a broad coalition of 
groups around a common social vision – those ranging from the pedigreed, urban 
professionals of the New Deal left to the white industrial working-class to the most 
marginalized sharecroppers in the cotton South – it might have done more than destabilize. 
Paranoid as it could appear, then, the business conservatives and southern reactionaries who 
responded with a foretaste of the red-baiting that was to come after World War II did have 
reason to feel under fire.26 
 The events leading to Henry Wallace’s infamous purge of AAA reformers in 1935 
offered a concrete example of why. The dispute was rooted in the tension at the heart of the 
agricultural program – overproduction versus under-consumption – yet, in touching on the 
most complex issues of class, race, and section, it stood for much more than that. For while 
the crop reduction schemes could affect all working-class consumers by increasing the price 
of food, they had truly cruel consequences in store for some. Bearing the greatest share of 
that cruelty were landless agricultural workers in the South, the majority of farmers in the 
region. As had so many of their ancestors, most of them toiled in fields of cotton. 
  The stage was set early on, in the weeks after passage of the Agricultural Adjustment 
Act, when the Director of the AAA Cotton Section, Cully B. Cobb, began to implement the 
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1933 cotton contract. Given the preponderance of tenant labor in the cotton economy, the 
agreement set the pattern by which the AAA would relate to this downtrodden class of 
workers, one that accounted the majority of agricultural workers in the country and the 
overwhelming share of rural African Americans.27 That pattern was one of heinous neglect. 
Payments were made directly to landowners, and though the planters were charged with 
distributing a portion of the sum to their workforces according to a predetermined rate 
schedule – one based on tenancy classification, with sharecroppers receiving the least and 
cash-tenants the most – federal oversight, at least initially, was far from rigorous. The first 
line of defense for aggrieved tenants were the county production control agencies, bodies 
under the firm grip of the AFBF and the local planter aristocracy, so little of the money 
trickled down.  
 Nor did the landed elite stop there. As expected, the AAA’s acreage reduction 
program cut their demand for labor – they needed fewer workers to harvest fewer crops. 
Fewer workers meant fewer tenants, and by the end of 1933 landowners were evicting 
southern farmworkers in droves. Winter was the worst time for tenant farmers to be “run 
off,” as that was when they had only whatever resources remained from the previous crop, a 
rapidly dwindling amount, and during those months they could not count on access to credit 
from the big landowners, who withheld liens until the spring planting season began. Efforts 
by the AAA Legal Division to insert stronger tenants’ rights language into the 1934-35 
contract went down in the face of intransigent opposition from Cobb and his lieutenant, 
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Finance Director Oscar Johnston, both allies of the southern planter class. It is thus no stretch 
to conclude that at least one consequence of early New Deal agricultural policy was to turn 
the crushing poverty already endured by these “American peasants” into a full blown 
humanitarian crisis.28 
 But Southern farmworkers did not just roll over. In short order, the Department of 
Agriculture and the White House became flooded with complaints from those stung by the 
debilitating effects of the new program. Robert Allen charged that “Mr. James Robb [the 
landlord]…has never give we the agricultural workers…not one dime of our Rightful Part,” 
while tenant organizer J.R. Butler demanded that the federal government “stop such ‘rackets’ 
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and give the man who tills the soil a break.” Conniving as they were, Butler continued, these 
“planters are not such big devils that you need to be afraid to crack down on them.”29 But 
those southern devils were big enough, and many tenants understood that, against such an 
opposition, letters not backed up by organization were worth little more than the scrap on 
which they were written. So they organized, spearheading one of the most courageous, if also 
tragic, struggles to unfold during those turbulent years. As field organizer Martha Johnson 
described the tenants’ activity to Socialist Party leader Norman Thomas in late 1933, in the 
land of King Cotton “you will find the true proletariat…moving irresistibly toward revolution 
and no less.”30 
 That movement first erupted in northeastern Arkansas, an area that was relatively new 
to cotton farming. The soil there, by then some of the most fertile for harvesting the white 
gold, had until a few decades earlier laid beneath virgin forest, one that large lumber interests 
only got to in the first quarter of the twentieth century. On what remained they established a 
few industrial scale plantations that employed a workforce of white and African American 
tenant laborers, many of whom had once earned their keep as wage workers cutting and 
hauling timber for those same companies. The place was a study in just how compatible 
capitalist society could be with persistent forms of unfree labor – as a New York Times 
correspondent noted, “Here Ole’ Master has assumed a corporate aspect.”31 Led by H.L. 
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Mitchell and Clay East, Socialist Party activists from Tyronza, Arkansas, and with the help 
of Martha Johnson, the daring exhibited by this “true proletariat” quickly captured the 
imagination of luminaries on the left, like Thomas, who after visiting the region in early 1934 
wrote to Wallace that “never in America have I seen more hopeless poverty,” and warned the 
Secretary that unless his Department took swift action there would be blood.32 At the urging 
of the country’s most recognizable Socialist, Mitchell, East, and others then began the 
arduous task of consolidating what they had built into the Southern Tenant Farmers’ Union 
(STFU). As a founding principle, the STFU was committed to interracial organization, and it 
therefore marked a challenge not only to the authority of the planter class in the fields but 
also to the white supremacist order upon which that authority rested.33 The landed elite 
responded with the kind of viciousness that had been their trademark at least since the 
interracial Populist insurgency of the late-nineteenth century last seriously contested their 
power. In this case, their preferred weapon was the violent eviction, and throughout 1934 
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union activists were thrown out of the makeshift huts that passed for homes and terrorized 
out of town. By early 1935 several of them had been forced into hiding, only granting 
interviews to journalists who swore not to reveal their whereabouts.34  
 If Norman Thomas’s plea to Wallace went unheeded, however, the Secretary’s 
inaction should not be taken as an indictment of the entire USDA. A cohort of left-leaning 
attorneys in the AAA Legal Division and activists in the Office of the Consumers’ Counsel, 
in particular, recognized the stakes involved in the STFU fight, and sought to use it as an 
opportunity to challenge the retrograde social relations that undergirded Jim Crow 
Democracy, their intra-party nemesis whose legislative clout stood as one of the chief 
obstacles in the way of a genuine planning.35 Most were Ivy League educated, several 
maintained close ties to the Communist Party, a few would have prominent careers in the 
CIO, and a few more – future Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust Thurmond Arnold, 
Supreme Court Justice Abe Fortas, and U.S. Senator Adlai Stevenson – were bound for even 
greater acclaim.36 In short, this was an able and committed group of progressives, but it was 
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also one that lacked familiarity with the peculiarly racialized character of southern society, 
much less respect for it. They were “Boys with their hair ablaze,” as George Peek had 
famously – and, in terms of gender, somewhat inaccurately – lampooned, who “floated airily 
into offices, took desks, asked for papers and found no end of things to be busy about.” They 
seemed intent on transforming the Department of Agriculture, Peek often complained, into 
the “Department of Everything.”37 
 On this account, at least, they were guilty as charged. And, much to the chagrin of the 
top brass of the Cotton Section, taking on southern race relations was one of the things that 
kept them busy. In early 1935, after the Arkansas Supreme Court sustained the evictions of 
several of the founding members of the STFU, Gardner Jackson of the AAA Consumers’ 
Counsel arranged a meeting between union leaders and Secretary Wallace, who immediately 
thereafter ordered an investigation into their charges. Mary Conner Myers – an AAA attorney 
who earlier, as a Treasury Department official, had gained some renown for her work in 
prosecuting Al Capone – was chosen to conduct it. Myers’s reputation, in fact, was as one of 
the more conservative lawyers in the Division, but what she witnessed apparently dissolved 
any ideological predispositions.38 After collecting hundreds of affidavits from tenant farmers 
who had only seen their conditions worsen in the year and a half since the AAA went into 
effect, Myers prepared a blistering report for Chester Davis, Peek’s successor as AAA head, 
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and Jerome Frank, the General Counsel. It never saw the light of day. Deeming it too critical 
and explosive, especially as legal challenges to the entire New Deal made their way through 
the courts, Davis killed it.39 The Myers Report must have been blistering indeed, because a 
study completed by Duke University economist Calvin B. Hoover, which the AAA did 
release a few months later, was not exactly flattering. Concluding that cotton planters were 
only brought to sign contracts “by an inducement obtained at the expense of the share-tenant 
and share-cropper,” Hoover exhorted the Administration to change course and to “spare no 
effort in preventing the unequal distribution of the advantages of the acreage reduction, and 
particularly to prevent the operation of that program from making the situation of any class 
of producers worse.”40 The obvious implication being that it already had markedly worsened 
the situation of at least one class of producers. 
 The tipping point occurred a few weeks later, during a confrontation over Section 7 of 
the 1934-35 cotton contract – they were lawyers, after all. In spite of its stated purpose of 
guaranteeing tenants’ rights, the paragraph in question had been drafted in intentionally 
vague terms so as to provide clear channels through which landlords could evade its spirit. 
The Section stipulated that the landlord “shall, insofar as possible, maintain on this farm the 
normal number of tenants and other employees” and that “[he] shall permit all tenants to 
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continue occupancy of their houses on this farm, rent free, for the years of 1934 and 1935, 
respectively (unless any tenant shall so conduct himself as to become a nuisance or a menace 
to the welfare of the producer).” What constituted a “nuisance” or a “menace” was, of course, 
in the eye of the beholder, and to many cotton planters tenant organizing qualified as such. 
Landowners therefore claimed to interpret Section 7 as a requirement that they retain the 
same number of tenants while denying that it compelled them to keep the exact same ones. 
On those grounds, they planned to hang on to their most docile workers, and to replace any 
troublemakers with those willing to accept their divinely ordained place at the bottom.41 
 In February, with Chester Davis away from Washington, senior AAA attorney Alger 
Hiss, along with his associate, Francis Shea, drafted and gained Jerome Frank’s authorization 
for a new interpretation of Section 7, one that made explicit the requirement that cotton 
planters keep the same individuals and not just the same number of tenants. This was as clear 
a case of federal intervention on behalf of workers’ right to organize as any in the 1930s. But 
upon his return Chester Davis responded in kind. Warning that the cotton contract, and the 
AAA as a whole, had been imperiled by Frank and Hiss’s act of insubordination, the AAA 
Director demanded that Wallace cut loose all the activists responsible for the Section 7 
revision. And, in what he readily admitted was the lowest point of his public career, the 
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Secretary acceded. On February 6, 1935, in a beleaguered appearance before the press, 
Wallace announced that Jerome Frank, Lee Pressman, Victor Rotnem, and Francis Shea 
would be relieved of their duties in the Legal Division.42 As the rather random assortment of 
individuals selected for the “purge” indicated, however – Hiss, for instance, who bore as 
much responsibility for the Section 7 action than anyone, was not among those fired – it 
seemed clear that Davis and Wallace were reacting against something larger than the 
lawyers’ quixotic ploy on behalf of southern tenant farmers. In Rexford Tugwell’s mind, at 
least, it was all “part of Davis’ studied plan to rid the Department of all liberals and to give 
the reactionary farm leaders full control of policy.” This, Tugwell continued, really meant 
“full satisfaction to all the processors with whom we have dealings since most of the farm 
leaders are owned body and soul by the processors.”43  
 
*** 
  
IF THE RACIALLY charged drama developing on southern cotton fields provided a fitting 
backdrop, the fault line separating the two camps in the USDA was over nothing less than the 
soul of the AAA – as Raymond Gram Swing worried in The Nation, the purge seemed to 
mark “the defeat of the social outlook in agriculture.”44 The struggle over that social outlook 
had played out from the beginning. A little over a year earlier, in December 1933, President 
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Roosevelt opted to let George Peek go from his post as AAA Director after the latter issued 
an ultimatum demanding autonomy from Secretary Wallace and calling for Jerome Frank and 
his cadre of radicals to be removed.45 Among those Peek had in mind was Lee Pressman – 
later the CIO General Counsel and, unbeknownst to Peek at the time, a Communist Party 
member – who would become a victim of the 1935 purge in spite of having had little to do 
with the cotton dispute.46 For the first six months of the AAA’s existence Pressman oversaw 
the drafting of marketing agreements with large processors, and during that time he had 
repeatedly feuded with Peek over the character and scope of those contracts. The issue 
which, as Pressman saw it, “led to the most bitter disputes within the AAA,” was whether or 
not the government had the authority and the right to access corporate processors’ account 
books and records so as to ensure that, as middlemen, they did not accumulate excessive 
profits at the expense of consumers. Such transparency, Pressman argued, was a most 
reasonable concession in exchange for the immunity from antitrust prosecution those firms 
enjoyed, and he went on to insist that this issue more than any other would determine 
whether the AAA would actually seek “to regulate, or whether the government would merely 
be a cat’s paw for the processors.”47  
 Managers of big processors felt otherwise. Internal financial data – on capital outlays, 
costs, profits – must, for long-term competitive purposes, remain confidential, they held, and 
in any event the government had no constitutional right to encroach on this most dearly held 
prerogative. The sanctity of private property itself was at stake. George Peek, a representative 
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of those big farm leaders Tugwell had accused of being “owned body and soul by the 
processors,” tended to agree. He would act, as he put it in his first of only two public 
statements as head of the AAA, “with as little interference with established institutions and 
methods – indeed with as little administration of any kind as is consistent with the fixed 
purpose of the law; namely, to raise farm prices.”48 This tension, then, between pure and 
simple farm stabilization and a broader social outlook, underlay the bureaucratic civil war in 
the New Deal Department of Agriculture. These were the politics of overproduction and 
under-consumption. 
 A look at the other casualties of the purge – Consumers’ Counsel Frederic C. Howe 
and his assistant Gardner Jackson – underscores the point. Though he would later regret it as 
among the worst decisions he made as AAA Director, Peek had established the Consumers’ 
Counsel in June 1933 at the behest of Wallace, who was himself urged on by Mordecai 
Ezekiel and Tugwell. Given that the AAA provided “for adequate representation of the 
producer and the distributor and processor,” Wallace wrote to Peek, the Department’s ability 
“to justify our decisions before Congress and other political groups” will require showing 
“that we have given equal interest to consumers’ interests.”49 The Secretary, in other words, 
acknowledged a glaring weakness in the entire agricultural program – that higher prices for 
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farm commodities, if simply passed on by processors and distributors, meant an increasing 
cost of living for already hard-pressed consumers. And, after some convincing by his 
Institutional Keynesian advisors, he demanded that something be done about it.  
 At the recommendation of BAE official Louis Bean, Wallace tapped Frederic Howe 
to serve as head of the new Office of the Consumers’ Counsel.50 Howe was a veteran 
Progressive – he had earned his doctorate at Johns Hopkins in 1892, cut his teeth at the 
famous Goodrich Settlement House in Cleveland, and authored a number of books on reform 
causes. George Peek, for his part, felt that he “had been seriously bitten by some kind of pink 
bug and had accumulated a hazy half radical, half uplifter set of views and attitudes.” Howe 
“was against the profit system and was all for abolishing it,” he continued, “without, 
however, exactly knowing what he wanted to put in its place.” Still, Peek had to admit, 
Howe’s views spread through the AAA “like an epidemic,” and to many of the young 
reformers this sixty-six year-old stood as a towering figure of the ascendant American 
liberalism.51 Joining Howe was Gardner Jackson, a crusading journalist who Lee Pressman 
and another CP affiliated AAA attorney, Nathaniel Witt, had recruited “to get in the show 
and help remake the world.” The wealthy son of a Colorado mining executive – he attributed 
his progressive politics to a “terrible resistance to the social privilege concept into which the 
accident of birth brought me” – Jackson devoted his fortune to, as Arthur Schlesinger put it, 
“helping the submerged people of his day, the subsistence farmers, the sharecroppers.”52 
Jackson was, again, the key figure in arranging that important meeting between Secretary 
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Wallace and the STFU leadership. Along with Thomas Blaisdell, a Columbia University 
economist who Tugwell had brought to Washington, the Consumers’ Counsel possessed 
considerable firepower. 
 They also had real institutional capacity. A defining feature of the AAA Consumers’ 
Counsel, in contrast to the three other New Deal consumers’ agencies, was its status as an 
administrative unit with paid staff as opposed to an advisory committee composed of subject 
matter experts.53 What was more, they had influential internal allies in the Legal Division’s 
left-leaning attorneys. As Jackson remembered, “in actual practice, from the very start, the 
consumers’ counsel’s office and the general counsel’s office collaborated with great intimacy 
and always took the same positions.” The Consumers’ Counsel therefore, in Blaisdell’s 
words, “became the focus for internal Agricultural Department conflicts between the 
traditional conservative elements whose thinking represented the larger, successful farmers 
and those with a more social outlook who were regarded as liberals or radicals.”54  
 And along with Lee Pressman and others in the Legal Division, the Consumers’ 
Counsel officials understood that advancing that social outlook would require the capacity to 
keep the corporate beneficiaries of AAA policy – the processors and distributors – in line. To 
do so they would need access to those firms’ books and records, authority that Howe 
understood would serve as “a kind of Damocles sword hanging over the processors.” 
Because “he will not know how closely we follow his accounts,” Howe noted in the summer 
of 1933, “he will be operating with a daily concern for his standing with the third party to the 
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agreement, which is the Government.”55 Secretary Wallace was just as clear on the issue. The 
federal government “will have to insist on a complete look at the books,” he averred before 
the Special Industrial Recovery Board in the fall of 1933, “because of the fact that capitalism, 
as I see it, inevitably takes out too much in the way of profits and does not pay out enough 
for labor and agriculture.”56 
 Their first bid for such regulatory power came in a stand off with cigarette 
manufacturers. Although the September 1933 marketing agreement on flue-cured tobacco 
was completed too late to effect acreage reduction for that year, the AAA staff did enlist a 
strong majority of growers to commit to crop cutbacks in 1934 and 1935, and, with the help 
of militant farmers who pushed the Governors of tobacco growing states to temporarily close 
markets for the commodity, they also managed to convince the giant processors to offer a 
higher price for that year’s harvest.57 Given that leaf costs constituted only a fraction of 
cigarette manufacturers’ total investment, this much was easy enough. But big tobacco would 
not stomach the Consumers’ Counsel and Legal Division demand that, in exchange for 
exemption from anti-trust prosecution, they provide the government with detailed cost 
accounting and price data. The remarkable profitability this industry enjoyed – if not, at the 
time, the public health hazard it posed – made it a logical target, but the urgency of getting 
the tobacco program going, not to mention the political capital required to wage such a 
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confrontation, led President Roosevelt to authorize a more conservative contract that had 
been drafted by Peek.58 
 The political struggle over the social outlook in agriculture became more acute in the 
dairy industry, source of what nutritional experts had come to call “nature’s perfect food.”59 
This was owing in large part to the peculiar geographical political economy of milk.60 
Because its rapid perishability necessitated constant refrigeration, the economics of milk 
production and distribution were tailored to specific urban markets, a practice that created 
distinct regional dairy systems known as “milksheds.” There were hundreds of milksheds 
scattered around the United States, and within each the balance of power between competing 
stakeholders – farmers located closer to the city who were organized into powerful 
cooperatives, smaller independent producers farther afield, corporate scale milk dealers like 
Borden and National Dairy Products, and teamster deliverers and consumers – varied 
dramatically. Consequently, whereas for staple crops like cotton, tobacco, and wheat, the 
AAA could implement master marketing agreements covering all producers, in dairy a 
separate contract for each milkshed had to be devised. If the bureaucratic challenges 
confronting the Dairy Division were amplified accordingly, however, the fragmentation of 
the industry did afford greater opportunities for local activists and their sympathizers in the 
AAA to challenge entrenched interests than might have been the case in a national 
showdown against the likes of the Tobacco Trust. 
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 In spite of its diversity, precedents would emerge in the regulation of dairy, and for 
that reason the development of the first AAA milk code in Chicago proved a contentious 
affair. Milk prices had fallen by more than 50% since 1929, and the despair wrought by that 
deflation was by early 1933 precipitating episodic violence – a series of milk strikes erupted 
that year in Wisconsin, in which members of the Wisconsin Cooperative Milk Pool vowed to 
forcibly prevent deliveries into Milwaukee until corporate distributors offered a higher price. 
It was against this backdrop that the AAA Dairy Section crafted their Chicago code. Put into 
effect on August 1, 1933, the agreement established a minimum price for milk sold in the 
city, one intended to put an end to competitive chiseling between dealers and thereby to 
enable them to pay producers more. But as the historian Shane Hamilton has noted, the order 
left “two very important groups – organized urban milk deliverymen and city consumers” 
vulnerable to dealers’ inclination to pass on higher costs. The agreement said nothing of a 
maximum price – it actually mandated that cash-and-carry vendors with much lower costs 
charge the same price as home deliverers – and, in spite Jerome Frank’s efforts to get 
teamster workers covered by Section 7(a) of the NIRA, neither did it say anything about 
wages.61 
 But the Chicago milk deal was not a total racket. First, the Legal Division was able to 
get a books and records clause into the agreement, and, as Howe had anticipated, this at least 
created the possibility that strong regulation of dealers’ prices and profits could be 
forthcoming. Equally important, in the fall of 1933 the Office of the Consumers’ Counsel 
initiated a public campaign against the rising cost of milk, placing the blame squarely on the 
powerful milk dealers. In anticipation of public hearings on the situation in Chicago that had 
																																																						
61 Hamilton, Trucking Country, 30. For a full reprint of the Chicago milk marketing agreement, see “Text of 
License for Chicago Milk Sales,” Wall Street Journal, August 3, 1933. 
 66 
been scheduled by the AAA to take place in November, the Consumers’ Counsel began 
featuring stories in in its bi-weekly publication, Consumers’ Guide, to raise awareness about 
and mobilize the public around the issue.  
 The Consumers’ Guide was edited by Mary Taylor, a veteran consumer activist who 
studied at Mt. Holyoke and did graduate work at the University of Wisconsin and the London 
School of Economics. Taylor’s work for the Consumer’s Guide made it one of the most 
widely circulated government publications, and in the years to come it would serve as an 
important vehicle by which Institutional Keynesians would broadcast their message. Taylor 
had worked as a foreign correspondent for the Chicago Tribune before joining government, 
and after leaving the USDA in 1943 she joined the Women’s Bureau, where for fourteen 
years she worked as an editor. They proved to be the last years of her life. Taylor became a 
victim of McCarthyism, spent much of the 1950s worried about her career, and died in 1957 
of a brain tumor that those close to her believed had to have resulted in part from the stress.62  
 In a late October issue, Taylor ran a cover story demonstrating that the lion’s share of 
the price paid by consumers wound up as a “distributor’s margin,” and she followed up, in 
the subsequent issue, with a survey soliciting the views of “The Women of Your 
Community” on the matter.63 Then, on November 29, while the Chicago conference was in 
progress, in another cover story entitled “The New Deal Comes to Town,” Taylor informed 
Consumers’ Guide readers that public hearings on the agricultural program were being 
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planned across the country, and exhorted them as such: “IF YOU THINK YOU’RE NOT 
GETTING YOUR MONEY’S WORTH FOR THE FOODS YOU BUY – go to these 
hearings.” She included, for good measure, a list of questions that consumers might ask at 
such a milk hearing.64 This would not be the last time Taylor would use the Consumers’ 
Guide to encourage rank-and-file consumers to take action.  
 The Consumers’ Counsel’s educational efforts around the Chicago hearings paid off. 
During the first two days of consumer testimonials, the 600-person occupancy room in the 
Stevens Hotel was packed, so much so that they relocated to a venue that could accommodate 
3,000 for the remainder of the hearing.65 And Chicagoan consumer sentiment, it seemed, was 
unanimous: milk prices were too high, and the prohibition on cash-and-carry vendors from 
selling for less than home-deliverers had placed a special burden on lower-income 
households. So familiar did the themes become that Jerome Frank had to conclude that “there 
is no use hearing the same story again and again.”66 One reason behind Frank’s frustration 
was that the big milk dealers had not as yet furnished the AAA with satisfactory accounting 
data, and had therefore prevented the government officials from assigning definitive 
culpability for the consumers’ expressed woes. As Frank’s co-Chair, Elmer Hays, put it, the 
“AAA has not made a complete audit of the books in Chicago.” “We were given figures,” 
Hays continued “but that doesn’t mean we were satisfied with them.” The applause he 
received after promising a more thorough inquiry, as a Chicago Tribune correspondent 
described it, “was long and loud, despite Attorney Hays’ attempt to quell it with his gavel.”67 
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What constituted access to corporate books and records, it turned out, would have to be 
determined through struggle. 
 It did seem, though, that the Legal Division and Consumers’ Counsel were beginning 
to amass the support needed to wage such a struggle – on the heels of the Chicago hearings, 
for instance, petitions from thousands of consumers demanding cheaper milk at cash-and-
carry stores poured into the AAA.68 This kind of popular participation was too much for 
Peek. But, again, when he presented his ultimatum to Roosevelt that week, the President 
sided with Wallace and Frank. For a moment, then, it could have felt like the New Deal was 
indeed adopting a social character. One New York Times reporter could not help but wonder 
“how far the AAA will swing to the left without the opposition heretofore provided by Mr. 
Peek,” and noted the “frequent” speculation that “under the dominance of the ‘brain trust’ the 
AAA would strike out for strict government control over [the] food processing industries” 
which could result in “Federal limitation on the profits of corporations subject to AAA 
jurisdiction.”69 Alas that would not be the case. Just a year later Peek’s wish was fulfilled, 
when the progressives in the Legal Division and Consumers’ Counsel were purged, and a 
year after that the Supreme Court struck down the AAA in the famous Butler case. By 1936, 
it instead seemed like the “social outlook” in agriculture might in fact be in eclipse. 
 
BUT INSTITUTIONAL KEYNESIAN influence in the Department of Agriculture was not 
so short-lived. One layer of progressives was gone, to be sure, but a number of others – 
including Tugwell – remained, as did key institutional loci like the Consumers’ Counsel. As 
Jess Gilbert has demonstrated, moreover, that it was only in the late 1930s and early 1940s 
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that a vision of more equitable and sustainable agricultural planning – the “Intended New 
Deal” – was beginning to take shape. In excavating the largely overlooked history of USDA 
efforts to promote continuing education and participatory research directed towards 
cooperative land-use planning in the American countryside, Gilbert makes a strong case for 
the conclusion that a progressive wing of what he calls “agrarian intellectuals” played more 
of a role in shaping New Deal agricultural policy, and for a more extended period, than 
scholars tend to appreciate. A similar argument can be made for the Department’s urban 
liberals and radicals whose planning instincts tended more toward distributive concerns than 
land-use.70 
 Again, the Consumer’s Counsel – which, incidentally, had been reclassified as an 
AAA Division amid the shake-up in 1935 – was still around. That fall, Donald E. 
Montgomery became Director of the Consumers’ Counsel Division, and for the next seven 
years his office would play a leading part in the campaign to keep the social outlook in 
Department of Agriculture alive.71 After studying economics at the Universities of 
Pennsylvania and Wisconsin, Montgomery entered government service, spending most of the 
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1920s investigating the meatpacking industry for the Wisconsin State Department of Markets 
and several years after that split between the FTC Securities Division and the SEC. When he 
joined the Consumers’ Counsel in 1935, then, he had extensive experience with both the food 
processing industries and corporate finance, not to mention a Progressive academic pedigree. 
Montgomery left the Department of Agriculture in 1942 to join the staff of the UAW, after 
being recruited by Victor Reuther, and would for the final fifteen years of his life serve as a 
key member of the brains’ trust that contributed to making that union such an important part 
of the history of postwar American liberalism. The arc of his career therefore offers a 
window into the strange ways the politics of agriculture intersected with industrial class 
struggle. 
 Like his predecessors, Montgomery would wage some of his most important battles 
over “nature’s perfect food.” Once more, the geographical specificity of milk production and 
distribution and the regionally distinct politics that resulted created opportunities for 
Institutional Keynesians that did not exist against more nationally coordinated industries. But 
big city markets were still formidable, and, like the earlier one in Chicago, the struggle that 
unfolded in 1937 over the price of milk in New York City testified to as much. Presaging 
what was to come at the federal level, in early 1933 New York State passed a Milk Control 
Act that granted the legislature emergency powers to stabilize prices, and after the Butler 
decision in early 1936 the state resorted to that law as the principal means of regulating the 
New York milkshed. A year later, however, Governor Herbert Lehman suggested that that 
program too be dispensed with. The legislature followed Lehman’s lead, and on April 1, 
1937 the production and distribution of milk in the nation’s most populous state was left to 
its own devices for the first time since Roosevelt had taken office. Prices immediately 
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plummeted, in some cases by more than 50%. But dairy producers were too well organized 
for this to go on for long, and within weeks their organizations had pushed Lehman to sign a 
new law establishing state guidelines along which producers and distributors could bargain 
over price. As the Governor put it rather straightforwardly, the bill returned “milk control to 
the milk industry, where it belongs.” That it did, but by ending direct state intervention in the 
process it also opened the door to galloping prices – if big distributors like Borden were 
going to pay farmers higher prices, they would surely try to sell to consumers for at least that 
much more. And by the fall of 1937, even as the economy sank into the “Roosevelt 
Recession,” New York milk prices began to gallop indeed.72 
 The fall of 1937 was also election season in New York City, and the popular, social 
democratic Mayor Fiorella La Guardia was running for another term. A rare kind of 
Progressive Republican, that year La Guardia faced an internal challenge from the 
conservative wing of the city’s GOP.73  As as an insurance measure he therefore accepted the 
nomination of the American Labor Party (ALP) – La Guardia actually wound up on both 
ballot lines, something enabled by the state’s electoral fusion system, and won the general 
election in a landslide. Sidney Hillman, leader of the ACWA and a New Deal insider, had 
spearheaded the establishment of the ALP in 1936 as a mechanism for channeling labor 
support towards Roosevelt, and by 1937 the fledgling party was strong enough to command 
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20% of the city vote for La Guardia, incidentally his exact margin of victory. It was not 
without cause, then, that some trade unionists, like Alex Rose of the Hat, Cap, and Millinery 
Workers, imagined the ALP developing into the “New Deal Party of our country.”74 And if it 
was not quite ready to become the mass organization through which an American social 
democracy could be achieved, Rose understood, the ALP might set its sights on favorable 
city like New York and work to build a model of what that future society might look like.75 
An equitable and balanced relationship between city and country was, of course, a 
precondition of such a vision, and at the municipal level that meant dairy. So the ALP 
focused on milk, including a plank in the 1937 New York City platform that called for a 
municipally owned milk distribution system to serve as a “yardstick” for regulation of the 
private sector. Operating without concern for “tremendous profits” that motivate the “milk 
trust,” the ALP platform read, a city facility would eliminate “the wide gap between the 
amount the trust pays the farmer and the price it extorts form the consumer” and could 
thereby ensure fair returns to producers and affordable milk to working-families.76 
 La Guardia and the ALP received a boost from the Consumers’ Counsel Division. 
Beginning in the late summer and running through the fall of 1937, the Consumers’ Guide 
ran an extended series entitled “Milk for Millions,” which provided analyses of everything 
from the history and geography of the development of regional milksheds, the political 
economy of milk pricing, the role of and potential for cooperatives, and the dairy production 
process itself – the sophistication of the articles and the complexity of the issues with which 
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they dealt, it should be noted, served as a testament to the level of confidence this group of 
Institutional Keynesians had in rank-and-file workers and consumers as organic 
intellectuals.77 In one piece, “Mapping the Road to Plenty,” Consumers’ Guide editor Mary 
Taylor publicized the findings of a study of the Milwaukee milk distribution system that had 
been commissioned by the city’s Common Council and completed over two years by public 
sector workers from the Civil Works Administration, the Federal Emergency Relief 
Administration, and the USDA. It found, the Guide summarized, that “Competition in milk 
distribution results in a musical comedy parade of milk men up and down the streets of 
American cities. But besides, it contributes to the higher prices of milk.” A “publicly owned 
system of milk distribution in Milwaukee,” by contrast, “could sell milk to the consumer for 
2 cents per quart less than the present price and could pay farmers 21 cents more a 
hundredweight for their milk.” At such prices, 30% of Milwaukee residents indicated that 
they would consume more milk, and estimates were that low income families would enjoy 
12.5% more dairy than they were getting at the time. What was more, the public investment 
required was modest enough that the milk plant would pay for itself in less than 20 years. 
Here was a federal publication touting the findings of a study, completed thanks to federal 
public works programs, that reinforced the American Labor Party’s social democratic agenda 
during an important election in the nation’s biggest city.78 The social outlook seemed alive 
and well. 
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 And the Consumers’ Counsel Division did more than issue a publication. On the heels 
of La Guardia’s resounding victory, the Milk Consumers Protective Committee, an umbrella 
group comprised of some forty activist consumer organizations, hosted a conference at the 
Manhattan headquarters of the Transport Workers Union to explore further the issue of 
municipal ownership.79 Various producers’ organizations, including the progressive Dairy 
Farmers’ Union, settlement houses and consumer cooperatives, and trade unions and the 
American Labor Party were all represented. Also in attendance was Donald Montgomery, 
who heartily endorsed the meeting, proclaiming that “the consumers and the producers are 
both getting the run around.” The big distributors, he continued, were chiefly responsible for 
the escalating prices, and they got only away with it by manipulating their books and 
publishing “manufactured” profit margins. In his capacity as a Department of Agriculture 
employee Montgomery was not authorized to explicitly endorse the municipal ownership 
proposal, but his presence at the event, not to mention the favorable treatment the idea 
received in the Consumers’ Guide, suggests the degree to which direct public ownership and 
operation of basic industry could seem, at least to a wing of Institutional Keynesians in the 
1930s, to be the best way of mitigating the economic hazards posed by oligopolistic control 
of pricing and production. If corporations would not allow for effective regulation by 
opening their books and records, the government could just as well supplant them.80 
 The ramifications of this insight obviously extended beyond milk, and corporate 
America understood as much. In the spring of 1939, Archie Wright, head of the CIO-backed 
Dairy Farmers’ Union, reported learning from reliable sources that the Chairman of General 
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Electric, Owen D. Young, “was preparing to finance [a] Central Sales Committee” – with 
support from G.E., U.S. Steel, International Harvester, and General Motors – to serve as “a 
more closely controlled milk shed-wide front organization.” And as a DFU attorney 
suggested to Montgomery, “this same source might well be supplying the funds for other 
reactionary farm organization committees.”81 If true, one can only conclude that the largest 
corporations in the United States were not actively organizing themselves and committing 
material resources simply to protect the profit margins of milk distributors like Borden Dairy 
by some few percent. They were doing so because the burgeoning movement of rank-and-file 
farmers, working-class consumers, and their allies in the federal government was mounting a 
real challenge to the most dearly held prerogatives of the capitalist class – indeed, to the very 
prerogatives that made them capitalists: the rights to invest, to price, and to accumulate 
without restraint. It was this movement, and not the politics of milk per se, that really 
threatened their class interest.  
 
ANOTHER EXPRESSION of that threat came from the Temporary National Economic 
Committee (TNEC), a joint executive-legislative body that from 1938 through 1941 
conducted what to that point was the most exhaustive empirical study of corporate power in 
the U.S. economy.82 Formally established by Congress at the recommendation of President 
Roosevelt, who warned of the dangers posed by the present “concentration of economic 
power without equal in history,” the genesis of the TNEC really began with the publication 
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of Gardiner Means’s Industrial Prices and their Relative Inflexibility in 1935. Since its 
inception, critics have questioned whether this “anti-monopoly committee” was up for the 
challenges of modern industrial society. Eggs, they would say, could not be unscrambled. 
Means would have agreed. A the time, he was at the NRC preparing what would become the 
most rigorous study on national economic planning completed to date.83 
 These competing perspectives, planning and anti-trust, were at the center of what 
Ellis Hawley classically described as the “problem of monopoly” in the New Deal. Given 
this contradiction, the TNEC can seem destined to have done little more than gather facts – 
the consensus required for anything more was lacking. As Progressive Republican Senator 
William Borah predicted, while the probe might “string along” for a time, before long it was 
likely to gather “the dust of the upper shelf in the form of ten or twenty volumes which few 
will ever consult.”84 Illuminating as Hawley’s formulation has been, however, the dichotomy 
can obscure the extent to which the two tendencies intermingled with one another and 
overlook the ways “planners” used the politics of anti-trust to their advantage. And while 
hindsight does make Borah’s remark seem prescient, embarrassingly so, given that a major 
obstacle confronting Institutional Keynesians in their efforts to regulate corporate capital had 
been a paucity of reliable data, the enormous amount of information gathered by the TNEC – 
and the precedents set in gathering it – could at the time hardly be seen as irrelevant. 
 Donald Montgomery’s experience with the TNEC helps to illustrate the point. In May 
1939, Montgomery orchestrated the TNEC investigation into the “Problems of the 
Consumer,” and he used the three days of hearings to rehearse the agenda the Consumers’ 
Guide had promoting for years. Banal as some of the subject matter might seem – detailed 
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testimonies covered things like federal publication of grades for essential commodities, 
standardized packaging, and retail price maintenance – there was a deeply critical undertone 
to the entire proceeding. Subject to particular scrutiny was the advertising industry, which, 
Montgomery concluded, not only withheld important information from consumers but also 
added to the prices they paid. Consumers, he emphasized at the conclusion of the hearings, 
“need information about commodities which ordinarily, and as illustrated by numerous 
exhibits and testimony here, they do not get from advertising.”85 
 Persia Campbell, a Columbia trained economist and Director of the Consumers’ 
National Federation, drew more attention to this point. Founded in the mid-1930s, the CNF 
was a national body composed of left-labor consumer groups around the country. One of its 
member organizations, the League of Women Shoppers, was at the time of Campbell’s 
appearance actively engaged in support of an American Newspaper Guild-CIO strike against 
Hearst newspapers in Chicago; the LWS was, at the same time, organizing a consumer 
boycott of firms that failed to comply with the National Labor Relations Act. Meanwhile, the 
CNF had filed a complaint with the FTC charging Good Housekeeping, a Hearst publication, 
with fraudulent advertising. In short, this was a partisan group, and the fact that Montgomery 
provided its leader a national platform from which to voice her views was only the latest 
example of Consumer Counsel Division support for activist working-class consumers. Much 
like the cotton planters in the South, the Hearst interests shot back. With material assistance 
from other business interests, the media tycoon launched a red-baiting campaign against the 
labor-consumer movement, one seized by Martin Dies’s House Committee on Un-American 
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Activities. As J.B. Matthews, an assistant to Dies, intoned to the Committee the movement 
was but a “Trojan horse” for the Communist Party.86  
 These proto-McCarthyists went after the Consumers’ Counsel Division, as well. In 
the summer of 1939, Richard E. Berlin, Executive Vice President of Heart Magazines, began 
accusing Montgomery and the TNEC of enabling “subversive elements, pretending to serve 
the consuming public but actually motivated by communistic theories” and demanded that 
“this subversive movement [be] publicly exposed.”87 And in December Matthews released a 
report that singled out the Consumers’ Counsel Division and the Consumers’ National 
Federation, charging that the Consumers’ Guide “has given frequent and favorable publicity 
to the CNF” and other organizations in which “Communists had played the leading role.”88 
As Montgomery well understood, Matthews’s report was simply part “of a concerted plan to 
smear as communistic certain persons and organizations in the consumer movement for the 
dual purpose of dividing that movement and throwing a smoke screen around the facts” of 
the FTC case against Good Housekeeping.89 But the stir it caused did raise questions among 
more respectable authorities about the scope of the Consumer Counsel Division’s activities.  
 As Montgomery had suspected, evidence demonstrating a clear connection between 
Hearst interests, business groups like the NAM, and the Dies Committee damaged the 
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credibility of the Matthews Report, and therefore while that episode may have been a 
harbinger it was not the most significant challenge facing the Consumer Counsel Division. 
That came from inside the Department of Agriculture itself. And it was rooted in the fact 
that, in spite of all the constitutional, legislative, and administrative overhauling that had 
occurred since the AAA was established in 1933, the basic tension that had beset New Deal 
agricultural policy all along – between over-productionists and  underconsumptionists – 
persisted. The alignment and balance of various forces both inside and outside the USDA had 
of course changed since the bureaucratic civil war between George Peek and Jerome Frank 
first erupted five years earlier. On the one hand, it was in the latter 1930s that the democratic 
planning impulse in the New Deal reached its apogee. Initiatives directed towards 
encouraging cooperative land-use planning and new programs like the Resettlement 
Administration and Farm Security Administration represented attempts to rectify some of the 
deficiencies of earlier agricultural policy – related to both soil erosion and human 
displacement – while the TNEC and NRPB served a similar function with regards to 
industrial policy. But on the other hand, in the wake of the recession of 1937 business 
interests and conservative policymakers intensified their campaign against the New Deal. 
Moreover, by the end of the decade the specter of war weighed more and more heavily on 
President Roosevelt’s mind, and he understood that it could not be waged without 
cooperation from big business. It was this context more than the red-baiting campaign itself 
that changed the USDA’s internal politics surrounding the Consumer Counsel Division. 
 In this round the main antagonist was Paul H. Appleby, a confidant of Secretary 
Wallace and effectively the USDA director of operations. Appleby, it must be noted, was no 
reactionary – in 1935 he had opposed the purge, and many of the Department’s conservatives 
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saw him as belonging to the Tugwell-Frank camp. But by 1939, it seems that those atop the 
USDA hierarchy began to see the Consumers’ Counsel’s activist orientation as a liability that 
needed to be reined in once and for all. It was one thing to maintain that regulation of 
corporate food processors required proper government audits of their records. It was another 
altogether to basically advocate for socialization of the milk industry and to crusade against 
advertising, both as an idea and a practice. Those USDA leaders, like Secretary Wallace and 
Paul Appleby, who might appreciate the spirit behind the social outlook were not quite 
willing to expend the political capital required to sustain it under the less favorable 
conditions of the late 1930s. The week after the TNEC hearings on consumers, then, Appleby 
argued to the members of a Department committee charged with issuing recommendations on 
the role of the Consumer Counsel that Montgomery’s Division should stop pursuing “activity 
with regard to things of consumer interest generally” and instead limit its purview to “the 
programs provided for in the act.” This was especially important when it came to the 
Consumers’ Guide, he added, which ought to focus its content on “matters directly related to 
the program carried on under the act.” Some independent adjudication of these boundaries 
was needed, Appleby complained, as he had “found it exceedingly difficult if not impossible 
to arrive at an understanding with [Montgomery]” on his own.90 
 The Committee’s report endorsed Appleby’s views, concluding that “it is not proper, 
and should not be permissible, for the Consumers’ Counsel to express public disapproval of 
any action taken by the Secretary of Agriculture.” The Consumers’ Guide, the report added, 
should present only “information relating directly to the programs administered by the 
Department,” an editorial shift that the authors understood “may materially change the 
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character and the appeal of the Consumers’ Guide to its current readers.” The committee 
grounded its judgment in the fact that appropriations for consumer representation in the 
agricultural program came with specific statutory guidelines, and that the Consumer Counsel 
needed to stop using the money for things Congress had never intended.91 Having been 
sanctioned by Secretary Wallace, the committee’s report marked a turning point for the 
Consumer Counsel.92 By the summer, the USDA Director of Information was trying to exert 
greater editorial control over the Consumers’ Guide, writing to Montgomery that “several 
articles [for the forthcoming issue] could hardly be brought under the new tent of 
prescriptions…on functions of the Consumers’ Counsel and field of the Consumers’ 
Guide.”93 Wallace himself followed up in the fall, instructing Montgomery that “the activity 
of the Consumers’ Counsel in initiating formulation of consumer groups and consumer 
expressions” was “outside the proper function of the organization,” as was its efforts at 
“fostering the consumer interest in the general field of consumer concern, rather than 
restricting activities to those essential to our specific program.” Both, Wallace added, were 
“an unwarranted stretching of our legal authority and therefore an unwarranted use of 
appropriated funds.”94 
 As the committee on the Consumer Counsel Division had to acknowledge, however, 
“Mr. Montgomery expresses a strong conviction that he cannot adequately discharge his 
responsibility under such a limitation.”95 Protesting the new constraints on the Consumers’ 
Guide, Montgomery explained that if the publication was required to rely only on “farm 
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program funds” it would surely “lose its consumer character and become and agricultural 
publication.” And a host of other educational programs supported by the Consumer Counsel 
Division – a weekly radio program broadcast on NBC, local consumer study groups, 
Montgomery’s ongoing work with the TNEC on the issue of consumer cooperatives – would 
likely have to be terminated as well.96 Institutional Keynesian influence in the Department of 
Agriculture, however, was not what it had once been. Not only would the source of funding 
for the Consumer Counsel Division limit the scope of its activities, but so would the size of 
the allocation. For the coming fiscal year, Montgomery saw his budget cut by some 25%.97 It 
would only shrink from there. 
 
*** 
 
AFTER A GAP in publication, as this internal review was completed between November 
1939 and March 1940, the Consumers’ Guide returned with a new character, one that 
reflected the deeper political shifts afoot in the Department of Agriculture and the New Deal 
at large. No longer were Mary Taylor and Montgomery featuring stories critical of processors 
and distributors which drew attention to the power relations mediating the process by which 
agricultural goods traveled from producer to consumer. The new guidelines authorized by 
Secretary Wallace had their intended effect of stymying the more aggressive campaigns 
waged by the Consumer Counsel Division. What had been scrupulous reporting on the ins 
and outs of the dairy industry became, between 1940 and 1941, a thirteen-part “Milk 
Glossary for Consumers,” which included extended definitions of terms ranging from “Cow” 
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to “Acidophilus” (“A form of buttermilk made from sterilized skim milk by adding a culture 
of bacteria known as Lactobacillus acidophilus”).98 This was stuff the ruling class could live 
with. 
 Still, in spite of the changes, the Department of Agriculture in the late 1930s and 
early 1940s remained an outpost of liberals, and Montgomery and his staff continued to try to 
make the most of the circumstances. In that first installment of the milk glossary, for 
instance, Taylor included “Administered Prices” and noted that “Milk is a commodity whose 
price is sometimes administered. When the price of milk is fixed by administrative decision, 
consumers should have a hand in determining the decision.” Definitions apparently did not 
have to be free of value judgments. Moreover, progressive USDA initiatives like Wallace’s 
pet project, the Ever Normal Granary, and the cooperative credit and land-use planning 
program implemented by the Farm Security Administration, began to receive greater 
coverage in the Consumers’ Guide. To be sure, this was not quite the radical radical planning 
Rexford Tugwell had hoped to achieve, but nonetheless it was among the more ambitious 
federal anti-poverty programs to date. Ecological concerns, like issues related to soil 
conservation, also drew increasing attention in the refashioned Consumers’ Guide.99 
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 There was also a noticeable “Keynesian” turn in the content contained in the 
Consumers’ Guide and the activities pursued by those in and around the Consumer Counsel 
Division. If campaigns directly targeting specific industries were too politically risky, a 
similar agenda might be advanced by couching their proposals in the new language of 
economic aggregates. Achieving a “greater abundance” of milk, the Guide reported in March 
1940, had become the principal goal of consumer organizers.100 Whereas in its early years the 
Guide consistently featured the tagline, “consumption is the end and purpose of production,” 
the Consumer Counsel staff was now contending that only through maximum production 
could consumers get the things they needed at prices they could afford. The great scourge, in 
other words, was under-consumption – and as Milo Perkins put it in the pages of the Guide, 
the time had come to “Wipe It Out!” “The term ‘surpluses,’” Perkins noted, “is simply a 
smug, polite name for a shocking amount of under-consumption.” The only way to put an 
end to this “black plague of the twentieth century,” he concluded, is full utilization of 
resources and “full employment.”101 Some of the earliest proponents of the idea of “full 
employment,” that is, which would become central to postwar American liberalism, came 
from the Department of Agriculture. 
 The style of Keynesianism emanating from the USDA did not, however, represent an 
abandonment of the structuralist outlook that those in the Consumer Counsel and Legal 
Divisions had earlier maintained. Indeed, their agricultural frame of reference all but 
guaranteed that they would remain sensitive to the uneven nature of the economy – 
maximum production was important because it would create a working-class consumer base 
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for agricultural goods, thereby ensuring security for urban and rural workers alike, and not 
because “economic growth” was desirable in and of itself. Keynes had only published The 
General Theory in 1936, and by the end of the decade the idea of growth – as well as 
attempts to measure it – was as yet very new. Mitigating social under-consumption rather 
than fetishizing individual consumption was liberals’ order of the day. 
 The “Stamp Plan” exemplified the USDA left’s vision of a structural reform directed 
towards enhancing purchasing power and spurring industrial production, things that would 
later fall under the rubric of Keynesianism. Formally established in 1939, the Stamp Plan 
grew out of federal efforts beginning in 1933 to utilize some amount of the surplus crops 
produced by providing it as food relief to the needy. But basic nutritional standards were not 
guaranteed by this earlier measure, nor was there much of a role for private food distributors. 
Progressives in the USDA, led by Secretary Wallace and Louis Bean of the BAE, along with 
grocers and wholesalers therefore came together in the late-1930s around a compromise 
proposal that would subsidize low-income consumers’ purchases at participating grocery 
stores. First unveiled in Rochester, NY, the plan functioned by allowing individuals to 
purchase Orange stamps for $1 a piece – with each $1 Orange stamp came a Blue stamp, 
valued at 50 cents each. Consumers could use the Orange stamps on anything – with the 
exception of alcohol, tobacco, and the like – and the Blue stamps on good which were in 
surplus, which especially included dairy, poultry, and fruits and vegetables.102 Calling it “a, if 
not the, most important feature of the farm program from a national point of view” thanks to 
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its wide ranging “educational, sociological and political effects,” Montgomery would become 
a leading champion of this innovative and ambitious program for most of its four years in 
existence. By moving “away from the notion that farm welfare must be achieved at the 
expense of the non-farm population,” and instead toward “a genuine identification of farm 
welfare with national welfare,” he insisted that the Stamp Plan marked an important step in 
the direction of a “program of national food supply, rather than a farm program.”103 
 Mary Taylor made sure that the Consumers’ Guide got this message out. In a feature 
story on the implementation of the plan in Dayton, Ohio, one single mother stressed “You 
can’t tell me that you can raise a child right on flour and dried beans” – thankfully, “Now I 
don’t have to worry about that anymore. I have some fruits and eggs and butter and 
vegetables in the kitchen all the time.”104 The Guide also become a leading source of 
information for the cotton stamp plan, which followed the food program – cotton stamps, the 
publication reported, would “give relief to cotton growers, jobs and wages to workers, and 
clothing and household articles to the needy.” The cheap mattresses that came out of the 
program, for instance, were going “to make sleeping a little more comfortable for some low-
income families.”105 
 Still, the program was not without flaws. The Stamp Plan functioned, as the Guide 
put it, by pulling “farm surpluses through commercial channels and into the market baskets 
of poorly fed citizens.”106 Citizens using food stamps had to fill those market baskets, the 
historian Rachel Moran has observed, at grocery stores, and the program therefore 
institutionalized a private intermediary at the center of this early Keynesian policy. That 
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arrangement would become more familiar as the postwar decades progressed. The safety net 
the Stamp Plan provided also was not that wide at first, though it did balloon. Covering a half 
dozen cities in 1939, by mid-1940 the program had been expanded to more than 80 areas 
serving 1.5 million recipients. At the end of 1941, the rolls had increased to 5 million, or 4 
percent of the population, and a year later some 60 percent of the country’s poor, in well over 
1,000 locales, were feeding themselves thanks to the stamps.107  
 But Montgomery still found the Stamp Plan insufficiently robust. The program 
“should be extended to all families under a given income level,” he argued in 1941, and “this 
level should be high enough to reach all families that are in need of assistance in order to 
achieve a satisfactory diet.”108 And his criticism had more to do with political economy than 
nutrition. The basic problem confronting the Department of Agriculture, Montgomery 
reasoned, had changed since 1933. At that time, when the national economy was in free fall, 
a grinding deflation in the price of agricultural commodities devastated workers in the 
American countryside. To them what economists might call exogenous variables like interest 
rates and price levels were matters of life and death, and at the depths of the Depression their 
survival depended on government intervention. That intervention, Montgomery continued, 
had been successful, so much so that by the end of the decade agricultural prices had risen to 
the point that inflation posed a greater threat than deflation. With regards to food stamps, he 
noted that “the limited kind of Plan we now have becomes – to state it crudely – a device to 
enable certain needy families to go into market armed with the money to put up prices and 
beat other needy families to a share of the total supply.” That is, unless the income ceiling 
determining eligibility was raised – admittedly “far beyond what seems politically possible” 
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at present – the program would be “open to the criticism of practicing an obnoxious 
discrimination between those who shall be given more food and those who shall do with 
less.” His sense of foreboding over the resentments such means-tested programs could 
incubate was prescient indeed. 
 Instead, Montgomery proposed that agricultural policy should be directed towards 
formulating a “national food program,” one “not tied to high prices.” The Stamp Plan should 
be part of a larger effort in which “the Government would state what production is required 
to meet all needs, including enough to guarantee a satisfactory food minimum to the whole 
domestic population” and then “take steps to assure distribution of those quantities, including 
low market prices to encourage larger consumer purchase.” “The greatest contribution of the 
Stamp Plan to date,” he concluded, “has not been its contribution to better diets at low-
income levels, but its preparation of public thinking for a program that would in fact get us 
all the food we need and get it distributed where it is needed.” Rather than seek to improve 
farm incomes by reducing output, Montgomery was suggesting that the government 
guarantee a certain income to agricultural producers in exchange for their maximizing 
production. The result would be security for farmers and affordable food for consumers, 
which sounded good enough, but achieving it required severing the link between price and 
income in the countryside. This radical reformulation of agricultural policy became the core 
of the Brannan Plan, advanced by President Truman’s Secretary of Agriculture in the late 
1940s. 
 
*** 
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WITH THE ONSET OF WAR, the purview of the Consumer Counsel Division and the 
Consumers’ Guide, already limited, shrank appreciably.109 The imperatives of combat 
apparently left no room for a social outlook in agricultural policy. Upon Montgomery’s 
departure, an incensed Mary Taylor put it straight to Roy Hendrickson, director of the 
Agricultural Marketing Administration, which oversaw the wartime food program: “I’ve 
done my work, month after month, year after year, in the belief that sooner or later the 
Department would come to tolerate, if not to welcome, the service of people whose 
peculiarity is that they think of food as something to eat,” and yet it had become clear that 
“we have no place in your new job.” And with that she got to the basic problem with the 
overproduction thesis undergirding that always undergirded New Deal agricultural policy. 
One cannot eat prices. 
 The Institutional Keynesianism that was born in the 1930s USDA would for the next 
three decades be central to the politics of inflation in the United States. It was a 
macroeconomic theory with microeconomic foundations, one that integrated production and 
distribution, a new idea called growth with older notions regarding wages, prices, and 
profits.110 And it was a tendency that the scholarship on the triumph of “commercial 
Keynesianism” has too often overlooked.111 Its most visible legacy incidentally came from 
someone who only briefly passed through the USDA: Gardiner Means and his administered 
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price thesis. But Institutional Keynesians had a deeper influence than that. This would 
become more clear in the 1940s, during World War II and in the years immediately 
thereafter, when the new industrial unions forming the CIO established themselves as 
formidable players in national politics. The fate of a planning vision that could approximate 
what Tugwell had outlined in 1931 would in many ways hinge on their efforts during those 
years, the subject of the next chapter. 
 It would also hinge, Tugwell noted in a May 1937 piece for Harper’s Weekly, on the 
emergence of a “farmer-labor alliance,” the progressive coalition that he hoped as on the 
horizon. Coming in the interregnum between the UAW’s historic sit-down strikes and 
SWOC’s crushing defeat by Little Steel after the Memorial Day Massacre, these were 
optimistic words. But Tugwell had always been ahead of his times, and his yearning for the 
world to come was never without a heavy dose of pragmatism. It would not be immediately 
forthcoming – “possibly beyond the next war, probably beyond the next depression, certainly 
beyond the next election” – and, whatever the timeframe, it would not come from above. 
Only if “there were enough thunder on the left to drown out the publishers on the right” 
Tugwell understood, would those masses whose toil produced the nation’s wealth finally “be 
able to push the Democrats around,” especially the reactionary ones from the South, and 
move towards the kind of planning that would provide security for workers in rural and urban 
America alike.112 In the absence of such an alliance, capital could not be stopped. And for 
that reason capitalists would do everything in their power to stop that alliance from forming. 
To that struggle we now turn.
																																																						
112 R.G. Tugwell, “Is a Farmer-Labor Alliance Possible?” Harper’s (May 1937).  
 91 
Chapter Two: Institutional Keynesianism and the Fictitious Commodities 
 
WORLD WAR II TURNED THE ECONOMIC CONDITIONS of Depression on their head. 
Maximum production for the war effort along with high levels of federal spending provided 
more of a jolt to investment and employment than the New Deal ever could. But strong 
economic performance only made the politics of inflation more acute. And if Institutional 
Keynesians in the USDA, the TNEC, and elsewhere had offered one of the most powerful 
explanations for the rising price level in the 1930s, conservative forces joined them in 
offering compelling theories of their own during the 1940s. Two causes in particular drew 
their ire, both of which were integral to the Institutional Keynesian program: federal deficits 
and growth in labor costs. 
 These arguments, to be sure, were not new. At the height of the New Deal, 
conservatives both in and out of the Roosevelt administration – above all Secretary of the 
Treasury Henry Morgenthau –  warned of the inflationary implications of a budget 
chronically out of balance. Such fiscal largesse had monetary consequences – it dramatically 
increased the volume of money in circulation – and in investors’ eyes it indicated a 
depreciating value of the dollar.1 And business concern with wages, productivity, and prices 
– what came to be called the “wage-price spiral” – was as old as the capitalist labor relation 
itself. Rising corporate leaders had more than once since the late nineteenth century used it as 
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an excuse to crush nascent industrial unions.2 If their efforts on this front in the postwar era 
lacked the overt violence of that earlier era, the objective was the same. 
 Confronted by these conditions and a corporate class emboldened and valorized by its 
centrality to the war effort, the Institutional Keynesian suffered a monumental defeat in the 
immediate postwar years. It occurred in three registers, each related to the others and together 
constituting the political economic base of that New Deal tradition. The defeats mapped on to 
what Karl Polanyi in his 1944 classic, The Great Transformation, called the fictitious 
commodities of labor, land, and money. These were things, Polanyi held, that could not be 
commodified but were treated as such in capitalist society. Indeed, they became the 
commodities upon which capitalist society rested. Only struggle could remove them from the 
nexus of exchange, and while the New Deal may have represented a start, by 1945 
Institutional Keynesians understood they had quite a way to go.  
 The first round was over the labor question. The experience of war had convinced 
rank-and-file workers and consumers, along with their allies in government, that full 
employment with price control was both possible and desirable even in peacetime. Access to 
a useful and remunerative job, as Roosevelt put it in his 1944 Economic Bill of Rights, 
should be a social right and not something over which capital should have veto power.  Next 
came agriculture. The myopic focus on prices, Institutional Keynesians had argued through 
the 1930s, benefited commercial agriculture at the expense of both the rural working-class 
and urban consumers. An agricultural policy that instead directed support to ordinary farm 
workers and encouraged maximum production could serve the dual purpose of providing 
industrial workers and their families with affordable food and incorporating that rural 
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working-class into the New Deal coalition. Last was the fight over the social nature of 
money, or more precisely capital. Starting during the Depression emergency and continuing 
through the war, the leadership of the historically independent Federal Reserve System 
subordinated its autonomy to the needs of the Roosevelt administration. Deficit spending has 
to be financed somehow, and the best way to do so is to have a national central bank 
coordinate its activities with the imperatives of fiscal policy. So from early in Roosevelt’s 
presidency until late in Truman’s, the Fed functioned at the will of the Executive. It was a 
period of political – indeed democratic – control of the financial system without precedent in 
history, and for a time it seemed as though the Fed might become the central bank for a U.S. 
social democracy. 
 Between 1945 and 1951, the Institutional Keynesians failed on each of these fronts. 
Congressional conservatives killed the full employment and price control proposals, and by 
the end of the 1940s collective bargaining at the firm level became the pillar of the country’s 
industrial relations system with an embryonic private welfare state displacing the more 
capacious vision of industrial democracy. They did the same to the legislative agenda pushed 
by a coalition of industrial unionists and small farmers, and in so doing sealed the rural 
working-class out of the New Deal order. Out of that exclusion would grow the cultural 
shock troops that would contribute to the fall of that political regime a generation later. And 
outside of Congress, the leadership of the Federal Reserve fought a protracted battle for 
autonomy from the political realm itself. In 1951, the “Fed-Treasury Accord” granted such 
“central bank independence,” an agreement suffused with political significance that was 
struck with a handshake behind closed doors. Without ever having agreed to it through 
democratic process, workers, farmers, and their Institutional Keynesian allies thus found 
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themselves confronted by an opponent in the politics of inflation who did not have to play by 
the same rules.  
 When Eisenhower entered the White House in 1952, on the heels of this triple defeat, 
it could seem that Institutional Keynesianism was dead. Many historians still feel that way. 
But as we will see in Ch. 4, that tradition was more durable than most have appreciated. 
Exploring in some detail the failures of the immediate postwar period, then, can both 
illuminate what they were up against entering the latter half of the twentieth century, as well 
as how they would have to adapt. 
 
*** 
 
IF WORLD WAR II did much to rehabilitate corporate America’s image in the public eye, it 
also provided Institutional Keynesians with a new set of opportunities. And in attempting to 
exploit them, left New Dealers found an important ally in the burgeoning industrial union 
movement. Indeed, it was the wartime situation that created the necessary conditions for that 
alliance to mature.  The CIO may have been born through the great strikes of the 1930s, but 
only in the 1940s did it come of age, neither the first nor the last time that the American 
working-class would enjoy the perverse benefits accruing from an economy devoted to the 
production of the means of destruction.  
 Roosevelt understood, as Wilson had during the First World War, that his 
administration would have to accommodate certain trade union demands in order to achieve 
the stable labor relations vital to maximum and continuous defense production. So in May 
1940 the President established the National Defense Advisory Commission (NDAC) – the 
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first of several “alphabet agencies” charged with coordinating the defense effort – and 
appointed Sidney Hillman head of its labor division. As the top leader of the ACWA, 
Hillman had since the 1920s played a central role in negotiating industrywide standards on 
wages, prices, and output – what Steve Fraser has termed a “strategy of microregulation” – 
that brought order to chronically volatile clothing markets and caught the attention of the 
reform-minded from Hoover on leftward (Ch. 1). Throughout the New Deal Hillman 
functioned as the most influential labor official in Washington, and his stature in the wartime 
mobilization program would remain high. On the eve of Pearl Harbor, Roosevelt elevated 
him, along with William Knudsen of GM, to the even more important position of co-director 
of the War Production Board (WPB).3 
 Hillman’s was not a token appointment, but industrial unionists understood that it 
alone was insufficient. In order to ensure both that workers would share in the abundance 
offered by the war economy and that their organizations would stand on strong enough 
footing to survive what past experience suggested was likely to be a perilous transition back 
to peacetime, labor needed to achieve an institutional role in the war effort. Nor was this just 
for the CIO’s sake. The sluggishness with which the largest corporations converted from 
civilian to military production, and the bottlenecks and resultant waste this caused, led 
unionists like Walter Reuther to conclude that such an institutional role – through which 
workers’ expertise on the technical issues of production could be tapped – was essential if the 
“war at home” was to be executed with maximum efficiency.4 
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 Philip Murray, President of the CIO and SWOC, was the first to articulate this 
position. In late 1940 he called for a system of “industry councils” composed of 
representatives of labor, business, and the state, which would bargain over and set 
industrywide production standards – a macro version of Hillman’s micro approach, or 
something of a democratized NRA.5 Murray indeed saw the industry council plan as a step 
towards the “industrial democracy” vision discussed in Ch. 1, by which worker and 
consumer interests would gain real influence over the shape of the national political economy 
in the years after the war. Many Institutional Keynesians agreed. Speaking at the final 
meeting of the TNEC in early 1941, Donald Montgomery, then still with the USDA, called 
Murray’s idea “the best consumer program that has been suggested since the war began.” 
While it “doesn’t attempt to solve all consumer problems,” Montgomery added in a remark 
that highlighted the increasing influence of Keynesian-proper thinking on New Deal 
planners, “it goes to the root of the most vital one – production.”6 Walter Reuther, for his 
part, took Murray’s plan and ran with it, proposing that the federal government establish an 
Aviation Production Board, modeled on Murray’s industry councils, which would be charged 
with rolling out “500 planes a day.” A plane, Reuther commented with characteristic punch, 
is simply a car with wings, and, indispensable as these flying cars were to the war effort, the 
companies best positioned to produce them – the automotive industry – had for the sake of 
short-term profitability proved reluctant to do so. Their intransigence, Reuther implied, left 
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the state no choice but to intervene. There was more than a trace of Veblen’s imagined soviet 
of engineers in the UAW leader’s vision.7 
 Neither the Murray Plan nor its more concrete expression from Reuther was ever 
realized. Such direct worker participation in industrial operations signaled too grave a 
violation of managerial prerogative for corporate executives to accept. Still, the war meant 
that the scope of state intervention in the economy would reach unprecedented levels, and for 
labor that meant an opportunity to continue politicizing the workplace nonetheless. And the 
politics of inflation was the most important terrain on which the trade unions would wage 
that struggle. Wartime conditions had definitively inverted the political economic dilemma 
confronting federal officials – and if scarcity gave way to the abundance of war production, 
this transition brought with it hazards of its own, above all the question of how to balance 
wages, prices, and profits in an economy awash with government contracts. This, of course, 
was a question to which the Institutional Keynesians had been honing an answer for some 
time.  
 The Office of Price Administration (OPA) – which started as a Price Division within 
the NDAC before being reclassified as its own agency in April 1941 – became their home 
base in that struggle.8 To serve as director Roosevelt appointed Leon Henderson, a 
progressive economist and Executive Secretary of the TNEC, and his choice indicated the 
type of agency the OPA would become. The historian Meg Jacobs has described it as “a 
radical model of state management: a popular government agency working in alliance with a 
coalition of labor, consumers, and social liberals that challenged the right of private interests 
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to set their own prices and sell their items freely.”9 The name itself harked to Gardiner 
Means’s “administered prices”, and he and other Institutional Keynesians – including 
Mordecai Ezekiel, Louis Bean, and John Kenneth Galbraith – gravitated towards the OPA in 
its early years.10 
 The OPA also attracted the consumer activists and feminist Institutional Keynesians 
that had cohered intellectually and organizationally in the 1930s, in no small part thanks to 
the work by the AAA Consumer Counsel Division. As Caroline Ware, who joined the OPA 
as Consumer Division Director Harriet Elliott’s deputy, observed, “In the past seven years, 
the consumer movement has gained great momentum.”11 And the women leading the 
Consumer Division continued this activist-administrative tradition, agitating housewives with 
provocative literature and organizing them through regional consumer information centers. In 
this campaign they partnered with the CIO, with working-class consumer organizations like 
the League of Women Shoppers, and with activists in the struggle for racial justice. Indeed, 
Ware, who taught history at Howard University, self-consciously worked to cultivate 
relationships with black reformers, and her efforts bore fruit. Her comrade Frances Williams, 
a black woman affiliated with the Negro branch of the YWCA, joined the Consumer 
Division and toured the country, meeting with people from Harlem to the STFU heartland, to 
organize around its agenda. The tens of thousands of women they recruited to police prices at 
the local level, and the national administrative infrastructure they constructed to enforce OPA 
policy, testified to the democratizing potential of Institutional Keynesianism at its best. It is 
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not too much of a stretch to conclude that the OPA represented the most remarkable 
experiment in economic democracy since Reconstruction.12 
 This could not but affect the labor movement. After Roosevelt signed the Emergency 
Price Control Act in January 1942, a measure granting granting the OPA statutory authority 
subject to annual renewal, trade union officials responded with an offer of wage restraint and 
a pledge not to strike for the duration of the war. Labor’s gambit for stable real wages did not 
yield as much as workers had hoped. The National War Labor Board’s summer 1942 Little 
Steel wage formula set January 1941 as the baseline, a date that erased a number of collective 
bargaining victories. What was more, the Little Steel formula relied on BLS cost of living 
measurements that trade unionists found significantly – indeed insultingly – understated the 
real prices people paid to survive in a wartime economy.13 But the deal did deliver something 
else: union security. The “maintenance-of-membership” clause endorsed by the NWLB 
finally institutionalized a version of the “union shop,” one of labor’s oldest demands.14 
 It was in this context that Donald Montgomery joined the UAW staff. In early 1943, 
soon after his arrival, Montgomery became Chairman of the newly created OPA Labor 
Policy Committee, the establishment of which he considered “historic,” a bold “attempt to 
represent consumers after the virtual breakdown of all the consumer counsels within 
administrative agencies.”15 From this position, as well as his concurrent role as head of the 
CIO Cost of Living Committee, he would become the leading figure in the formulation of a 
laborite politics of inflation that persisted well into the postwar era.  
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 And if ever there was an opportunity to push that agenda further it was in the mid-
1940s. Although Congressional conservatives had forced Leon Henderson out of the top 
OPA position after the Republican rout in the 1942 midterms, the former TNEC official had 
by then built the agency upon radical foundations. Foremost among them was his price 
policy itself – Henderson employed an “overall earnings standard,” which called for keeping 
prices as low as possible without pushing an industry into the red. In other words, the OPA 
used industrywide profit margins to determine the lowest price that average performers could 
charge without being forced to operate at a loss. To corporate executives who hoped for a 
replay of the First World War’s War Industries Board (WIB), which implemented a “cost-
plus” price policy that guaranteed a certain rate of return for all firms, the overall earnings 
standard was not far short of expropriation.16 On top of this, Henderson oversaw the 
tremendous expansion of the OPA – under his direction its staff increased tenfold to 30,000, 
and it doubled again by the end of 1943, with 90% of the employees stationed outside of 
Washington.17  
  But even in this most favorable climate – as an industrial union representative in a 
proto-social democratic body – Montgomery faced steep challenges that illuminated just how 
much was at stake in the politics of inflation. In October 1943, Roosevelt appointed Chester 
Bowles, then state director of the Connecticut OPA, to lead the national price control 
program. Bowles counted Montgomery as an important personal and intellectual influence, 
and looked to him for guidance every step along the way. Soliciting Montgomery’s advice 
before accepting the position, Bowles admitted to being “very fearful [the OPA] will get in 
the hands of a reactionary group who are more anxious of appeasing business than really 
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controlling inflation and the cost of living.”18 Still, he noted that Montgomery was “so right 
in sensing the opportunity that faces the labor movement on price control,” and felt that if 
“labor can only bring that fight to a successful conclusion and successfully dramatize the part 
that it played in bringing that victory about, it will be able to store up a huge backlog of good 
will which will come in very handy in the trying days after the war was is over.”19  
 Montgomery may have appreciated the sentiment, but admiration would not stay 
mutual for long. Over the next three years he would grow increasingly frustrated with the 
OPA director’s unwillingness – or inability – to take the bold steps needed to help labor 
achieve that “successful conclusion.” Montgomery grew frustrated, that is, but not surprised 
– “No disparagement of your personal anatomy is implied,” he wrote to Bowles, “in recalling 
[UAW staffer] Paul Sifton’s definition of the upright public servant as an official whose 
backbone is maintained in that position by approximately equal pressures from all 
directions.”20 The problem, Montgomery knew from his time in the USDA, was that those 
pressures are never applied equally. This was something the fate of the OPA would bear out. 
 The issues arose immediately after Bowles took office. In early 1944, Congressional 
Republicans and Southern Democrats used the annual renewal process of the OPA to amend 
the Price Control Act in ways that Montgomery and the OPA LPC felt would “grossly vitiate 
the emergency wartime controls…as well as the enforcement essential to the exercise of 
those controls.”21 The new bill granted cotton interests their demand for special price 
treatment, and it substantially reduced penalties for non-compliance.22 What disappointed 
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labor representatives the most, however, was Bowles’s apparent spinelessness in the face of 
the assault. Attuned to the OPA’s widespread popularity – polls repeatedly showed strong 
public support – the LPC called for Roosevelt to veto the bill, thereby forcing the 
conservatives’ hand and turning the upcoming 1944 election into a referendum on the merits 
of price control. But Bowles demurred, criticizing the bill yet refusing to discourage the 
President’s from signing it, a stance against which Montgomery and the LPC felt “compelled 
to take strong exception.” The trade unionists’ displeasure would with the OPA director 
would only increase. The cuts to enforcement, the LPC noted to Bowles, would place “a very 
heavy burden of responsibility and expense” on the labor movement, which was left on its 
own in mobilizing “voluntary consumer participation” for the bottom up campaign to 
politicize prices. The OPA ought therefore, Montgomery would plead to Bowles more than 
once, to create a Deputy Administrator position “responsible for general supervision and 
coordination of labor activities” and to place paid labor coordinators in all district offices.23 
Bowles replied the same way each time – that it would be “extremely tough from an 
organizational point of view,” not least because the Bureau of the Budget refused to make 
funds available for such a purpose.24 Such was the peak of the labor movement’s influence 
on the OPA. Still, in the face of mounting corporate and congressional opposition it was 
significant that the OPA even managed to survive, and although the LPC would spar with 
Bowles for the next year over things ranging from the price of vacuum cleaners to steel, state 
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level personnel to the content of official pamphlets, for the duration of the war the cost of 
living would remain stable.25  
 After V-J Day, however, when the imperatives of wartime emergency no longer 
seemed to hold, the class conflict at the root of the inflation question exploded volcanically, 
and the UAW was at the center of this epochal struggle. In the summer of 1945, Walter 
Reuther submitted to William H. Davis, the sympathetic Director of the Office of Economic 
Stabilization, which oversaw both the OPA and the NWLB, a report prepared by 
Montgomery that highlighted the perils involved in the reconversion process. In order to 
sustain mass purchasing power and prevent a sharp postwar downturn, Montgomery’s 
analysis held, workers needed a substantial increase in real wages, which industrial 
corporations showered with wartime profits could surely absorb without raising prices. Davis 
endorsed the proposal – indeed he concluded that real wages would have to rise by some 50 
percent over the next five years if another slump was to be avoided – as did other high 
ranking progressives like Henry Wallace, who was then Secretary of Commerce. The new 
President Truman, however, was less enthusiastic. He called for restraint by all parties until 
the fall, when he hoped to convene a grand Labor-Management conference at the White 
House charged with settling the matter.26 
 Walter Reuther and the UAW were unwilling to wait, and just a week after Nagasaki 
the autoworkers’ leader unveiled his union’s “Purchasing Power for Prosperity” bargaining 
program to GM. Drafted by Montgomery, its central demand was a 30 percent wage hike 
without an increase in the price of a car. The proposal was intended to be political, and the 
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strike that resulted – the company refused even to entertain the idea that “capacity to pay” 
represented a bargaining subject, let alone to discuss figures –  had a radical character 
throughout. In late November 1945, 175,000 autoworkers walked out of GM plants, and they 
would stay out for the next 113 days. Before long they were joined by tens of thousands of 
steel workers, meatpacking workers, electrical workers, miners, and many others – more than 
4 million in total – in what became the largest strike wave in U.S. history.27 
 It ended in what Reuther and Montgomery considered a disaster. For if the UAW 
leadership saw the politics of price as the key battleground of reconversion, the same could 
not be said for other CIO unions. This was especially the case for the USWA. Ever since the 
founding of U.S. Steel, out of the deflationary wreckage of the late nineteenth century, the 
wage-price relation in this “fundamental” industry had drawn political scrutiny. And as we 
will see in later chapters, this continued well into the postwar period. As a result, steel 
executives were less wary than their counterparts in auto of brokering deals with the state and 
the union over wages and prices.28 Moreover, productivity in the expansive internally 
complex steel plants always lagged behind the Fordist pace pioneered in Detroit, and a 
reasonable case could be made that for that reason steel needed more price relief than the Big 
Three car manufacturers. Stir into the mix Philip Murray’s less confrontational style, as well 
as the USWA leader’s perhaps misplaced hope that Truman was on the cusp of spearheading 
a new New Deal, and it is less than surprising that the leadership of the CIO’s biggest union 
proved hesitant to hitch their fate to Reuther’s bold gamble. Others, like the electrical 
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workers, followed Murray over Reuther. That most unions only began their strikes in January 
1946 – two months after the UAW – when it became clear that the President would be unable 
to get corporate leaders to the table suggested just how divided the industrial union 
movement was.29 
 The division was underscored in mid-February when the USWA accepted a contract 
that provided a sizable wage hike but said nothing of prices. Days later, the OPA approved a 
steel price increase of more than five dollars a ton, twice what Bowles had earlier indicated 
would be a reasonable bump. Isolated and vulnerable – a frustrated Reuther had to admit that 
the steel settlement “weakened our position” – the UAW carried on for another month, but in 
mid-March settled for a less than satisfactory wage boost without, again, any promise on 
prices. If “Treason and Double-Cross” by others in the labor movement was one way to make 
sense of the defeat, Montgomery understood that it was the Truman administration and the 
OPA that had “abandoned the hold-the-line policy” – whether they knew it or not, they had 
“converted [the OPA] into a price-raising agency.”30 And his criticism was not without 
cause. Two weeks before the UAW strike began, Bowles had authorized modest price 
increases for Chrysler and Ford, a move that Montgomery felt amounted to “in practical 
effect – seating yourself and, with you, the United States Government on the GM side of the 
bargaining table” because the “rank and file of UAW-CIO feel personally that any price 
increase on automobiles is as much a defeat for them as the denial of a wage increase.”31 
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Montgomery’s hope that, “in the last moment, you will not stand against us” was to no 
avail.32  
  Montgomery’s pointed criticisms notwithstanding, the OPA did still place some 
downward pressure on prices. But its future was very much uncertain. Congressional 
conservatives would spend the two months following the GM strike settlement trying to gut 
it, and the amended Price Control Act they presented to Truman that summer was so weak 
that even this most cautious President felt compelled to veto it. On July 1, 1946, then, the 
OPA became a dead letter. In a memo delivered to Reuther the next day, Montgomery 
assessed the situation. “Inflation is here,” he began, and the real “issue in that controversy is 
who is to get the blame.” Unfortunately, he continued, that issue had already been decided. 
“Labor has been made the scapegoat of this inflation.” And for a variety of reasons the 
unions should not expect to find relief from it any time soon – with the government running 
large deficits a tighter monetary policy (which itself would be of questionable efficacy) was 
not on the table, and consumer spending power in the immediate postwar period appeared to 
be higher than anticipated. The inflationary pressures would therefore be “self perpetuating, 
and will spread and accelerate.” An increase in the general price level of “far more than 20 
percent” was, remarkably, not inconceivable. “We have lost round one in our wage-price 
fight,” Montgomery had to admit in conclusion, but he added that the “fight will go on.” And 
a “valuable by-product” of it “will be that our members through their own experience in the 
fight will enlarge their understanding of the larger wage-price battle which organized labor 
must win if it is ever to get a good living.”33 
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 But politics often outpace the development of the kind of class consciousness 
Montgomery had in mind. Inflation skyrocketed for the remainder of the year – 
Montgomery’s estimate of 20 percent was close to the mark – and it became the biggest issue 
in the 1946 midterm elections. Widespread frustration with the galloping cost of living, as 
well as an effective business campaign to “scapegoat” organized labor, combined with low 
voter turnout to deliver a Republican majority in Congress for the first time since Roosevelt 
first took office. And led by the rabidly anti-union Senator Robert Taft from Ohio, these 
conservative shock troops struck while the iron was hot, passing the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947 
over Truman’s veto. If it was not quite a “slave-labor bill,” Taft-Hartley did weaken the 
Wagner Act in a number of ways – it allowed states to abolish the union shop; prohibited 
secondary strikes; prevented supervisors from unionizing; expelled Communists from union 
leadership positions – and its passage rightly stands as among the most significant defeats in 
twentieth-century U.S. labor history.34 
 The fate of the OPA stymied the development of Montgomery’s hoped for class 
consciousness in still another way. It signaled the death knell of labor’s other political 
objective at the end of the war: full employment legislation. Indeed, as Michal Kalecki had 
predicted in 1943, even under the best of circumstances the obstacles capitalist society placed 
in the way of full employment may just be too great to overcome. His prescient words are 
worth quoting at length:  
under a regime of permanent full employment, ‘the sack’ would cease to play 
its role as a disciplinary measure. The social position of the boss would be 
undermined and the self assurance and class consciousness of the working 
class would grow. Strikes for wage increases and improvements in conditions 
of work would create political tension. It is true that profits would be higher 
under a regime of full employment than they are on the average under laissez-
faire….But ‘discipline in the factories’ are more appreciated by the business 
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leaders than profits. Their class instinct tells them that lasting full employment 
is unsound from their point of view and that unemployment is an integral part 
of the ‘normal’ capitalist system.35 
 
That, again, is what they could expect to confront if successful. But the struggle did not even 
get that far.  
 By all accounts, a full employment policy without attendant economic controls would 
prove inflationary. When times were good, high levels of investment and employment would 
drive demand up and take prices with it. And when times were bad, the federal government 
would have to prime the pump with heavy doses of deficit spending which would in turn fan 
the flames of inflation. The defeat of the OPA and the great inflation of 1946, then, gave 
business conservatives just the issue they needed to kill the full employment campaign. How 
could Congress authorize even more inflation in this economic climate?  
 That the original version of the bill itself had been drafted by none other than 
Mordecai Ezekiel and Louis Bean of the BAE along with NFU Legislative Director Russell 
highlights both the centrality of the Institutional Keynesian tradition to this struggle and the 
significance of the failure.36 In its final form, sponsored by Montana Senator James Murray, 
the Full Employment Act of 1945 called for the president to submit to Congress an annual 
National Production and Employment Budget that forecast the number of jobs and the 
amount of investment that would be required to provide work for everyone in the national 
labor force. If private investment was expected to fall short of the necessary amount, the 
federal government would step in to make up the difference. The idea was to break capital’s 
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monopoly on the investment function, and like Kalecki predicted capitalists understood the 
threat. Through 1945 and 1946, until the midterm elections bought them some breathing 
room, corporate America waged a relentless two-pronged war against the OPA and the full 
employment bill, finally using the demise of the first to justify their opposition to the 
second.37 
 But popular demand for full employment was high – not least because the war had 
proved it possible – so the business community responded with a measure of their own. The 
Employment Act of 1946, differed from the Institutional Keynesians’ measure in 
fundamental ways, name included. First, it had two goals, not one: maximum employment, 
which it defined as an unemployment rate of three percent, and price stability. Whether those 
goals might conflict its sponsors failed to mention. They also failed to reckon with the 
consequences of attaching a number to the optimal rate of unemployment – this provided an 
institutional foundation for the idea of a “natural rate of unemployment,” one that we will 
examine in Ch. 5 but whose potential ideological implications should be clear. Second, it 
dispensed with the National Production and Employment Budget, the substantive core of the 
law. The Employment Act did create the Council of Economic Advisers, charged with 
publishing an annual Economic Report of the President, and a congressional Joint Committee 
on the Economic Report (later changed to the Joint Economic Committee), both of which 
have remained mainstays of the federal economic policymaking top brass. And both, indeed, 
would provide Institutional Keynesians with opportunities to advance their agenda in the 
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postwar period. Still, the derailment of full employment policy during reconversion stood as 
an epochal defeat for the New Deal order.38  
  A third, less perceptible but equally profound defeat lay in the years ahead. With the 
end of the OPA and the fate of full employment legislation, the state formally extricated itself 
from involvement in labor relations for the first time since Roosevelt and Michigan Governor 
Frank Murphy had in 1937 dispatched the National Guard to protect UAW sit-down strikers 
in Flint. In contrast to the experience in 1919, however, this round of postwar workplace de-
politicization did not spell immediate disaster for the labor movement. Five years of NWLB 
maintenance-of-membership policy provided the industrial unions with a stable constituency, 
one that in the decade after the war would grow to an apogee of one-third of the non-farm 
workforce. And in 1948 and again in 1950, the CIO, led by the UAW, successfully translated 
this raw power into collective bargaining agreements of a scope that most workers would 
have found unthinkable a decade earlier. When Reuther and the UAW accepted the famous 
Treaty of Detroit in 1950, which provided employer funded pensions, healthcare, and an 
annual productivity-based income supplement, all on top of strong wage gains, it was clear 
that organized labor was there to stay, at least for the foreseeable future. During the quarter-
century “Great Compression” that followed, workers’ real incomes, as well as their share of 
the total pie, climbed at a rate without precedent in the United States.  
 But when the social critic Daniel Bell observed that the billion dollars GM paid for 
labor peace in 1950 was in fact a bargain, he highlighted the darker side of this achievement. 
As scholars have noted, the CIO’s commitment to an expansive political economic vision fell 
in inverse proportion to the benefits its affiliate unions secured from employers at the firm-
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level. The workers’ victories in the immediate postwar years, then, did in a sense signal the 
“eclipse of social democracy.” Without assigning blame to labor officials who accepted 
agreements that objectively improved their members’ standard of living, one can conclude 
that this success brought with it contradictions of its own.39 But neither the severity of those 
contradictions nor the means by which they would be resolved was foreordained. That 
history too would be the subject of struggle. 
 
*** 
 
THE LABOR QUESTION in the immediate postwar years was rivaled in significance only 
by the question of what to do about agriculture. War had transformed the issues facing the 
U.S. countryside, as two decades of downward pressure on commodity prices, which the 
New Deal met with production restraint, gave way to a booming demand and the threat of 
inflation. The political economy of war, that is, called for a different approach than seemed 
appropriate in a time of depression. But old habits, especially those conditioned by material 
interests, died hard. As Donald Montgomery and others had learned in the 1930s, commercial 
agricultural producers and processors fixated on price movements alone would resist any 
obstacle in the way of an upward drift.  Complicating matters was the changing character of 
the USDA. In 1940, Roosevelt put Henry Wallace on his ticket, and as a result of the 
personnel shakeups and the exigencies of war the Institutional Keynesians lost much of the 
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ground they had held since 1933. Soon after Montgomery’s departure, for instance, the 
Department closed the Consumers’ Counsel Division’s doors. 
 Throughout the war, then, tensions flared between big agricultural interests, along 
with their representatives in the USDA, and the planners in the Office of Price 
Administration. And during reconversion these tensions erupted to catastrophic effect. 
Indeed, agribusiness and corporate processors bore as much responsibility for the death of the 
OPA, the inflationary spike that followed it, and the political consequences that resulted, as 
any other single issue. Freed from price control, the cost of food surged through 1946 – and 
as one of the largest items in working-class household budgets this took a more immediate 
toll than did climbing industrial prices, which crept into consumer goods more gradually. 
Arriving at a national agricultural policy that ensured both stable incomes for farm workers 
and affordable food for urban consumers – a challenge that had bedeviled Institutional 
Keynesians in the New Deal – therefore took on renewed urgency.40 
 But that challenge had only become more complex since the war. For one, 
commercial agricultural interests were themselves divided over what was to be done. 
Whereas producers of “basic commodities” like cotton, wheat, and tobacco feared a repeat of 
the surpluses and deflation of the 1920s and called for a maintenance of production restraint, 
corn and livestock raisers, who stood to benefit directly from rising consumer demand, hoped 
for a return to the free market. After the war, these competing interests vied for control 
within the AFBF, and following a heated leadership fight the corn and hog forces emerged 
triumphant. The division had a geographic, and therefore partisan, character – the 
Democratic South and northern Plains versus the Republican Midwest – and it was through 
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this internal struggle that the AFBF became firmly planted in the GOP camp, where it would 
stay through the 1950s. Still, in the short-term the result was a political stalemate. The 
wartime agricultural program had mandated a two-year extension of production controls after 
the cessation of hostilities, a preventative measure informed by the experience in 1919, and 
the Agriculture Act of 1948 that followed effectively kicked the can for an additional two 
years.41 The struggle over a long-term agricultural program, which had begun in 1933, was 
still very much ongoing. 
 Donald Montgomery was of course familiar with the challenge, and he continued to 
voice concern about it from his position with the UAW. “Always,” he noted to a New York 
State committee on nutrition in late 1943, commercial agriculture “has been concerned 
primarily with price.” Judging by recent federal policy, Montgomery continued, borrowing a 
formulation coined by Mary Taylor, an observer could reasonably “think that the purpose of 
agriculture was to produce prices” rather than “food as something to eat.” Why? Because 
“the big farmers who control government policy” and who, through depression and war, had 
accumulated a larger and larger “proportion of the total agricultural productive capacity of 
this country,” profited from the continuation of the status quo. Not unlike their industrial 
cousins GM and U.S. Steel, the owners of the means of agricultural production would always 
charge as much as they could get away with. The difference was that they did so with 
government sanction. As a result, Montgomery soberly concluded, while there “will certainly 
be enough food for our country as a whole” after the war, “mismanagement” would lead to 
unfair distribution and waste. Poor “families will continue to starve on their feet, as they 
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always have,” and, he feared, many middle-class “families are going to have to join their 
low-income colleagues because of the rise in the cost of food.”42 
 James Patton, the young, progressive leader of the revitalized National Farmers’ 
Union (NFU), felt the same way. Founded in 1902, in the wake of the Populist defeat, the 
NFU through the 1930s could not shed the increasingly outdated worldview and political 
program that had energized its forerunners. Its central demand in the Depression years was 
currency inflation, and if the shadow of William Jennings Bryan was long, it was not that 
long. The AAA represented a firm rebuke of the NFU agenda, and during Roosevelt’s first 
two terms the organization fell into disarray. By 1939 its membership had plummeted to 
65,000, a sharp contrast to the AFBF, which grew three fold over that same period to 
450,000. Patton, a shrewd organizer who was then the head of the Colorado Farmers’ Union, 
took control of the organization in that moment of crisis, and he quickly stabilized its 
membership and reoriented its political vision.  Born the year the NFU was founded and 
raised in a western Colorado experimental community called Nucla (New Utopia 
Cooperative Land Association), Patton’s father was a socialist and an active supporter of the 
striking miners who were savagely killed at Ludlow in 1914. Those politics would stay with 
rising farm leader.43 
 Under Patton’s direction, the NFU endorsed left USDA initiatives like the FSA, and it 
was the only farm organization to throw its full support behind the OPA. The timing was 
ripe, as the civil war within the AFBF which pushed that group into the Republican Party had 
left an opening for the NFU among Democrats, at least those outside the South – the 
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organization, composed mostly of small to mid-sized Midwestern wheat farmers, was hostile 
to the big landowners, and this along with Patton’s avowed commitment to racial equality 
made the NFU anathema to those southern agriculturalists on the losing end of the internal 
AFBF struggle.  As a result, the NFU grew closer and closer to the CIO, and in the latter half 
of the 1940s the two worker organizations showed signs of fusing into the kind of labor-
farmer alliance that Institutional Keynesians had long hoped to see.  
 And they had reason to be optimistic. Again, the BAE and NFU had been central in 
the legislative struggle for the ill-fated Full Employment Act, and the latter was a leading 
force behind the passage of the scaled down Employment Act of 1946. In the spring of 1946, 
moreover, Patton co-sponsored a conference, along with A. Philip Randolph of the BSCP, 
H.L. Mitchell of the STFU, and others, that led to the establishment of a National 
Educational Committee for a New Party (NECNP). The NECNP, which received support 
from both AFL and CIO unions, was intended to serve as “a clearing house and coordinating 
center” that could “carry on educational work for independent political action” in pursuit of a 
broadly social democratic agenda.44 Discussing agriculture, the NECNP declaration of 
principles, drafted by largely by Lewis Corey (the socialist formerly known as Louis Fraina), 
began by noting that although “stability of farm prices is important for farmers, a progressive 
farm program must go beyond price policy.”45 In the postwar struggle over agriculture, the 
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labor-farmer coalition would finally move this perspective – long advocated by Institutional 
Keynesians inside the USDA Consumers’ Counsel – to the center of debate. 
 And there it would die, but not without a fight. In 1948, after Truman’s conservative 
Secretary of Agriculture, Clinton Anderson, resigned to run for an open Senate seat in his 
home state of New Mexico, the President appointed Charles Brannan to fill the vacancy. 
Brannan was an exemplar of the 1930s and early 1940s USDA liberal-left. Having never 
lived on a farm, he joined the Tugwell-led RA as an attorney, worked for its successor, the 
FSA, and in 1944 rose to the position of Assistant Secretary of Agriculture. A native of 
Colorado, Brannan and James Patton were longtime friends, and he was the NFU’s top 
choice to replace Anderson. In spite of their political differences, Brannan’s able service to 
the Department also earned him a recommendation from Anderson, the outgoing head.46  
 The timing of Brannan’s appointment was significant. In the 1948 election, Truman 
faced two formidable challenges. From his right was the popular liberal Republican 
Governor of New York, Thomas Dewey, and from his left the former Secretary of 
Agriculture, Commerce, and Vice President, Henry A. Wallace, running on the ticket of the 
newly formed Progressive Party. Wallace’s platform was unabashedly social democratic, 
much like the one outlined by the NECNP, and, on the eve of the Cold War, he advocated 
cooperation with the Soviet Union. Both stances won him favor with Communists, who used 
the election season to show one last display of political dynamism before the hammer of 
McCarthyism came down on the U.S. radical left. If awareness of the witch-hunts to come 
can leave one with the impression that the Wallace campaign was at best quixotic, however, 
to labor-liberals at the time it posed something between an agonizing dilemma and an 
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outright threat. The Democratic establishment, along with most of the CIO leadership, saw it 
as the latter – a strong Wallace performance could well deliver the White House to the GOP 
– and the Progressive Party’s Communist ties did not hurt their case. Truman managed to 
win, in what many pollsters considered the greatest upset in the history of U.S. presidential 
elections, but increasingly anti-communist industrial union officials still used the occasion to 
purge CP members from their ranks – adhering to a Taft-Hartley provision that they might 
have resisted on civil libertarian grounds. In the process, they happened to consolidate their 
control over the CIO. By 1950, the industrial union federation had expelled eleven left-led 
unions – including the mighty United Electrical Workers (UE) – and blacklisted scores of its 
most brilliant organizers, those with the deepest commitments to the struggle for racial 
justice and without whom the CIO project would have been stillborn.47 
 Still, the challenge posed by the coalition surrounding the Wallace campaign, as well 
as the fact that CIO and NFU support proved indispensable to Truman’s success, convinced 
the President that a program appealing to his twin urban and rural constituencies could 
solidify Democratic control at the national level for the foreseeable future. And to wage that 
legislative struggle, he turned to Charles Brannan. The Brannan Plan that resulted, unveiled 
soon after the inauguration in 1949, represented the culmination of more than fifteen years of 
Institutional Keynesianism inside and out of the federal government. The proposal was 
complicated in its technical details, but straightforward in principle: the purpose of 
agricultural policy should be to guarantee farmers stable incomes, not high prices. This the 
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government could achieve by providing producers with subsidies and encouraging high 
production to bring down consumer prices. To protect natural resources and to direct 
production towards low supply but nutritionally valuable crops, receipt of the subsidies 
would be conditional upon following USDA guidelines about conservation and 
diversification. And, most controversially, to promote family farming over large-scale 
commercial agriculture, a cap would be placed on the number of acres for which a producer 
could collect the subsidy.48 No more handouts to the southern planter class. 
 The Brannan Plan, it should be noted, was premised upon the understanding that U.S. 
agriculture was undergoing a wholesale transformation through which mechanization on 
farms and employment opportunities off them would substantially reduce the number and 
proportion of farm workers.49 This process had been underway since early in the century, and 
it accelerated during World War II, as evidenced by the Second Great Migration of African 
Americans from the rural south to urban-industrial centers. And Brannan felt it should not be 
resisted. Greater support for resettlement and a full employment economy would offer 
security for the landless, while the institutionalization of a mosaic of independent, mid-sized 
farms, could serve as a New Dealized version of the old republican dream for those who 
remained. A healthy urban economy, that is, was a precondition for rural prosperity. As 
Donald Montgomery put it a few weeks before the plan was announced, in an NBC broadcast 
debate with representatives of the AFBF and the Chamber of Commerce, whatever “the 
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details of the farm program are, it is not actually going to get prosperity and security for the 
farmers unless we make up our minds that we are going to maintain full employment and a 
full productive economy year after year.”50 To James Patton, the synthesis Brannan had 
achieved represented “a milestone in the history of American agriculture.”51 As Truman had 
hoped, the proposal had the potential to formally incorporate an urban-rural alliance under 
the auspices of the Democratic Party, one that would have tilted the balance away from both 
Republicans and the reactionary South once and for all.  
 Conservatives were aware of that threat, and the campaign they waged against the 
Brannan Plan was accordingly determined. Republicans, southern Democrats, and every farm 
organization excepting the NFU opposed it, with more than few labeling it “socialistic,” 
“Communist bunk,” “un-American,” and other buzzwords of the paranoid style then gaining 
currency in U.S. political rhetoric.52 The most powerful criticism of the Brannan Plan, 
however, was that it would be inflationary – just as was the case with the Full Employment 
Act. Although the Secretary insisted that its cost would be comparable to that of the existing 
agricultural program, critics charged that it would encourage dangerous amounts of deficit 
spending and thereby serve to depreciate the value of the dollar. This was an argument 
Institutional Keynesians had heard since early in the New Deal, and it was one from which 
they could not escape. Led by freshman Senator and former Secretary of Agriculture Clinton 
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Anderson, and with strong support from the AFBF and its processor allies, the anti-Brannan 
forces prevented the bill from coming to a vote, replacing it with a modest refinement of the 
1948 law. Brannan tried again in 1950, but his proposal did not even make it out of 
committee, and with the onset of the Korean War the Truman administration abandoned its 
pursuit of Fair Deal, of which a new agricultural policy was to be a central part.53 
 Brannan continued to harbor hopes that his idea might be revived in the 1950s, and he 
corresponded about it with trade unionists and leading Democratic officials well into that 
decade.54 But the tide had turned. During the Eisenhower administration, Secretary of 
Agriculture Ezra Taft Benson represented everything the Institutional Keynesians had 
opposed. A Mormon raised in Idaho – later in life he would serve as the thirteenth president 
of the Church of Latter Day Saints – Benson sympathized with the John Birch Society and 
hated the New Deal. Early in his tenure, which lasted both Eisenhower terms, he shut down 
the BAE, terminated the Department’s soil conservation program, and strengthened the 
Extension Service, which was infamously controlled by the AFBF. And though he railed 
against state intervention of any kind, that did not stop him from showering the corn interests 
– who led an AFBF with which he was closely allied – with generous aid. But Benson did 
face stiff opposition through the 1950s, not least from a NFU that retained substantial 
influence in Congress, especially among the growing number of Democrats in what had been 
the AFBF-GOP stronghold, the rural Midwest. Producers of other commodities, too, resented 
Benson’s special treatment of the corn bloc, and as a result the search for a long-term 
national agricultural policy stalled during the Eisenhower years just as it had in the 1940s.55 
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 That long-term solution was only achieved in the mid-1960s. And like the Kennedy-
Johnson solution to the labor question, the subject of Ch. 5, it was an ostensibly progressive 
measure that implicitly served to ratify the existing class structure. The Food and Agriculture 
Act of 1965, which set the parameters within which agricultural policy would be conducted 
for the next three decades, did include some of the key features of the Brannan Plan. It 
offered tailor-made subsidies to different commodity groups, guaranteeing a stable income 
regardless of fluctuations in the market price. It allowed global market forces to drive down 
the prices consumers paid. And it dramatically expanded the Food Stamp Program, providing 
millions of low income households with access to a more nutritious diet. On the whole, it 
signaled that the state was in agriculture for good.56 But just as important is what it did not 
do: it said nothing about ownership of the land. Brannan’s effort to check the concentration 
of land ownership by limiting provision of subsidies to smaller landholders had failed, and 
under the long-term farm program finally reached under Johnson corporate agribusiness 
claimed most of the benefits, as it had since the days of the AAA. By the late twentieth 
century, the family farm had faded out of existence and rural populations continued to shrink. 
Working people who remained in the countryside were effectively shut out from whatever 
social contract the New Deal Order signified. Proletarianized and poverty stricken, many of 
them found it easier to blame their hardship on that liberal political project – and the 
industrial unionists, African Americans, immigrants, and feminists who seemed to benefit 
from it – than on the absentee landowners who had stymied Institutional Keynesian 
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ambitions of extending the New Deal in rural America. To answer the question of what is the 
matter with Kansas and places like it, one must start there.57 
 
*** 
LESS VISIBLE TO THE PUBLIC EYE but just as significant as the immediate postwar 
responses to the labor and agriculture questions were the politics surrounding the social 
character of capital. The financial sector, including the Federal Reserve and Treasury 
Department, has been thus far absent from our story, and given that financial legislation was 
Roosevelt’s first order of business in 1933 this might seem a curious omission. But it was the 
efficacy of the banking and securities acts of 1933, 1934 and 1935 in meeting their stated 
objectives that left the captains of finance and their representatives in government as 
secondary actors in the struggle over economic policy in the 1930s and through the war. That 
would all change by the early 1950s. 
 The appalling degree of speculation in the 1920s, and the disregard with which 
investment bankers squandered workers’ savings in pursuit of each successive peak in the 
asset bubble that resulted, all of which served to precipitate the titanic collapse at the end of 
the decade, concentrated public scorn on Wall Street more than any other political or 
economic symbol. This was but a generation since the Populist upheaval, and ideological 
antipathies towards the investor class – especially in the South and West – still drew 
sustenance from the collective memory of that epochal tragedy. Some of the most durable 
New Deal policies emerged out of the legislative reforms that followed. The Banking Act of 
1933 – sponsored by southerners, Carter Glass and Henry Steagall, who saw a racial caste 
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system and regulated finance as the twin keys to maintaining the Dixie way of life – erected a 
firewall between investment and commercial banking; the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
established a Securities Exchange Commission charged with overseeing the stock and bond 
markets; and the Banking Act of 1935 made permanent the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation. For the next half century, these laws would do much to stabilize the financial 
system and to prevent the kinds of panics that had since 1819 chronically convulsed the U.S. 
economy (and which have again begun doing so since the 1980s).58 
 The Banking Acts of 1933 and 1935 also bore significantly on the Federal Reserve. 
Both initiatives were led by Roosevelt’s appointee to head the central bank, Marriner 
Stoddard Eccles. A little known Republican banker from Utah who had been recommended 
to the President by Rexford Tugwell (by way of Stuart Chase), Eccles became the first 
westerner to hold the top Fed post. He brought with him an acute sensitivity to the social 
hardship induced by monetary shortages, something those in the commodity producing 
mountain regions had learned the hard way during the deflations of the late-nineteenth 
century and again in the 1920s. Monetary policy, Eccles thus concluded, should serve the 
public interest and not only that of the bankers. But as things stood, he complained in 1934, 
the Fed “cannot help but be profoundly influenced by a narrow banking rather than a broad 
social point of view.”59 Its decentralized structure over-determined it. Moreover, if a flexible 
monetary policy was necessary, Eccles also emphasized that it alone was insufficient in the 
face of the crisis at hand. Only an activist and redistributive fiscal policy, directed towards 
putting people to work and supported by a cooperative central bank, could boost mass 
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purchasing power. Indeed, Eccles, an organic intellectual who lacked a college degree, 
anticipated the expansionist theory that would soon be associated with Keynes. He continued 
to expound upon it well into the 1940s, even as he insisted that he had never ready anything 
the Cambridge don had written.60 
 But Eccles was still a banker. He was interested in modernizing the financial system, 
not socializing it. And as a condition for accepting the position, Eccles demanded that 
Congress invest the Fed leadership with authority to superintend that process. Established in 
1913 in response to both rural pressure for representation in the formulation of monetary 
policy and corporate desires for financial stability and predictability, the Federal Reserve 
System had from its inception been a body riven with contradiction.61 Composed of twelve 
relatively autonomous branch banks directed by members of the financial class in different 
geographic regions, a federated structure that lent each branch a distinct character and 
allowed room for conflicting interests to emerge, policy decisions were made in a most 
haphazard fashion. The Fed’s confused response to the 1929 crash – the money supply 
remained low even as the economy descended into the abyss – exposed the limitations of the 
decentralization that Eccles wanted changed.62 The Banking Act of 1933 provided a statutory 
basis for “open market operations,” the Fed’s term for management of money and credit 
through purchase and sale of Treasury securities, and the 1935 bill, which Eccles helped to 
draft, centralized decision making in the Washington based Federal Open Market Committee 
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(FOMC). The New Deal, then, did much to shift the center of gravity of financial 
policymaking from New York to the nation’s capital. 
 And there the Fed would be shaped by the politics of the New Deal.63 The “actions of 
the monetary authority,” as Eccles’s deputy and ardent New Dealer Laughlin Currie put it, 
“must be subject to the control of the Administration.”64 In the first instance, that implied that 
Fed independence would have to be subordinated to the imperatives of the federal deficit 
spending program. In concrete terms, this required that the central bank partner with the 
Treasury Department in channeling government securities into the private banking system, 
accessing the credit needed to finance increasing federal outlays, and ensuring that the cost of 
servicing that debt – above all the yield on Treasury bonds – remained low. In effect, Eccles 
agreed to run the Fed as a central bank for the New Deal, and throughout the 1930s and for 
much of the 1940s he kept his word. This was the first time national fiscal and monetary 
policies were implemented in a planned and coordinated fashion. 
 That balance was not struck without tension. The leaderships of the Treasury – during 
most of this period Secretary Henry Morgenthau – and the Federal Reserve locked horns 
more than a few times before their grand “Accord” of 1951. But the fault lines between them 
changed over time and with economic circumstance. In 1936, Morgenthau, concerned about 
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the inflationary repercussions of chronic federal deficits, led a successful campaign within 
the administration to bring the budget into balance. Eccles and Currie slammed the proposal, 
warning that it would sap the fragile recovery, and the deep recession that followed in 1937 
seemed to validate their viewpoint. Morgenthau, for his part, placed blame for the 1937 
downturn at the doors of the central bank. In response to a flood of gold pouring into the U.S. 
from war wary European banks, a base upon which American financial institutions had 
increased their lending and thus expanded the money supply, Eccles moved to raise reserve 
requirements on the grounds that it would check the specter of asset inflation. Fearful that the 
action might ever so slightly increase interest rates, Morgenthau saw it as monetary austerity. 
While scholars tend more towards Eccles in their assessment of the 1937 “Roosevelt 
Recession,” the point here is not to pass judgment but rather to investigate the conditions – 
intellectual, institutional, structural – that worked to set the terms of debate.65 
 Personality too had something to do with it. Perhaps owing to an insecurity born of 
his inexperience in banking and concern for his standing in the administration, Morgenthau 
jealously guarded his authority at the Treasury Department. And although he had approved of 
Roosevelt’s decision to nominate Eccles, he quickly came to see the heterodox central banker 
– who seemed of a piece with the New Deal left against which Morgenthau regularly stood in 
opposition – as a direct threat. But as a political outsider who had already conceded 
autonomy to the larger goals of the New Deal, Eccles harbored no such ill will. The source of 
tension was deeper, having to do more with institutional culture and ideological disposition 
than interpersonal squabbles. At the helm of the Treasury, Morgenthau retained a narrow 
conception of his responsibility as maintaining the federal government’s fiscal health, and 
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doing so required two things: limiting the accumulation of public debt and minimizing the 
cost of servicing it. Eccles brought a broader perspective as a central banker. General 
recovery meant more to him than short-term fiscal soundness – indeed, he felt that budgetary 
orthodoxy of the kind espoused by Morgenthau was responsible for the lumbering response 
to the crisis before Roosevelt’s election. And while recovery did depend upon coordinated 
fiscal and monetary policies, coordination required some room for negotiation. Monetary 
affairs were complicated, and responding to exogenous factors – like European anticipation 
of war – demanded a level of flexibility that Morgenthau, fixated on low Treasury yields 
alone, never quite trusted.66 The challenges of synchronizing fiscal and monetary policy 
between the two institutions would become more clear over the course of the next decade. 
And as we will see, Treasury and the Fed officials would view those challenges differently as 
the global political economy began to change after 1945. 
 But first came the war. After Pearl Harbor, Eccles doubled down on his commitment 
to facilitate Roosevelt’s deficit spending demands, promising “to assure an ample supply of 
funds” to the war effort.67 The mechanism for doing so came to be called the “peg” – a fixed 
pattern of interest rates on Treasury bonds, ranging from 3/8 percent for those with the 
shortest-term and 2½ percent for the longest-term maturities. Maintaining such low rates 
would require a high demand for Treasuries – bond prices and yields are inversely related – 
and Eccles promised that the Fed would step in to buy any amount necessary to keep the 
government’s borrowing costs low. If it was necessary to win the war, however, the banker in 
Eccles understood the perils that a wide open monetary spigot could pose after the war. “If 
left uncontrolled,” Eccles wrote to a congressional committee in early 1945, “the vast and 
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rising tide of war-created liquid funds could overwhelm the markets.”68 As the war drew to a 
close, the Fed Chairman also urged the Truman administration to maintain the emergency 
stabilization program, especially the OPA and the excess-profits tax, fearful that their repeal 
would only multiply the means by which those “war created liquid funds” could inflate the 
economy.69 
 A related global development contributed to Eccles’s anxiety about the dangers of a 
postwar inflation. In mid-1944, delegates from more than forty countries – including Eccles – 
convened for a conference on international monetary issues at Bretton Woods, New 
Hampshire. The painstaking negotiations behind the agreement, however, had already been 
conducted by Harry Dexter White and John Maynard Keynes, representing the U.S. and 
British Treasuries, respectively, and their closed door deliberations laid the foundation for an 
international monetary order that would stand for the next quarter century. Postwar security, 
White and Keynes held, depended upon global economic stability. And achievement of 
global economic stability required two things: reconstruction of war devastated industrialized 
states, as well as “development” of soon to be post-colonial new nations; and promotion of 
domestic economic policies that would drive full employment, growth, and increased 
international trade. The World Bank was designed to facilitate meeting the first objective, the 
International Monetary Fund the second. In addition, White and Keynes understood, 
monetary flexibility was vital to the success of such a regime – expansionist policies required 
strong state spending that would induce at least temporary balance-of-payments deficits – so 
the new global order had no place for the rigidity of a gold standard. But the competitive 
currency devaluations that fueled national antagonisms after the universal abandonment of 
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that gold standard in the early 1930s also had to be avoided. This, along with bankers’ 
demands for disciplinary means by which they could place at least some limit on how much 
governments spent, provided the rationale for the third pillar of Bretton Woods: a system of 
fixed exchange rates linked to the dollar, which would be convertible to gold at a set price. 
As Leo Panitch and Sam Gindin have observed, this  “institutionalized the American state’s 
predominant role in international monetary management as part and parcel of the general 
acceptance of the US dollar as the foundation currency of the international economy.”70 It 
was, they concluded, the basis for the political economy of postwar American empire. 
 But power, Marriner Eccles recognized, came with responsibility. With the global 
financial system resting on the integrity of the dollar, price stability in the U.S. became an 
imperial imperative. And just as it did, inflation began to gallop. The end of the OPA and 
other wartime controls, again, unleashed a tidal wave of consumer demand and liquid capital 
that overwhelmed even the reduced government spending that came with peace. Still, if the 
budget deficits after V-J Day were not what they were during the conflict – by the end of the 
decade they would turn to surpluses – the Treasury nevertheless held an enormous total 
wartime debt. Henry Morgenthau’s successors as Treasury Secretary in the Truman 
administration, Fred Vinson and John Snyder, understood that meeting this obligation in a 
fiscally sustainable way required continual refinancing. Refinancing, in turn, required that 
borrowing costs remain low. And as such, Treasury leaders demanded, with Truman’s 
support, that control over the central bank remain within the Executive, as it had during the 
New Deal and war.71 
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 Marriner Eccles and the bankers who led the Federal Reserve, however, saw the 
postwar political economy as a brave new world that necessitated an altogether different 
approach. If many New Dealers worried about a return to depression after the war, central 
bank officials insisted throughout the conflict that an inflationary boom was the more likely 
threat.72 But in spite of the influence of, as Eccles had put it in 1934, the more “narrow 
banking interests,” led by Allan Sproul, President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 
most members of the Federal Reserve Board were reluctant to confront the Treasury – as 
well as the larger New Deal order – outright. Between 1946 and 1949, Fed officials therefore 
promoted a compromise agreement: the “special reserve plan” would have prohibited 
investors – namely banks – from selling government securities. That is, the government 
would determine the volume of and yield on bonds that each bank was required to hold. 
Having thus insulated Treasuries, the central bank could apply selective monetary and credit 
policies aimed at tempering inflation without affecting the government’s debt burden. The 
scope of the proposal, indeed, says something about the ideological center-of-gravity of the 
immediate postwar years. The special reserve plan both represented an acknowledgement 
from the Federal Reserve that it had and would continue to owe an obligation to the New 
Deal state and legitimated extensive and protracted state intervention in the financial sector. 
It drew strong opposition from the banking community, and after the 1951 Accord trade 
unionists began calling for a version of it as a solution to the challenge of synchronizing 
fiscal and monetary policy.73 
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 The special reserve plan never got anywhere in Congress, not least because the 
Truman administration refused to get behind it. Their opposition was not unfounded. Radical 
as the proposal can seem in retrospect, at the time it did represent a concession from the 
Executive. Government bonds might be protected, assuming the plan worked as billed, but 
the range of operations an otherwise liberated Fed could conduct would surely have other 
consequences, intended or not. And at a more basic level, Truman, through the Treasury, had 
effective control of the Fed – why would he willingly give that up? The president’s stance 
was bolstered by that of his Council of Economic Advisers, by 1949 led by the archetypical 
Institutional Keynesian Leon Keyserling. Keyserling had studied law at Harvard and 
economics at Columbia, where he became a mentee of Rexford Tugwell, before going to 
work for New York Senator Robert Wagner, under whose direction he drafted such 
legislation as the National Labor Relations Act. Regarding the dispute between the Fed and 
the Treasury, he felt that decisions about the relationship between fiscal and monetary policy 
ultimately “should rest, putting personalities aside, in an agency such as the Council of 
Economic Advisers.”74 That is, squarely in the Executive, where the proper balance of 
autonomy and accountability could be struck.  
 After the demise of the special reserve plan, Eccles amplified his criticism, both in 
public and private, of the government’s handling of inflation, and in early 1948 an irritated 
President Truman announced that he would not appoint him to another term as Fed 
Chairman. Thus ended Eccles’s decade and a half tenure as the top central banker. But he 
remained on the Board of Governors, and as one of its most influential members he 
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continued to agitate around the specter of inflation and the need for greater central bank 
independence in the years to come. In this campaign Eccles got an assist from Paul Douglas, 
the newly elected Democratic Senator from Illinois. And if he is remembered as a “crusading 
liberal,” the public figure Douglas embodied all the contradictions carried by that ideological 
label. Having trained as an economist at the Institutional stronghold Columbia, he served on 
the faculty at the University of Chicago as that Department transitioned from its early 
eclecticism to its more famous (or infamous) monetarism. Douglas’s early academic and 
political work bore out the first influence – his 1930 study, Real Wages in the United States, 
1890-1926, was an extensive empirical inquiry into a question that captivated reformers in 
the 1920s, the cost of living, and through the 1930s he was active in progressive Chicago 
politics and a supporter of the New Deal.75 
 But the Chicago economics experience stuck with him. Literally weeks after Douglas 
arrived in Washington, Joseph O’Mahoney, Chairman of the Joint Committee on the 
Economic Report, appointed him to head a Subcommittee on Monetary, Credit, and Fiscal 
Policies. Through the fall of 1949 Douglas conducted hearings touching on a host of issues 
but focusing above all on the relationship between the Federal Reserve and Treasury. And in 
January 1950, as he celebrated his first anniversary in the Senate, the Douglas Subcommittee 
released a report with a straightforward conclusion: “we believe that the advantages of 
avoiding inflation are so great and that a restrictive monetary policy can contribute so much 
to this end that the freedom of the Federal Reserve to restrict credit and raise interests rates 
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for general stabilization purposes should be restored.”76 Eccles could not have asked for a 
clearer defense of central bank independence. He later thanked the freshman Senator for his 
“force, conviction, and knowledge, of the subject” which far exceeded that of “any member 
of Congress.” “I doubt that any accord could have been brought about between the Treasury 
and the Federal Reserve,” Eccles acknowledged, without Douglas’s services.77 
 Douglas’s recommendations took on greater force with the drumbeat for war in 
Korea. After a brief recession in 1948-49, the mobilization for this next round of conflict 
rejuvenated the U.S. economy (it had an even more consequential impact on Japanese 
industrial recovery) and through 1950 drove prices up. The Truman administration responded 
with a call for a wartime wage-price control program, as well as a demand that the Fed renew 
its commitment to Treasury objectives. But this time the central bankers refused, setting the 
stage for a standoff over the relationship between the two institutions and the balance of 
power between the Executive and the Fed in the politics of inflation going forward. Yet 
again, Eccles and his allies got support from the Chicago school of economics. In early 1951, 
Milton Friedman, Theodore Schultz, and others presented the members of the Fed Board of 
Governors with a statement on “The Failure of the Present Monetary Policy.” “[T]he 
monetary actions of the Federal Reserve since Korea,” they began, conducted “presumably 
under the influence of the Treasury” were “highly inflationary” and “ill-conceived.” 
Moreover, the federal government’s “attempt to control prices and wages,” the monetarist 
economists added, “do not strike at the root cause of inflation.” Only a “vigorous monetary 
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policy designed to make credit tight, to prevent an increase in the quantity of money, or if 
necessary, to decrease the quantity of money” could rein in the surging price level. And as to 
who ought to have final say on the matter, Friedman and his colleagues were clear: 
“Monetary policy cannot serve two masters at once.”78 Control should rest with the 
competent - that is, the central bankers.  
 Eccles circulated the statement widely, endorsing it as “the best and clearest 
exposition that I have seen on the subject,” one whose value was enhanced by the fact that 
“the economists who sign it are completely objective in their approach” and “are not 
influenced by partisan or political considerations or by special interests.”79 The Fed should be 
the “master” of all things monetary, and anyone who felt otherwise was a partisan hack – 
unlike the “completely objective” University of Chicago economists. Eccles had traveled a 
long way since his days as the New Deal’s central banker. 
 But there was continuity as well as change in Eccles’s perspective.80 His concern all 
along had been with the health of the economy in general and not how its returns were 
distributed. If he was a heterodox enough thinker to understand that during a crisis like the 
depression some measure of redistribution would be needed to kick-start growth, and to 
know that that required deficit spending supported by a liberal monetary policy, he saw that 
as only temporary. Indeed, once the pendulum began to move the other way and eventually 
reached a business cycle peak, conditions would demand the exact opposite approach. In 
other words, Eccles had always advocated for a counter-cyclical fiscal and monetary policies 
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– he was, in this sense, an ideal type “commercial Keynesian,” and if that technocratic 
tradition became the dominant current in U.S. liberalism, as historians have suggested, its 
first beachhead was at the Fed. For if Eccles was willing in the 1930s to subordinate his 
institution to a presidential administration with whose views he was aligned, when political 
forces obstructed his ability to carry out a policy more distasteful to the Executive he 
demanded that they be removed. “In dealing with the problem,” Eccles and the other 
members of the Board of Governors put it in a confidential letter to Truman, “it would be a 
grave mistake to have the issue confused by assertions of prerogative or interpretations of 
statutory responsibility.”81 Politics, they pleaded, should be removed from this most serious 
technical matter. 
 Much to Truman’s chagrin, they got their wish. Through late 1950, Fed officials 
asserted themselves in increasingly public confrontations with the Treasury, and they 
gradually chipped away at the administration’s resolve. First to go was the short-term interest 
rate peg, and by the turn of the year they had set their sights on a clean break. But the central 
bankers confronted a dilemma – they were waging a political struggle to free themselves of 
politics, all while maintaining utmost secrecy about their specific plans for future monetary 
policy. Those contradictions came to a head after an unpublicized late January 1951 meeting 
between FOMC member and President Truman at the White House. The meeting has been 
the subject of much interest by historians of U.S. monetary policy, though no one knows 
what actually happened at it. What is clear is that both sides – Truman and the FOMC 
members – came out of it with very different ideas about what they had agreed to. Eccles and 
Fed Chairman Thomas McCabe saw it as a hand shake settling the Fed-Treasury dispute, 
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while Truman felt, as he indicated in a public letter the next day, that the central bankers had 
renewed their commitment to meeting the Treasury’s needs. At a meeting of the FOMC the 
next week, an impassioned Eccles made a case for swift action – “The public today is 
confused. They think this is nothing but a feud for power between between the Treasury and 
the Federal Reserve. It is no such thing. We have not only the power but the responsibility to 
do a certain job.”82 
 Eccles’s colleagues followed his lead. The next day Chairman McCabe made public 
their response letter to the Truman – “Mr. President, you did not ask us in our recent meeting 
to commit ourselves to continue on this dangerous road” and it “would not be consistent with 
our responsibility to the Congress and to the people of this country to follow such a program” 
– and in the week to come the administration caved.83 By the end of February the Fed and 
Treasury had ironed out the technical details of the divorce, which they made public in early 
March.84 And to provide at least a patina of political legitimacy to this otherwise backroom 
agreement, Paul Douglas sponsored a non-binding resolution in support of the “Accord.”85 
For good measure, the Fed staff provided the Senator with all the materials he would need for 
his floor speech.86 
 The Fed-Treasury Accord of 1951 has received minimal attention from historians, but 
its consequences on the U.S. and by extension the global political economy was monumental 
in two ways. First, it ended the New Deal era commitment by the central bank to underwrite 
federal deficit spending. The federal government, that is, no longer had a reliable means of 
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financing a robust expansion of the welfare state. Second, it unleashed an independent, at 
times rogue, central bank that could effect major economic changes relatively free of political 
accountability. In this sense it also served to insulate monetary policy from the “political” 
and to facilitate the ideological project of making economic management a science, one best 
left to technical experts who operated over and above the public. It was, indeed, the end of 
the long period during which populist thinkers grappled with the most complex economic 
questions, illuminated their social dimensions, and sought to democratize their governance. 
The effects would become clearer in the years to come, and they would get cruel in the 
1970s. 
 If scholars have neglected it, however, these stakes were not lost on contemporary 
observers. Speaking before a new JEC Subcommittee on General Credit Control and Debt 
Management a year after the accord was struck, Donald Montgomery wondered whether the 
Fed would be “a part of our Government” or “a Government apart.”87 John Baker of the NFU 
compared the moment to the time when “Andrew Jackson and the people” struggled “to take 
the monetary and banking policies of the country away from the privately controlled bank 
and return it to the Government of the people.”88 And if his analysis was both clunky and 
anachronistic, Baker did get at the class politics of Fed open market operations. Comparing 
the central bank’s manipulation of general interest rates to a “broad ax,” he noted that “there 
is no selectivity at all in the process, so that the fellow who is building a race track gets just 
as good a chance to get credit as the farmer who is trying to increase his production of food.” 
Through a “more selective credit control approach,” the NFU representative added, “credit 
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can be made available to add to our steel capacity, to increase farm production, to do 
desirable things, while discouraging the extension of credit to” more speculative avenues.89 
The Fed itself had proposed such a selective approach, Montgomery added, with its special 
reserve plan in the late 1940s. But by 1952 the cold war was underway, Eisenhower was 
months away from the White House, and the Fed was in the saddle. The central bank did not 
need to make concessions in such a climate, and it has not to this day. 
 
*** 
 
THESE THREE DEFEATS left a crater in the Institutional Keynesian agenda, one from 
which it would ultimately never recover. Industrial labor, the rural working-class, and the 
financial system upon which an expansive welfare state could have rested all moved in 
different directions, and the resulting misalignment undermined both the popular and 
material base of the New Deal order. Trade unions depended on state support in their effort 
to secure gains from employers – not least through the economic statistics the federal 
government produced – but in so doing isolated themselves from a substantial share of the 
working-class and therefore came to be seen as but another interest group concerned with 
sectional objectives alone. To working people in rural America, increasingly squeezed by 
large landowners who enjoyed a monopoly on the benefits generated by federal agricultural 
policy, greedy unions, people of color, and the liberal state became easy targets for their 
woes. And even if Institutional Keynesians could manage to resurrect the farmer-labor 
coalition that showed such promise between the middle 1930s and 1940s, their attempts to 
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achieve transformative social policy would be policed by an independent central bank intent 
upon inflation control above all else. Their fate, it seemed, was sealed. 
 But Institutional Keynesianism rested on old progressive foundations that would not 
give so easily, and however embattled they were by the 1950s they still functioned in a world 
made by the New Deal. Compared to things in the 1920s, that is, the opportunities were 
tremendous. Only in comparison to the truly remarkable potential existing in 1945 did the 
defeats of the immediate postwar years seem epochal. They proceeded accordingly. Although 
social democratic reforms of the national agricultural system were stymied during the 1950s 
by Ezra Benson-led USDA, by the dawn of the 1960s no long-term solution to that question 
had as yet been realized. And they were more successful elsewhere - through industrial labor 
struggles and in Congress, the Institutional Keynesians continued to advance their agenda in 
the 1950s.
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Chapter Three: The Career of Institutional Keynesianism in Congress 
 
THE ELECTION OF Dwight D. Eisenhower to the presidency in November 1952 
punctuated the defeats Institutional Keynesians had suffered since the end of the war. For if 
Eisenhower existed in a world made by the New Deal, he was not a New Dealer.1 The new 
administration promised to balance the budget, to limit state intervention in the private sector 
(which included agriculture), and to stay out of labor-management disputes. And Eisenhower 
gave his supporters reason to believe he would keep his word. One of his first actions in 
office was to terminate the Korean War wage-price control program, which in spite of the 
defense boom had kept inflation at bay for the previous two years. This was a sharp contrast 
from the year prior, when Truman unsuccessfully sought to nationalize the country’s steel 
plant after industry leaders refused to comply with a price edict issued by that body.2 
 Steel collective bargaining rounds in 1954 and 1956, like those in other industries, 
then proceeded without federal involvement for the first time since SWOC gained a foothold 
in 1937, and the industry took good advantage. Led by U.S. Steel, steel management did 
grant their workers substantial wage and benefit increases, but they also raised prices by at 
least as much thereafter, a formula that resulted in the most profitable years in industry 
history. And it it took a fight to win even this modest concession. Only after a national strike 
in 1956, the fourth in a decade, would the USWA secure the kind of contract that led 
industrial relations experts to hail the arrival of a “labor-management accord.”3 Another, 
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even bigger work stoppage would follow three years later. Nevertheless, steelworkers’ wages 
surged through the middle 1950s, and the COLAs they achieved after the 1956 strike 
mitigated whatever burden was imposed by the low inflation rate that prevailed during those 
few years. This settlement was lopsided, of course, but it still provided the basis for what 
observers began to call the “wage-price spiral,” a term that on its face inverted the causal 
sequence and elided the power dynamics involved in the process of distributing industrial 
income.4 
 In any event, things began to change in 1957. The story starts with the Federal 
Reserve, whose 1951 “liberation” from the Department of Treasury was further 
institutionalized by the hands off Eisenhower administration. After a brief recession 
following the end of U.S. military aggression in Korea, the economy gained steam and by 
early 1955 registered one of the highest peacetime growth rates ever before or since.5 And 
the independent Fed responded the way Eccles, now retired, felt a central bank should during 
an expansion: by applying monetary restraint. For the next two years the FOMC, led by Fed 
Chairman William McChesney Martin, steadily pushed up interest rates. But their actions 
achieved only one of the intended effects.6 Economic growth slowed, and unemployment 
settled at 4 percent – the Employment Act called for a 3 percent target – before beginning to 
climb.7 The unemployment rate during the supposedly prosperous 1950s, that is, was at its 
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best fully a third higher than Congress had deemed acceptable a decade earlier. Such was the 
“age of affluence.” 
 But while demand slackened, inflation continued to creep. This apparent 
contradiction became most acute in late 1957 and early 1958, when the economy sunk into 
the deepest recession since 1937 while the national price level kept climbing. Here steel 
came back into the picture. In the summer of 1957, as the tremors presaging the impending 
downturn were being felt, U.S. Steel led the industry in effecting an across the board price 
increase. The occasion was a round of wage increases stipulated by the 1956 collective 
bargaining agreement, but the timing of the move – not to mention the intra-industry 
coordination in taking it – raised questions about steel firms’ ability to charge more in a time 
of falling demand. And given that steel was, as Judith Stein has put it, the nation’s 
“fundamental” industry, these questions stood in for larger ones about the place of corporate 
power in the economy. The leaders of GM and GE no doubt had their eyes on steel.8 
 So did those Institutional Keynesians who remained in the federal government during 
the chilly 1950s. Having long been preoccupied by the macroeconomic dimensions of steel 
industry behavior, they used the opportunity in the late 1950s to mount one final campaign 
around their planning vision. A central actor in this struggle was the Subcommittee on 
Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Committee of the Judiciary. Chaired by Estes 
Kefauver, a populist New Dealer from Tennessee who had beat out John F. Kennedy for a 
spot on the 1956 Democratic ticket under Adlai Stevenson, the Subcommittee in the summer 
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of 1957 initiated what would become a four-year investigation into “administered prices” in 
American industry. Charging that this practice, first described by Gardiner Means during his 
time in the USDA, was responsible for the “No. 1 domestic economic problem – the problem 
of inflation,” Kefauver chose the steel industry as his first target.9 
 Politically, Kefauver was primed for the challenge. For one, he was probably the only 
Southern Democrat in the Jim Crow era who could count a Trotskyist intellectual among his 
most ardent supporters. The last book published by Harvey Swados, a onetime member of 
Max Schactman’s Workers’ Party, was a glowing biography – a hagiography, really – of the 
Tennessee Senator, Standing Up for The People: The Life and Work of Estes Kefauver.10 But 
Kefauver would not have gone far on his own. He depended for help on Subcommittee Chief 
Economist John M. Blair, a quintessential Institutional Keynesian who had ascended through 
the network constructed by those committed to that tradition over the previous three decades. 
In 1936, at age twenty-two, Blair left his childhood Louisiana to enroll in the Department of 
Economics at American University in Washington, D.C. At the time, American provided an 
accredited institutional base for the USDA Graduate School, and their curricula were very 
much integrated.11 As a graduate student, Blair took at least one course under Gardiner 
Means, through which the two established a close relationship, and he almost certainly 
studied with Mordecai Ezekiel, Louis Bean, and others too. During that time the precocious 
doctoral candidate published a regular book review in the Washington Post – through which 
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his commitment to the New Deal and disdain for orthodox economics shine – and he also 
wrote a book himself. Blair later described Seeds of Destruction: A Study in the Functional 
Weakness of Capitalism, which appeared the year he turned twenty-four, as an attempt to 
relate “institutionalism to the subject matter of all that now goes under the banner of 
Keynesianism.”12 His brief acknowledgements singled out for credit W. Jett Lauck, a 
longtime advisor to John L. Lewis in the UMW, and Robert Nathan, a CIO favorite 
economist who would famously endorse the UAW demand for wage increases with price 
stability in the latter 1940s. And reviews of Blair’s statistically sophisticated and acerbically 
written study appeared in venues ranging form the American Economic Review to The New 
Republic to the Daily Worker, with figures like Charles Beard and Norman Thomas 
expressing admiration for the work.13 This was a rising star of the Institutional Keynesian 
left.14 
 Still well under thirty and without a PhD in hand, Blair then took a job with the 
TNEC, where he co-authored its famous report, Price Discrimination in Steel.15 He next 
passed through the War Production Board en route to the Small War Plants Corporation, an 
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underappreciated incubator of heterodoxy within the wartime government where, among 
other things, he recruited C. Wright Mills – then a little known assistant professor at the 
University of Maryland – to prepare a study that related economic structure to “civic 
welfare.”16 Blair would remain a close acquaintance and vocal champion of Mills until the 
radical sociologist’s untimely death a decade later. In 1956, he even challenged the incoming 
President of the American Economics Association to include a panel showcasing Mills’s 
soon to be released The Power Elite and David Riesman’s The Lonely Crowd at the 
organization’s annual convention in the hope that it might “awaken particularly the minds of 
our younger brethren to the existence of paths to truth other than those of [MIT economist 
Paul] Samuelson et al.”17 
 After spending the first postwar decade at the FTC, Blair joined the Subcommittee as 
Chief Economist when Kefauver assumed the Chairmanship in early 1957. The struggle they 
undertook in the years to come testified to the durability of Institutional Keynesianism even 
after the defeats of the immediate postwar years, but it also exposed its limitations. The 
experience of Kefauver, Blair, and the Subcommittee to which they were attached moreover 
illustrates the importance of Congress, and especially Congressional committees and 
subcommittees, as sites in the production and dissemination of knowledge and venues that 
sustain policy-intellectual traditions in otherwise adverse political climates. Passage of 
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legislation need not be the sole political function of Congress, and proponents of legislation 
which is at any given time forestalled for political reasons can advance their agendas through 
other means. Political education campaigns which seek to reframe issues and shift the terms 
of debate around them are one such way, and investigations conducted by congressional 
committees – which possess both resources and respectability – can contribute to that 
cause.18 
 The Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly is instructive in this regard. The only 
legislation to come out of Kefauver and Blair’s investigation into administered prices 
resulted from their 1960 probe into the pharmaceutical industry, which coincided with a 
public panic over the defective drug Thalidomide. The 1962 Kefauver-Harris amendment to 
the Food and Drug Act expanded the province of the FDA and mandated disclosure of side 
effects in drug advertisements, and it has been the subject of most scholarly attention on the 
Subcommittee.19 But the Subcommittee’s opening inquiries into the steel and automotive 
industries, although they did not ultimately result in any legislation, were influential as well. 
Drawing some of the most prominent corporate officials, trade union leaders, and many more 
professional economists to Washington for questioning, and issuing volume after volume of 
transcripts packed with data-rich appendices, the Subcommittee laid bare for contemporary 
observers – and for future historians – the inner-workings of American industry at mid-
century.20 
																																																						
18 See Julian E. Zelizer, Taxing America: Wilbur D. Mills, Congress, and the State, 1945-1975 (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996). 
19 See Robert Bud, “Antibiotics, Big Business, and Consumers: The Context of Government Investigations into 
the Postwar American Drug Industry,” Technology and Culture (April 2005), 329-349; Daniel Scroop, “A 
Faded Passion? Estes Kefauver and the Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly,” Business and 
Economic History On-Line (2007). See also Jacobs, Pocketbook Politics, 256-261; Stapleford, The Cost of 
Living in America, 305-311. 
20 The hearings produced twenty-nine volumes along with five formal reports running some 20,000 pages in 
total. See Appendix for full list of publications. 
 147 
 This chapter focuses on those early hearings into steel and auto and highlights the two 
conceptual points that Kefauver and Blair hoped to advance, both of which had important 
policy takeaways. First, they set out to demonstrate that the conundrum of 1957-58 – 
simultaneous recession and inflation – was no paradox. It was rooted in the structure of 
corporate capitalism as it stood in the middle of the twentieth century, and without proper 
planning it could be expected to afflict the economy again in the future. In essence, that is, 
they anticipated the stagflation of the 1970s and offered suggestions for how to deal with it. 
That later iteration would be of a greater magnitude, to be sure, but the phenomenon was not 
as unprecedented as scholars have made it seem. Kefauver and Blair’s punchline was that 
neither fiscal nor monetary policy could reasonably address this “new inflation,” as 
contemporaries in the late 1950s referred to it – such blunt instruments could not target with 
precision the sources of inflationary pressure. And, reasonably, because everyone understood 
that fiscal and monetary austerity that invited a deep recession could probably drag all prices 
down, but just two decades removed from the Depression such a response seemed outside the 
boundary of the thinkable. That would no longer be so by the late 1970s. 
 Kefauver and Blair’s second point took them back to Institutional Keynesian basics: 
corporate profits. If the late 1950s economic woes originated in the structure of corporate 
capitalism, the problem with that structure was the existence of overwhelming corporate 
power. Only an analysis centered on power, they held, could explain the ostensible 
peculiarity of unemployment and inflation rising in tandem. Here Kefauver and Blair drew 
most directly on Gardiner Means, whose testimony would feature prominently in the 
Subcommittee hearings over the next few years: such market power enabled certain firms to 
respond to falling demand by cutting production and raising prices, a recipe for what would 
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come to be called stagflation. It is indeed a historical irony that the Phillips Curve, which 
scholars read to demonstrate an inverse relationship between unemployment and the price 
level and which policymakers came to associate with “Keynesian” thought, was published in 
1958, just as the Kefauver-led investigation was demonstrating the opposite.21 
 But, after all, this was just one Subcommittee, and the limits it faced shed light on the 
larger challenges confronting Institutional Keynesianism at the dawn of the 1960s. On their 
first objective, Kefauver and Blair met real success – by the end of the decade it was widely 
accepted that a new kind of inflation was on the scene, one with which fiscal and monetary 
policy was ill equipped to deal. As the case of the late 1970s would attest, this was no small 
achievement. Still, mounting a defensive campaign against contractionary measures was not 
the same as advancing a politically viable planning program that could render such 
orthodoxy moot. And winning on their second point was even more challenging. It was one 
thing to make a compelling case that excessive corporate profits were to blame and it was 
another altogether to do something about it. Complicating matters was the fact that the 
Subcommittee was not the only congressional entity looking into the matter. Elsewhere, 
especially in the Paul Douglas-led Joint Economic Committee, figures less sympathetic to the 
Institutional Keynesian analysis offered interpretations of their own.22  
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 Most followed the Subcommittee’s lead on the first point, that regarding the efficacy 
of fiscal and monetary policy, but they diverged on the profit issue. And in the debate that 
followed the Institutional Keynesians fell victim to the obstacles that had long confronted 
them in dealing with this most basic issue of private property: corporate assertion of 
managerial prerogative. Unable to access corporate books and records, Kefauver and Blair 
found themselves building their case through reference to the relationship between two 
variables: labor costs and productivity. The latter was a famously slippery concept, and 
questions over its meaning and significance resulted in a consequential struggle around the 
turn of the decade. The resolution of that contest is the subject of Ch. 5, but first we must 
understand its stakes. 
 
*** 
 
THROUGHOUT KEFAUVER’S CAREER in public office he had been preoccupied with 
the perils posed by unregulated corporate power. Soon after arriving in Congress in 1939, 
Kefauver secured a widely coveted seat on the House Judiciary Committee and he used the 
post to cultivate a relationship with its second-ranking Democrat, the veteran New York anti-
monopolist Emmanuel Cellar. A few years later, in 1945, Kefauver petitioned to join 
Congressman Wright Patman’s Select House Committee on Small Business, through which 
he first met John Blair. The latter fondly remembered that there “was quick recognition, I 
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believe on both our parts, that we were intellectually, ideologically and idealistically 
simpatico,” and so began a close personal and professional relationship that would endure 
until the Senator’s death nearly two decades later.23 Over the next few years, Kefauver 
worked closely with Cellar and Blair, then at the FTC, to advance legislation closing a 
loophole in the Clayton Act that left corporate acquisition of assets – as opposed to stocks – 
unregulated, an opening that big business had used to its advantage during what Kefauver 
called the “third great merger movement” unfolding in their time.24 After several frustrated 
efforts, in 1950 the Cellar-Kefauver Act became among the more notable amendments to the 
famous Progressive law and marked one of Kefauver’s few legislative achievements.25 If 
Kefauver and his colleague shepherded the bill through Congress, however, everyone 
involved knew that it was Blair’s brainchild. President Truman even gave the economist the 
pen he signed it with.26   
 The Subcommittee was established in 1951 at the behest of Wyoming Senator – and 
former TNEC Chairman – Joseph O’Mahoney, who used his position as co-Chair of the Joint 
Committee on the Economic Report to advance a resolution calling for improved federal data 
on the economic consequences of monopoly.27 Kefauver sought to politicize that mission, a 
task that required a capable staff – and none better, he felt, than alumni of the TNEC. In 
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addition to Blair, Kefauver poached two of them from the FTC. The “able trial lawyer and 
keen student of antitrust laws,” Paul Rand Dixon, would serve as general counsel and staff 
director, and Irene Till, who would become the driving force behind the pharmaceutical 
investigation, came on as a staff economist. Till – who, incidentally, had been the partner of 
the late Walton Hamilton, the famous economist who coined the term “institutionalism” – 
would also go on to edit Kefauver’s posthumously published memoirs on the investigation, 
In a Few Hands: Monopoly Power in America.28 
 In addition to re-staffing the Subcommittee, Kefauver promptly set about enhancing 
its capacity, time and again requesting and securing larger budgets, beginning with a fifty 
percent bump for his first year in charge.29 Unable to afford a single calculator when he took 
over – quite a handicap for a group that published thousands of pages of statistics – by the 
early 1960s the Subcommittee, then just a decade old, was far and away the biggest and best 
funded of its kind in Washington.30 Given that they were “engaged in the preparation of a 
comprehensive, systematic study of unprecedented scope and intensity,” one that went much 
further than “even the monumental but now outdated studies of the Temporary National 
Economic Committee,” Kefauver maintained, they deserved the resources.31 
 If Kefauver provided the infrastructure for conducting this “comprehensive, 
systematic study,” almost everything else came from John Blair. In February 1957, the Chief 
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Economist circulated among the Subcommittee staff a proposal for an “Investigation of 
Monopolistic Pricing and Production Policies” which contained the blueprint for the probe. 
Suggesting that the investigation be “directed toward determining the nature and possibly 
injurious economic effects of pricing and production policies in the so-called ‘administered-
price’ industries,” Blair went on to outline a strategy intended to help “focus the attention of 
those involved in public policy where the real inflationary danger exists.” Without wider 
understanding of this threat, he warned, the old tools of reaction – fiscal and monetary 
restraint – would likely be deployed to stifle growth.32  
 To frame the debate, Blair recommended that Subcommittee open the hearings with 
testimony from experts which could establish that “the present inflation, about which so 
much concern is being voiced at the present time, is not a ‘demand’ inflation or ‘monetary’ 
inflation” but rather “a ‘price’ inflation which is almost entirely confined to the administered-
price industries.” The distinction was critical, again, as the viability of alternative public 
policies hinged on it. In addition to Means, Blair’s top economist was Edwin C. Nourse, the 
first Chair of the Council of Economic Advisers who at that point served as President of the 
Brookings Institute. Scholars have with some justification characterized Nourse as a 
“conservative Keynesian” – he resigned from the CEA in 1949 in protest to the left-liberal 
Leon Keyersling’s increasing influence in the administration – but the label obscures as 
much as it reveals. Nourse, an agricultural economist and past president of the American 
Economic Association, had written extensively on administered prices – most famously in 
his 1945 work, Price Making in a Democracy. The point is, structural economic analysis was 
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not the exclusive property of the left – and Blair felt achievement of Institutional Keynesian 
goals depended in part upon demonstrating that.33 But as we will see, such openness could 
create problems. To join Means and Nourse, Blair proposed Harvard economist and 
acclaimed author, John Kenneth Galbraith, making the expert roster something of a 
composite of mid-century Institutional Keynesianism. 
 Next, Blair proposed that the investigation move from one concentrated industry to 
the next, examining the relationship between prices, production levels, and, most 
importantly, profits. By comparing these trends to those in more competitive industries, the 
Subcommittee could isolate the significance of market power as an independent variable in 
the price formula and highlight the “injurious consequences upon demand, production and 
employment” it had wrought. “Armed with factual data supporting” this point, Blair 
imagined, Kefauver could then confront the “representatives of the leading firms” and force 
them to publicly defend their actions.34  
 From the outset Blair knew that corporate officials’ “principal line of defense would 
be that costs, particularly labor costs, have risen, making necessary an upward adjustment in 
price.” What deserved blame for rising prices – labor costs over and above productivity 
gains, or corporate power? For this reason, Blair cautioned, “[i]t is important that the 
investigation not be led into the impossible undertaking of trying to evaluate the validity of 
cost studies for particular products,” as reliable “data on unit costs are perhaps the most 
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difficult of all types of economic data to come by and put to meaningful use.” Instead, he 
concluded, “the Committee would be perfectly justified in taking, in effect, the position that, 
while these cost increases may indeed have occurred, their impact on the company’s earning 
capacity could not have been very serious in view of its high and increasing rate of profit.”35 
Their singular focus, that is, would be on corporate profits, but from the outset Blair 
understood that given the limited data to which they had access there was not much they 
could do but point at them.  
 Blair’s memo echoed a complaint that Institutional Keynesians had voiced decades. 
During their time in the New Deal USDA, Lee Pressman, Donald Montgomery, and others 
had struggled to gain access to corporate processors books and records and thereby to 
demonstrate how they could well afford to lower the price of food. And if milk was “nature’s 
perfect food,” automobiles and the steel out of which they were built were the perfect 
industrial goods of postwar America. It made sense, then, that Pressman and Montgomery 
landed with the steel workers and autoworkers, respectively, and the UAW’s role in the 
famous 1945-46 strike wave spoke to the influence these Institutional Keynesians had on the 
rising industrial union movement. If the immediate postwar defeats put the issue to rest for a 
time, the Subcommittee investigation portended a revival of the longtime demand for 
transparency in corporate accounting. 
 Donald Montgomery did not live to see it. In the fall of 1957, while the administered 
price hearings were in their early stages, he committed suicide. Montgomery’s spouse, Mary 
Taylor, who once edited the Consumers’ Guide, had recently succumbed to a brain tumor, 
one that was diagnosed just as she fell victim to what Landon Storrs has described as the 
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“Second Red Scare and the unmaking of the New Deal left.” Taylor was a federal employee 
and a radical in her own right, but Montgomery is said to have believed that his politics were 
at least part of the reason why she became a target, and been convinced that the stress bred 
the disease. The tragic episode is just one of many examples of how McCarthyism slowly 
and invisibly served to extinguish oppositional currents in and around the federal 
government. 
 Montgomery was gone, but he had made a lasting impression on Walter Reuther, who 
understood the opportunity Kefauver’s ascendance to the Subcommittee Chairmanship 
provided – the Tennessee Senator had been one of the UAW’s closes allies in Washington.  
Days after he moved into the position, Kefauver received a letter from Reuther encouraging 
him to conduct a “Congressional investigation into the relationship between wages, profits, 
and prices” that might illuminate “the root causes of the creeping inflation which…seems to 
be increasing now at an accelerated pace.”36 In the politics of inflation, Reuther understood 
all too well, public blame came with disastrous consequences. Yet, “[n]one of those who 
allege that wage increases are the primary, if not the sole, cause of rising prices have thus far 
been willing to support our efforts to have a Congressional committee conduct such an 
objective inquiry.” Kefauver should use his new role, Reuther urged, to determine “where the 
fault really lies so that the innocent will not be condemned for the sins of the guilty.” The 
Senator agreed, and in the Subcommittee’s investigation into the automotive industry early 
the next year the provocative UAW chief would play a prominent role.37 
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THE INVESTIGATION BEGAN in mid-July 1957, two weeks after the steel price increase, 
with what Bernard Nossiter described in the Washington Post as “a catalogue of economic 
blasphemies that may shake the lobbyists, agitate faculty rooms, and tax the ingenuity of the 
public relations boys for years to come.”38 Featuring appearances by Means, Nourse, and 
Galbraith, the opening phase explored top subject on Blair’s agenda: whether administered 
pricing was responsible for the new inflation, and if so whether alternative public policies 
were needed to deal with it.39 Each independently answered in the affirmative, leading more 
than a few “veteran observers of Congressional hearings” as Edwin Dale of the New York 
Times put it, to consider their collective performance “as among the most stimulating in 
memory.” 40 If Congressional hearings set a low bar for excitement, it does say something 
that an academic inquiry into inflation should surpass it.41 
 The star witness, Gardiner Means, who since the late-1940s had been an economist 
with the business backed Committee on Economic Development, presented a refined version 
of the administered price thesis he had first introduced in the early 1930s. “Even in Adam 
Smith’s day administered prices were known,” Means informed his audience, but they “were 
never taken into account in classical economic theory.”42 But just try, he encouraged the 
Subcommittee members, to make sense of orthodox theory in practical terms. A market 
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explanation of price-setting rested on the assumption that producers had a precise sense of 
both their costs and the demand for their goods, information they could use to identify the 
point where marginal costs equaled marginal revenue; that is, where “the additional cost of 
producing one more unit would just equal the additional revenue” gained from selling it.43 At 
this price, profits were maximized. In reality, Means averred, there is always a bit of 
guesswork involved in forecasting demand, and, moreover, while prices a bit above or below 
the optimal level would lead profits to deviate form their potential peak, they would not end 
up all that different. In other words, while the invisible hand guided prices within certain 
ranges, human beings set them at specific levels. That range of prices, within which final 
profits did not vary by much, constituted a “zone of indifference” to modern managers. 
“Within this area, prices are not dictated by market forces,” Means observed. “Within this 
area, Adam Smith’s unseen hand fails to operate.”44  
 Means added that because of the “discretion implicit in administered prices” – there 
could be a lot of room within that zone of indifference – “it would be possible to have a rise 
in prices without a prior increase in the public demand for goods.” He labeled this 
“administrative inflation.”45 Bearing no relation to demand, he added, administrative 
inflation posed “a real problem of public policy” – neither fiscal nor monetary policies aimed 
reducing “buying power” would address its root cause. Indeed, given that the practice of 
price administration itself could lead production to stagnate in certain industries – since 
administered price industries tended to meet drops in demand with reduced production rather 
than lower prices – such restrictive policies were likely only to make matters worse than 
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proponents of such austerity realized. Administrative inflation “is a new phenomenon,” he 
concluded. “I do not find it anywhere in our history of prices.”46 And “until we understand 
the actual pricing processes involved” in this new phenomenon, “we are quite as likely to 
make bad, as good, national policy decisions.”47 
 In general agreement with Means’s diagnosis, the other two notable witnesses’ 
testimonies together highlight the challenges the Institutional Keynesians would face in 
addressing this new administrative inflation. Nourse added that organized labor’s ability to 
“administer wages” deserved just as much attention as the larger issue of administered prices, 
and he proposed prosecuting such labor monopolies under antitrust law.48 Harking to the 
days of Pinkerton’s and yellow-dog contracts, this was indeed the only trustbusting measure 
worth mentioning to be raised during the hearings. In technical terms, Nourse’s point was 
that in many industries growth in labor costs had exceeded the improvement in productivity. 
This conservative variety of structuralism would gain greater traction during the Kennedy 
administration. 
  While Nourse ascribed blame, Galbraith provided recommendations. Then one of the 
most recognizable names in the American economics profession, Galbraith had cut his teeth 
in an Institutional Keynesian milieu. A native of Ontario, in 1934 he completed a doctorate in 
agricultural economics at Berkeley, and in the years to come would interrupt his assistant 
professorship at Harvard more than once to do stints with the New Deal USDA and the OPA. 
Galbraith’s first major work, A Theory of Price Control, came out of that experience, and 
before long he had earned as much of a reputation as a writer as he had as an economist. 
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Henry Luce, publisher of Fortune, where Galbraith published a regular column in the 1940s, 
is reported to have admitted to John F. Kennedy years later that “I taught Galbraith how to 
write – and have regretted it ever since.”  Each of subsequent books, beginning with 
American Capitalism: The Concept of Countervailing Power, which appeared in 1952, had 
mass appeal, and by the end of the decade Galbraith seemed like an ideal candidate to take 
Institutional Keynesianism public. 
 But he did not. Indeed, with hindsight we can see the course of Galbraith’s 
intellectual career as a harbinger of the challenges which would confront Institutional 
Keynesians in the 1960s. His Subcommittee appearance was in this sense illustrative. Given 
that nothing “is more elementary in modern public relations than to use the occasion of a 
wage increase as the opportunity for a price increase,” Galbraith held before the 
Subcommittee, in major sectors “we might have a provision for a standstill on price increases 
after the conclusion of any new wage contract.” This would provide a “chance to see what 
could be afforded before prices were raised” and to ensure that contracts would stay within 
those bounds.49 The problem was that determining “what could be afforded” was, politically, 
the hardest part. And by placing the wage-price spiral at the center of the analysis, Galbraith 
helped to ensure that the only way public officials could hazard a guess as to what could be 
afforded was by comparing labor costs and productivity. If, however, corporate power over 
price setting and investment decision-making was placed at the center, as Kefauver and Blair 
sought to do, the question of what could be afforded might have led to greater consideration 
of the social function of profit. Instead, with utmost elegance Galbraith – in both his 
Subcommittee testimony and in his concurrently published book, The Affluent Society – 
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skirted the issue of ownership and suggested that by connecting wages and prices to the 
growth in capacity, or productivity, the bugbear of inflation might be overcome. Prone to 
pessimism of the intellect over optimism of the will, as he said this Galbraith doubted 
whether the “conventional wisdom” would allow for even this minimal state intervention in 
the market.50 He would have done well to have reflected upon the risks that might ensue if it 
did. 
 On the questions Blair had set out to answer, however, Nourse and Galbraith were on 
the same page – the 1957 inflation was of a “new” sort, and conventional responses like the 
Fed’s stringent monetary policy would at the very best prove futile. “The old-fashioned test 
of the success of a policy is results,” Galbraith noted, and while “monetary policy has been 
applied with steady rigor” over the past two years, “the companion effect, so far, has been a 
steady increase in prices.”51 Galbraith, who devoted a chapter of The Affluent Society to the 
limits of monetary policy in the face of the new inflation, concluded that given the landscape 
of the modern economy – islands of oligopolistic industries in seas of competitive ones – 
tight money was bound to impact certain industries and sectors more than others, creating 
“discrimination in anti-inflationary policy.” It would work like this: “[restraining] investment 
– which is the function and only function of the monetary policy” squeezed localized 
industries like residential construction as well as smaller businesses that depended on short-
term credit, while large corporations in administered industries hardly noticed the 
difference.52 Drawing largely on internal retained earnings and in with the big banks, the 
leadership of U.S. Steel, General Motors, and their ilk were not terribly concerned with the 
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cost of borrowing.53 Rectifying this “discrimination in anti-inflation policy,” as Galbraith put 
it, would require focusing attention on the real culprit behind the “new inflation” – 
administered prices.  
 
BUT AS NOURSE AND GALBRAITH’S testimonies suggested, the question of how 
exactly administered prices were set was still an open one. And answering it seemed to 
depend on access to what Blair understood were “the most difficult type of economic data to 
come by” – corporate costs. The challenge became clearer when the investigation moved 
from theory to practice in their investigation of the steel industry the next month. U.S. Steel 
CEO Roger Blough, who early in his career had squared off with a young John Blair in front 
of the TNEC and who would later go on to found the Business Roundtable and lead the 
corporate crusade against inflation in the 1970s, set the tone that his associates in the 
automotive industry would follow. First, aware of the radical stakes involved in the 
administered price debate in general, he denied their existence outright. Second, he asserted 
that insofar as the public had right to be concerned about steel prices, the focus should be on 
the industry’s skyrocketing employment costs, which were far out of proportion to the 
increase in productivity. When asked to prove the latter point by providing his firms cost 
data, however, Blough resorted to intransigence - “we believe that it is quite important that 
our costs, which are confidential, be kept confidential.”54 General Motors chief executive 
Harlow Curtice was not much more creative, maintaining that “all [automobile] cost 
increases are the result of an upward trend in wage rates,” and that the cost data requested by 
																																																						
53 Ibid, 42. Before the hearings Nourse had expressed a similar view. See Edward Collins, “Administered 
Prices: A Proposal to Revive an Idea Studied Twenty Years Ago,” New York Times, July 8, 1957. 
54 Administered Price Hearings, Part 2, 379-386. Blough quoted on 381; Suggested Questions for Mr. Roger 
Blough, undated, Box 230, Folder 10, EK. 
 162 
the Subcommittee was “confidential information and should remain so.”55 Ford’s General 
Counsel William T. Gossett added that his firm had “never, except as required by wartime 
legislation, made such information available for any purpose to anyone not in our employ,” 
as doing so “would put our company at a serious competitive disadvantage.”56 Even that 
corporate data in the federal government’s possession – OPA records at the National 
Archives and the evidence from a 1949 Department of Justice investigation – proved out of 
reach due to “statutory restrictions” and “pending litigation.”57 That it lacked the power to 
subpoena was just one indication of the structural limits facing the Subcommittee. 
 This did not stop Walter Reuther from pressing the issue. A few months after the two 
first corresponded about the urgent need for just the kind of investigation Kefauver later 
launched, Reuther had again come to the Tennessee Senator’s attention with his “positive and 
practical proposal to stop inflation” in the automotive industry. In an August 1957 open-letter 
to the chief executives of the Big Three, Reuther submitted that if the corporations would 
“reduce prices on their 1958 models to levels averaging at least $100 below the price for 
comparable 1957 models,” the UAW would promise to “give full consideration to the effect 
of such reductions on [their] financial position in the drafting of our 1958 demands and in our 
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negotiations.”58 Kefauver promptly wrote the other Subcommittee members urging that they 
take advantage of the stir caused by the UAW leader’s admittedly “vague and indefinite” 
proposal by bringing “Mr. Reuther and the manufacturers of the automobile companies 
together, with the hope of getting a firm, hold-the-line wage and price formula.”59 General 
Motors, Ford, and Chrysler had already made clear their rejection of this latest “Reuther 
Plan,” as they had each time the iconoclastic labor leader sought to discuss issues that they 
felt were their prerogative alone – like prices. But, thanks to the Subcommittee investigation, 
for the first time since the great 1945-46 auto strike Reuther would have the chance to air his 
vision before a national audience.60 
 Reuther did make sure to preface his remarks with an obligatory paean to the virtues 
of free enterprise and a vow that the postwar American labor movement had “rejected the 
Marxist concept of class struggle.”61 This was 1957 after all. Nevertheless, his dozen or so 
hours of testimony, not to mention his 110-page formal statement for the record, highlighted 
once again the class politics inherent in price making. For years the UAW had been deeply 
concerned with inflation, Reuther reminded his audience, “not just as wage earners, but as 
consumers, as American citizens.” “In 1945 we walked the bricks for 113 days,” he 
continued, “trying to implement a socially responsible collective bargaining policy that says 
we do not want to make progress at the expense of our neighbor. We do not want higher 
wages out of higher prices.” What his union wanted, and what all workers deserved, Reuther 
added, was “more purchasing power out of the fruits of our advancing technology, out of 
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automation, out of new science, out of new tools of economic abundance.”62 Yet, even while 
“the capacity to produce cars far out ran the demand for cars” over the past decade, “the price 
of automobiles has been raised year after year” – with the result of lower levels of 
production, greater unemployment, and an intractable inflation.63 “[W]hat we want,” Reuther 
concluded, “is a wage increase that essentially reflects the increase in productivity in the 
whole economy.”64  
 Just like that Reuther boxed himself into the same corner as Galbraith, and the move 
would haunt Institutional Keynesians in the 1960s and after: the wages-productivity trap. Of 
course it was not so sudden, nor is it to say that he had much of a choice. For one, if only for 
rhetorical effect, why not connect wage demands to the great strides in productivity 
demonstrated by the national economy in the twentieth century? Indeed, exponents of 
purchasing power arguments had long made that point – that rising productivity could allow 
for a living wage was the core of that strain of Progressivism. And commentators lamenting 
the rise in inequality since the 1970s frequently do so with reference to the yawning gap 
between productivity and wages that has occurred since those years. What was more, veteran 
trade unionists well understood the perils that myopia on something so difficult to define as 
productivity might present. They were not ignorant of the fact that even if wages did rise in 
sync with productivity while prices stayed stable, the distribution of the total income would 
remain unchanged. They also understood that, absent a consistent rate of investment (a 
difficult thing to achieve when the investment function was privately controlled) and growth 
in demand, rising productivity was only certain to produce one thing: structural 
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unemployment. If fewer people can produce more stuff, and if demand does not grow 
accordingly, that means fewer people are going to have jobs. As AFL-CIO Research Director 
Nat Goldfinger put it in 1960, “American trade unions do not necessarily accept the 
distribution of income among the factors of production, at any particular point in time, as 
ethically good, socially and economically desirable or inviolable.” This was especially so, he 
continued, when a “considerable portion of the economy’s potential for growth…has been 
translated, not into increased output but into joblessness and part time work.”65 
 In any event, as public officials began to frame the inflation question in terms of the 
relationship between labor costs and productivity – itself in part a result of the limited access 
to corporate data – trade union officials went along. But how exactly they would go along 
was still an open question. The UAW’s official 1958 Bargaining Program modified 
somewhat Reuther’s original plan by replacing the blanket price cut with a “profit-sharing” 
plank. A ten percent return on investment, the union held, was a healthy base profit, and 
anything on top of that ought to be split in three ways – one half to stay with the firm, a 
quarter to go to its workers, and the remainder returned to consumers in the form of a price 
rebate.66 This was hardly the demand Reuther made during the 1945-46 strike wave – though 
the 10 percent figure did serve as a firm rebuke to GM’s longtime insistence on a 20 percent 
rate of return. Still, it marked a retreat. UAW Research Director Nat Weinberg, who 
accompanied Reuther before the Subcommittee, had previously opposed such profit-sharing 
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plans on the grounds that they undermined the union’s long-held goal of industrywide wage 
standardization. By placing it atop the UAW’s bargaining program, moreover, Reuther 
foreclosed radical unionists’ demand for a shortened workweek with no change in pay or 
price. Such an emphasis on the workweek over wages might have mitigated a share the labor 
displacing effects of rising productivity.67 But that is not to suggest that it was winnable 
 To place blame with one figure like Walter Reuther, then, misses the point. by the late 
1950s all trade unionists’ social imaginations had been reshaped by the defeats of the 
immediate postwar years, and their incrementally less creative bargaining proposals testified 
above all to the contradictions inherent in bargaining over political issues at the firm level. 
Nonetheless, in spite of the limitations of the 1958 UAW bargaining agenda, this was still 
politicized bargaining, and it attested to the durability of the industrial union-Institutional 
Keynesian synthesis even in the face of more than a decade of resolute corporate opposition. 
And it was at least possible that, as Nat Goldfinger hoped, the wage-productivity link would 
be a starting point and not a ceiling. Toward that end they had allies in Estes Kefauver and 
John Blair. But that was about it. 
 
*** 
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THE FINAL SUBCOMMITTEE REPORTS into the steel and automotive industries 
confirmed what Kefauver’s critics had been saying all along – as Maryland Republican John 
Butler put it, that it would “wittingly or unwittingly” advance organized labor’s political 
agenda.68  Released in the spring and fall of 1958, respectively, the documents were 
penetrating explorations of the core American industries which presented a dizzying amount 
of empirical evidence and concluded with what Blair had set out to prove: the new inflation 
was “due principally to price increases in administered price industries,” and, consequently, 
monetary and fiscal restraint would be of little use in combatting it.69 Power enabled firms 
like U.S. Steel, General Motors, and a few of their subordinates to charge prices well in 
excess of costs, thus driving inflation, choking growth, and enjoying tremendous profits all 
the while. “No matter what the change in cost or demand,” the steel study reported, “steel 
prices since 1947 have moved steadily and regularly in only one direction, upward.” 70 
Indeed, they actually continued to “climb even when unit labor costs declined.”71 USWA 
Research Director Otis Brubaker’s giddy report to union officers underscored the stakes 
involved in this conclusion: it should prove “extremely useful to our Union in the current 
public controversy over whether wage increases are responsible for inflation or whether it is 
the greed of the Industry for exorbitant Profits…which is the culprit.”72 
The automotive report went further, probing into how the Big Three – especially the 
“monopoly” General Motors – not only gouged consumers, but also sought to hoodwink 
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them.73 The obsession with “style” – what Kefauver called “frills” and what even GM’s 
Harlow Curtice admitted was but “fancification” – as well the deployment of advertising to 
create it, which had come to substitute for price competition within the industry, also had the 
effect of unnecessarily increasing the cost of an automobile.74 Indeed, Blair’s appreciation for 
C. Wright Mills and David Riesman, not to mention Galbraith, seeped throughout the report, 
leading I.F. Stone to conclude that this obscure government document “will be a joy to the 
anthropologist with a sense of humor; no primitive tribe exhibits odder folkways. The 
intricately planned irrationality and calculated wastefulness is here laid bare for the social 
psychiatrist.”75  
The significance of such conclusions coming from a body bearing the imprimatur of 
the U.S. Senate was not lost on the business community and its political representatives. 
Senator Everett Dirksen, expressing the lone dissenting opinion to the steel report, disagreed 
“vigorously from the attempt of the majority to raise the completely unfounded specter of 
future economic stagnation in America as a result of alleged monopoly power.” The Illinois 
Republican concluded that the “report is based on a theoretical, preconceived, biased 
economic and legal analysis developed by the subcommittee staff.”76 In coming years, steel 
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industry officials, in particular, responded by stepping up their public relations campaign on 
the wage-price issue, making sure to denounce Kefauver and his Subcommittee at every 
opportunity.77 Blough responded to news of the report by decrying the “thoroughly biased 
and distorted view” of his testimony it presented and excoriating Kefauver for having rigged 
the investigation. He “begins the hearings by reading a statement pronouncing your business 
guilty of all kinds of unsavory practices,” Blough said of the Chairman, “after which you are 
assured in a friendly manner that the committee will now launch a completely unbiased 
investigation of the facts.”78 Indeed, the conservative New York Herald Tribune business 
columnist Donald Rogers’s accusation, before the investigation was even underway, that 
Kefauver and his “anti-capitalistic aide” John Blair intended to “Crush the Skulls of the 
Rich,” seemed ever so slightly less hysterical by the end of 1958. 
 A more significant and sober response to the Kefauver’s probe, however, came from 
unexpected quarters. In March 1959, Woodlief Thomas, a senior economist for the Federal 
Reserve Board, published a piece in the Washington Post endorsing many of the 
Subcommittee’s conclusions. The occasion was a new round of the administered price 
hearings exploring alternative public policies, in which Means, Galbraith, and others offered 
a renewed criticism of monetary restraint as an approach to the new inflation. Thomas did not 
at all disavow the Fed’s earlier efforts to halt the mid-1950s “creeping inflation,” but he did 
acknowledge that the inquiry into Means’s idea had “made a significant contribution to a 
better understanding of the problems of inflation and fluctuations in economic activity and 
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employment.”79 Administered prices in heavy industry produced such “distortions and 
inflexibilities in the price and income structure,” Thomas continued, that they “cannot be 
avoided by monetary and fiscal policies.” Though this “revolution in thought” does not mean 
that central bankers “now favor price or wage controls or any form of direct Government 
intervention,” New York Times financial correspondent Edwin Dale noted, “the sharp change 
in thinking about the problem is the sort that would necessarily precede a decision that 
controls are necessary.” And, with a presidential election looming, Dale recognized that a 
new “Democratic President might be even less reluctant than President Eisenhower to choose 
the road of controls.”80 Wyoming Senator Joseph O’Mahoney had already begun moving 
down that road by proposing a bill that would require firms in the most concentrated 
industries to notify the public in advance of a price increase, and the agitation for stronger 
regulation of prices was unlikely to stop there. Perhaps even the idea of central bank 
independence could again be in question. When the Democrats had swept the 1958 midterm 
elections, the Wall Street Journal warned that the coming years might witness the “Biggest 
Anti-Business Drive Since [the] New Deal.”81 
  A month earlier, Raymond Saulnier, the conservative Chair of Eisenhower’s CEA, 
announced that he had been swayed by the administered price thesis, as well. An anti-
inflation hardliner, Saulnier contributed to pushing upward the CEA’s definition of an 
acceptable – or non-inflationary – rate of unemployment, from the 3 percent level stipulated 
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by the Employment Act of 1946 to somewhere around 5 percent.82 In other words, Saulnier 
was among the last economists one would expect to endorse the arguments presented by 
Institutional Keynesians. But, after more than two years of the new inflation, the Republican 
CEA head believed that “we would have been better off if we had avoided the price increases 
that occurred [in] the heavy industries and in those producing automobiles,” and that “these 
price increases were a major factor in limiting demand and thereby restraining output.”83  
 What a contrast this would be from the Carter administration and the Paul Volcker 
Federal Reserve.   
 
*** 
 
KEFAUVER AND BLAIR’S SUCCESS was, however, limited by the structural obstacles 
confronting Institutional Keynesians by the early 1960s. And if the Subcommittee shed 
substantial light on those obstacles, it did little to programmatically challenge them. A senior 
Federal Reserve analyst gesturing towards an idea promoted by Institutional Keynesians was 
not quite the same as a statutory basis for subordinating the central bank to a legislature and 
executive committed to an Institutional Keynesian agenda. In any case, the Fed proved a 
fleeting ally. Over the next two decades, the independent central bank would frustrate every 
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presidential administration, and those tensions contributed to more than a few personnel 
shakeups during that time. But if the executive maintained some manner of influence over 
the figures directing the Fed, it did so within a narrow range of options, and, in the last 
instance, when the Board of Governors gathered behind closed doors there was not much any 
President could do about what they decided. This separation of powers, which in modern 
form dated only to 1951, was still politically contested when the Subcommittee conducted its 
investigation into administered prices. But as the Fed-Treasury Accord receded from 
memory, central bank independence began to seem like a natural feature of a modern and 
incomprehensibly complex economy. By the time Jimmy Carter appointed Paul Volcker to 
lead the Fed in the late 1970s, Estes Kefauver, John Blair, and Walter Reuther were all dead, 
and there were few echoes of the politics that animated their late 1950s struggle to place the 
spotlight on the social significance of monetary policy. 
 Of greater consequence in the immediate period were the terms on which the 
Subcommittee investigation was forced to proceed: in particular, the labor cost-productivity 
relation. The probe was, to be sure, just one of many factors that gave rise to the fetish of 
productivity by the early 1960s. Since the late nineteenth century, purchasing power 
progressives had sought to link demands for a livable wage to the remarkable strides in 
productivity displayed by the new industrial economy. In its time this argument made sense, 
and there was a case to be made that its rhetorical force warranted continued use even after 
the material conditions that nurtured it gave way to a new era. Still, a decade after World 
War II Institutional Keynesians in government and their allies in the trade union movement 
understood that the logic of linking their fate to the productive capacity of U.S. industry 
carried risks. Moreover, the durability of organized labor into the postwar period – which, it 
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must be emphasized, was unprecedented – had convinced many that such a limited demand, 
which did little to challenge the prerogatives conferred by ownership, was insufficient. But 
such a challenge was, of course, difficult to mount – not least because of the defeats suffered 
immediately after the war – and instead Institutional Keynesians found themselves waging a 
battle that at best would reproduce the status quo: synchronizing labor costs and productivity 
for the sake of price stability. Even this stalemate required cooperation from corporate 
leaders loath to cooperate, and this is to say nothing about what would occur if that status quo 
changed. Both would cause problems in the 1960s. 
 The steel industry collective bargaining round in 1959 provided a preview of how this 
might play out.84 Perhaps the Subcommittee’s most important effect was on steel executives, 
who determined that the changing political climate demanded a new strategy for shoring up 
profitability. Using wage increases as an opportunity to raise prices even further was no 
longer tenable. Unable to pay their workers less or to charge more for what they produced, 
then, steel managers resorted to their most tried and true method of accumulating capital: 
driving those workers harder. That is, increasing productivity. But achievement of increased 
productivity was not so simple. In theory, it required new investment in labor displacing 
plant and equipment, machinery that needed less labor power to churn out more stuff. This 
was expensive, and for two reasons industrial officials were reluctant to commit to it. First, 
no matter how fast the economy grew in the postwar years, steelmakers clung to old anxieties 
about excess capacity. The market could only bear so much steel, they felt, and those 
deciding how much to produce felt more comfortable tending towards too little than too 
much. Second, while the federal government did alleviate the burden of that expense by 
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Strike of 1959 and the Anatomy of the New Deal Order,” in author’s possession. 
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providing tax incentives, above all a liberal depreciation allowance, in the Revenue Act of 
1954, steel management felt that support from public authorities for their investment was not 
generous enough. Under a profit regime governed by the return on investment (ROI), the 
amount of old plant and equipment that could be written off each year – that is, the 
depreciation allowance – had a direct and significant effect on corporate earnings.85 In other 
words, they wanted the depreciation allowance to effectively function like a state subsidy for 
investment. But, of course, they promised nothing in return for it.  
 For these reasons, steel executives did not make the investments that would have 
provided a technological basis for greater output. And that forced them to reckon with the 
greatest obstacle in the way of greater productivity: the USWA. Since the late 1940s, the 
USWA’s industry standard collective bargaining agreement included language – Section 2-B 
– that prohibited management from touching established work rules unless new technology 
demanded it. In 1959, steel officials led by Roger Blough and R. Conrad Cooper of U.S. 
Steel instigated a major confrontation over that issue. The result was the largest strike – in 
terms of person hours lost – in U.S. history. And following 114-days on the line, the 
steelworkers won. After a Taft-Hartley injunction, an unfavorable Supreme Court ruling, and 
just a year removed from the deepest recession in two decades, this was no small 
achievement. 
 But that it took such a titanic struggle just to maintain the status quo ante testified to 
just how much Institutional Keynesians and industrial unionists were up against. In 
Washington, where the settlement was mediated by Vice President Richard Nixon, the 
central issue in the strike was the relationship between labor costs and productivity in the 
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postwar steel industry. Kefauver and Blair had advanced one interpretation, and the dispute 
was ultimately resolved in a way that accorded with their view. But they were not the only 
ones who chimed in. While the strike was in progress the Joint Economic Committee, led by 
Chairman Paul Douglas, issued a report that arrived at the exact opposite conclusion. The 
study, prepared by Harvard economist Otto Eckstein, held that, in fact, steel labor costs far 
outpaced the gains in productivity, and that, in effect, the union was responsible for the new 
inflation. That two congressional bodies could proffer such conflicting statements spoke to 
how much was uncertain, and how much was at stake, in the politics of productivity. How 
those politics played out is the subject of the next chapter.
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Chapter Four: From Profit Control to Productivity 
 
A NEW ERA in the politics of inflation began during John F. Kennedy’s short presidency. In 
the first few years of the 1960s, the balance of power in that struggle took a decisive shift 
away from Institutional Keynesianism. And the Kennedy administration itself did much to 
impel the sharp turn. The youngest person ever to be elected president, and also one of the 
most privileged, Kennedy surrounded himself with economists committed to a different kind 
of liberalism than that which had inspired the New Deal generation, one that emerged out of 
the unprecedented material conditions of the decade and a half after World War II: growth 
liberalism. Embodied in Kennedy’s famous and influential Council of Economic Advisers 
(CEA), this was the tradition to which the shorthand term “Keynesian” is typically affixed. 
These growth liberals were more attuned to macro-dynamics than micro-foundations, and 
they sought to use counter-cyclical fiscal policy, deployed via automatic stabilizers, to 
smooth out troughs and peaks and deliver a predictable rate of economic expansion.1 When 
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stagflation erupted in the 1970s and rendered such counter-cyclical tools ineffectual, 
however, the growth liberals who had advocated for them suffered a similar fate. And that, 
the standard story goes, left room for the onslaught of fiscal and monetary austerity which in 
the late 1970s and early 1980s tamed inflation only by inducing a recession of the likes not 
seen since the 1930s. It was a crisis from which the U.S. working-class has yet to recover. 
 But understanding why Institutional Keynesians were nowhere to be found in the 
1970s after having met some success during the recession of 1957-58 requires complicating 
the history of the new liberalism and exploring its relationship to the old. This chapter seeks 
to do that by showing how growth liberalism displaced Institutional Keynesianism from its 
central position in Democratic Party economic thought during the Kennedy administration. 
Through their intervention in labor-capital conflicts, in particular, growth liberals introduced 
a new paradigm devoted to a concern with productivity instead of profitability. In so doing, 
they tilted the balance in the politics of inflation away from the profit-inflation thesis John 
Blair and the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly had advanced and towards a “cost-
push” interpretation that assigned as much blame to labor as it did to corporate power.2 It was 
this paradigm that collapsed under the weight of its own contradictions in the 1970s, but by 
then Institutional Keynesianism had long been in retreat. And in what seemed to be a brave 
new world defined by increasing global competition and declining profitability, it was easy to 
assume that the older tradition no longer applied, or even to forget that it ever existed. 
 But the question is still how the one eclipsed the other. Juxtaposing the two brings 
into clearer focus what was at stake. The defining feature of growth liberalism as compared 
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to Institutional Keynesianism was this: it abandoned class relations as an analytic. At the core 
of the Institutional Keynesian analysis was an understanding that corporate capitalists as a 
class exerted profound influence on the course of economic development through their 
control over pricing and the investment function. Organization of countervailing social forces 
like trade unions, farmer cooperatives, and consumer groups, they felt, could place a check 
on corporate capital from below, while state intervention through industrial policy could do 
the same from above. In the last instance the idea was that redistribution of income and 
wealth to the working-class would enhance purchasing power, and that this coupled with 
state control over the terms on which that money was spent – through regulation of prices – 
and the uses to which the resulting returns were put – through regulation of profits and 
investment – was the only way to provide security for all. 
 The growth liberals began from a different premise. Led by the MIT economist and 
famed textbook author Paul Samuelson and his acolytes, they saw the economy as a single 
unit could be managed with proper technical expertise. Although that single unit was 
internally complex, it was governed by certain laws of motion. And one of the most 
fundamental laws was the inverse relationship between inflation and unemployment. 
Samuelson was responsible for popularizing the Phillips Curve, which had been published in 
1958 amid conditions that belied its central conclusion: that is, the new inflation. But in spite 
of its dubious applicability to the twentieth century U.S. economy, Samuelson saw an 
opportunity in the Phillips Curve. Technical experts like himself could use it to advise 
policymakers on the optimal balance between inflation and unemployment – offering, as they 
put it, a menu of choices – and in the process may be able to push things in a progressive 
direction. It gave them the scientific means by which to argue for expansionary policies when 
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inflation was not on the horizon. The problem was, inflation and unemployment did not 
always act the way the Phillips Curve said they should, and this conundrum forced 
Kennedy’s economic advisers to devise a different kind of solution.3 
 This chapter focuses on that effort. Specifically, it explores the genesis of the 
Kennedy administration’s signature inflation control policy, the productivity guideposts for 
wages and prices, which took shape around the 1962 steel collective bargaining round. 
Designed by Kennedy’s CEA and formally unveiled in the 1962 Economic Report of the 
President prepared by that body, the guideposts would set the terms of debate in the politics 
of inflation into the Nixon administration. The wage-price control apparatus that that 
Republican administration constructed was but a more robust version of the program 
Kennedy started, and it failed for reasons that were evident as early as 1962. But, first, what 
were the guideposts? The logic behind them was simple: tying wages to productivity would 
allow business and labor to share the fruits of economic growth without increasing real labor 
costs and therefore without necessitating an increase in prices. Economic growth with price 
stability was achievable after all. On its face it was a reasonable, even progressive idea – 
Gardiner Means, John Kenneth Galbraith, and Walter Reuther had all endorsed some version 
of it before the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly in 1957.  
 But as Charles Maier has argued, “the politics of productivity that emerged as the 
American organizing idea for the postwar economic world depended upon superseding class 
conflict with economic growth.”4 And that ostensible panacea brought contradictions with 
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which these labor-liberals proved either unable or unwilling to reckon. For one, while the 
guideposts were designed to address the new inflation that surfaced in the late 1950s, the 
CEA, led by Chairman Walter Heller, viewed that problem much differently than had John 
Blair and Estes Kefauver. Administered pricing in uncompetitive industries was the problem, 
they acknowledged, but business and labor deserved more or less equal blame for that 
process. And in a sense, as we will see, they placed greater blame on labor. What was more, 
their proposed solution was not to regulate wage and price setting industry by industry, but 
rather to force “uncompetitive” industries to act more competitively by imposing a universal 
standard of productivity on all.5 This was a clear departure from Institutional Keynesians 
who felt the answer to economic concentration was public control through comprehensive 
economic planning. It also ignored the history of that thing they were calling the economy, 
which was of course never a single thing at all but rather a set of relations and processes that 
unfolded in dynamic and uneven ways across space and time. One number could never 
account for the economy’s complexity. 
 Here the other instruments in Kennedy’s economic policy repertoire came into the 
picture. Following the Institutional Keynesians, Heller and his associates urged the Federal 
Reserve to adopt an expansionary monetary policy, and like those predecessors the growth 
liberals had to contend with the challenges presented by an independent central bank. But 
there were differences here too. Wary of rocking the boat with the global financial elite, 
Kennedy’s advisers took to issuing behind the scenes suggestions instead of public 
exhortations. This was in part because the Kennedy CEA took Fed independence as a given, 
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“a fact of life.”6 Their goals for monetary policy underscored the point: instead of pushing for 
a progressive monetary management to be integrated into a government spending program, 
they called for low interest rates only on the grounds that it would stimulate private 
investment. Their fiscal policy was similarly revealing. In addition to easy money, Heller felt 
that the most effective way to spur investment was to offer tax incentives to business. 
Passage of an investment tax credit and liberalization of the depreciation allowance became 
their first order of business, even before the more widely celebrated “Keynesian” income tax 
cut.7 In other words, private rather than public investment was their key to growth; and 
voluntary discipline by labor and capital the key to price stability. These early economic 
policies testified above all to the Kennedy administration’s firm conviction that pricing and 
investment were the sole prerogatives of capital. The class politics were there even if they did 
not mention them. 
 And there were still further pitfalls with their structural policy, the guideposts. First, 
even under the best of circumstances the guidepost program could only reproduce the status 
quo ante distribution of income. Whereas Institutional Keynesians criticized the existing 
share between profits and wages, growth liberals effectively naturalized it. Their insistence in 
the 1962 Economic Report that “there is nothing immutable in fact or in justice about the 
distribution of the total product between labor and nonlabor incomes” highlighted just how 
conscious they were of this consequence.8 Second, for all their gusto about the promise of 
productivity, Kennedy’s economic team largely failed to grapple with the one consequence it 
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was sure to have: structural unemployment thanks to the introduction of labor displacing 
machinery.9 Their disinterest in the unevenness of the national economy in an equally uneven 
global economy led them to neglect the fact that productivity growth came with costs in 
addition to benefits, and that the burden of those costs could well be felt more acutely in 
some places than others.  
 Then there was the question of what exactly productivity was. As we have seen in 
relation to the definition and measurement of inflation, the production of economic statistics 
was itself a political and ideological process.10 Did labor productivity refer to output per hour 
worked or output per dollar spent on labor? The first definition would allow for workers to 
share in the gains created by new machinery, while the second would punish those able to 
bargain for higher wages. Also, how should capacity utilization figure into the calculation? 
Firms were most productive when they ran their plants at the highest possible rate, but as 
Institutional Keynesians had long understood powerful corporations often had reasons for 
operating only a low part of their capacity. Should they be rewarded for doing so in the form 
of a lower guidepost for wages? Moreover, given that productivity did develop unevenly, 
how should one account for the fact that increasing output by, say, a supplier, might affect 
the cost composition and by extension a number of other things for a purchasing firm? 
Economic change could ripple far and wide. And finally, if it was at all reasonable of Marx 
to refer to productivity as an expression of the “rate of exploitation,” was it not the greatest of 
contradictions to hitch workers’ fate to its intensification? 
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 The gravest implications of the guideposts, however, only became clear as the 
program was implemented. Through their control over that magical productivity figure, 
presidential administrations were able to delimit the boundary of the winnable for organized 
labor in the 1960s. A few additional decimal points could make quite a difference to workers, 
and only the President and his closest advisors had the power to nudge the number in one 
direction or the other. To be sure, the arrangement depended on cooperation from labor 
officials, and there were legitimate reasons why trade unionists might go along. The 
guideposts represented a step towards the further institutionalization of political collective 
bargaining, and against increasingly intransigent corporations such state intervention was by 
the 1960s most welcome. The case of the 1959 steel dispute, in which the Eisenhower 
administration brokered a deal favorable to the union, proved that this could be so even under 
a Republican president.11 But the guidepost program was more presidential involvement than 
thoroughgoing politicization, and it came with tradeoffs. For the sake of the productivity 
figure unionists would have to subordinate both principle and pride to John F. Kennedy and 
Lyndon B. Johnson, often to ugly effect. Indeed, as U.S. military aggression in Southeast 
Asia picked up during the 1960s, the tragedy of this Faustian bargain would be thrown into 
painful relief. The trade union movement found itself on the wrong side of history in its 
support for the Vietnam War, in large measure because complicity in carnage on the other 
side of the world was the price its leaders had agreed to pay for a few tenths of a percent 
more at home. 
 And while the labor movement had to kneel before the President and contractually 
bind itself to the figure he announced, business was under no comparable legal obligation. 
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Good faith along with a helping of moral exhortation – what they called “jawboning” – was 
supposed to be enough to get the most powerful corporations in the world to voluntarily limit 
their prices and profits. To little surprise, it did not work. Throughout the 1960s labor leaders 
complained about the fundamental unfairness of a program that really only applied to one 
party, and by the end of the decade few had any faith in it. But this basic limitation was 
visible as early as 1962, both in the famous confrontation between Kennedy and U.S. Steel’s 
Roger Blough and in how it was resolved. That both Democratic administrations remained 
committed to it in spite of its manifest weaknesses testified to the shifting terrain in the class 
politics of inflation.  
  
THE ECONOMY WAS IN FLUX when John F. Kennedy was elected in November 1960. 
Although both candidates in that year’s presidential race, Kennedy and then Vice President 
Richard Nixon, did their best to stay away from the word “recession,” that the economy 
slowed markedly during the campaign, with unemployment climbing to almost 7 percent, no 
doubt favored the Democrat. For years to come the ever spiteful Nixon would harbor 
resentment towards Federal Reserve Chairman William McChesney Martin, who in the run 
up to the election oversaw a policy of monetary tightening which Nixon took to have caused 
of the downturn. In any case, the economy was in bad shape when Kennedy entered the 
White House. But rejuvenating it was not his first priority, as many thought it should be. The 
new President did begin his first economic address before Congress by calling for “measures 
both to alleviate the distress arising from unsatisfactory performance and to stimulate 
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recovery and growth.”12 Yet his proposals could hardly be classified as ambitious. Area 
redevelopment and manpower training, expanded unemployment insurance and minimum 
wage coverage, and, especially, tax incentives for investment stood in for substantive 
planning and public works. As CEA member James Tobin put it some years later, “the group 
around Kennedy felt politically that a kind of unmitigated [Leon] Keyserling or old-style 
Democratic liberalism in regard to economics and fiscal policy wasn’t going to pay off.”13 In 
other words, Institutional Keynesianism was out from the get go. 
 Kennedy did explain why he would not do more. He was unwilling to “buy short-run 
economic gains by paying the price of excessive increases in the cost of living.” 14 And he 
even promised to use the “powerful tools of fiscal and monetary policy to arrest any such 
movement if it should arise in the year ahead.”15 Inflation was intolerable, that is, and 
progressive economic policies could not even be considered until the administration had 
inoculated against the threat of it. Whereas a generation of New Dealers saw such 
progressivism as a means of overcoming concrete economic challenges, now having 
overcome all concrete economic challenges was a precondition for anything more 
imaginative.16 Indeed, MIT economist and Kennedy adviser Paul Samuelson’s 
characterization of himself as one of the “little picture men” nicely describes Kennedy’s 
																																																						
12 John F. Kennedy: “Special Message to Congress: Program for Economic Recovery and Growth,” February 2, 
1961. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Wooley, The American Presidency Project, 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=8111. 
13 CEA Oral History, 48. 
14 John F. Kennedy: “Special Message to Congress: Program for Economic Recovery and Growth,” February 2, 
1961. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Wooley, The American Presidency Project, 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=8111. 
15 Ibid. 
16 This point is informed by others scholars who have argued that economic growth became a condition for 
rather than a consequence of reform. See Collins, More; Alice O’Connor, Poverty Knowledge: Social Science, 
Social Policy, and the Poor in Twentieth-Century History (Princeton: PUP, 2002), Ch. 6-7; Thomas Stapleford, 
The Cost of Living in America, Ch. 8. 
 186 
vision in general – it was a little picture economics.17 The editors Wall Street Journal agreed, 
expressing pleasure at Kennedy’s “rather modest proposals,” which displayed an “evident 
awareness that his desire to stimulate the economy is disciplined to a great extent by avoiding 
dangers in other areas,” while the New York Times was “encouraged by his continued 
emphasis on the dangers of inflation.”18 
 But by early 1961 prices had been stable for some time, and the CEA even noted after 
the inauguration that “Inflation dangers are at their lowest point in years.”19 In a much 
heralded public appearance before the JEC in March 1961 – Eisenhower’s CEA testified only 
in private – Heller and his associates reiterated the point, concluding that the risk that anti-
recession measures “will aggravate an inflationary boom [is] smaller in 1961 than it has 
appeared in any previous postwar recession.”20 Still, Kennedy balked at recovery measures 
that he felt might prove inflationary. The administration actually came to define 4 percent as 
their target rate of unemployment, a figure higher than any Democrat and most Republicans 
would have publicly accepted through the 1950s, because they felt anything lower would 
feed inflation.21 In “terms of trade between unemployment and price stability,” Heller called 
a 4 percent rate of joblessness the “fulcrum.”22 And when the President that spring publicly 
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aspired to achieve a 5 percent rate of economic expansion, Heller, whose devotion to growth 
no one doubted, chided him for committing the administration to what “is really too high as 
an early goal.” Moreover, he added, “it is unwise to tie ourselves to a specific figure with 
which political opponents can belabor you in 1964.”23 The CEA Chairman felt no 
comparable reluctance to tying themselves to a specific figure of unemployment. But the 
question remains: with unemployment surging and inflation nowhere to be seen, why did a 
popular, new Democratic administration move so gingerly? Why, as Walter Lippmann wryly 
observed, did they act “like the Eisenhower administration but thirty years younger”?24 
 Global politics account for part of the answer. Kennedy’s chief economic 
preoccupation - some would call it an obsession or even “almost phobia” – from the moment 
he took office was the rising U.S. balance of payments deficit and the corresponding gold 
outflow problem.25 In simplest terms, the balance of payments referred to the difference 
between the amount of foreign exchange coming into a country and the amount going out. 
For the Kennedy administration, the stakes of this swelling deficit went back to what Leo 
Panitch and Sam Gindin have called the “political economy of American empire” in the 
postwar period. Starting with the Bretton Woods Accord in the mid-1940s, again, the U.S. 
dollar functioned as the global reserve currency. An international monetary system of fixed 
exchange rates was linked to it and backed by convertibility between the dollar and gold at an 
established price, one that the U.S. government was committed to maintaining. While the 
system was designed to provide most countries with some measure of flexibility so as to 
enable them to run budget deficits as they pursued full employment, the centrality of the 
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dollar to the whole arrangement put U.S. officials in a uniquely difficult situation. Stability in 
currency value was a greater imperative in the U.S. than anywhere else, and this had 
attendant consequences on every dimension of the politics of inflation.26 
 Recent history complicated matters further. Internationally, the dollar had in short 
order gone form being in high demand to excess supply, an imbalance that raised questions 
about the ability of the U.S. Treasury to meet all of its obligations. In the immediate 
aftermath of the war, dollars flooded to war devastated parts of Western Europe and the 
Pacific where they served as the principal medium by which reconstruction was financed. 
This began with the Marshall Plan and postwar aid to the Japanese state, and as those 
programs proved successful investment opportunities in Europe in particular attracted ever 
more sums of greenbacks. The establishment at the end of the decade of the European 
Economic Community, which protected the Continent from imports but liberalized trade 
within it, encouraged additional investment in Europe itself. And the emergence of an 
unregulated Eurodollar market compounded things. All of this along with increasing U.S. 
military expenditures abroad turned what had just after the war been a global shortage of 
dollars into a glut, and by the early 1960s foreign holders of American paper were beginning 
to raise eyebrows. Whether or not they would start calling in their claims to gold depended 
on their confidence in those at the helm of the U.S. state, and Kennedy and his advisers took 
that responsibility to heart.27 
 In an address to Congress soon after the inauguration, Kennedy focused on the peril 
of balance of payments deficits. As “the principal banker of the free world,” he warned the 
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legislature, “any potential weakness in our dollar spells trouble, not only for us but for our 
friends and allies who rely on the dollar to finance a substantial portion of their trade.”28 But 
if the balance of payments problem expressed itself financially, the new administration 
determined that the answer to it lay in industrial productivity. A task force on the balance-of-
payments convened soon after the election recommended that the way forward was to make 
products produced in the United States more competitive on the world market – in other 
words, to compensate for the outflow of dollars by improving the U.S. balance of trade in 
goods and services. How to achieve that? By focusing on the “inter-related subjects of 
productivity, costs, and prices.”29 Walt Whitman Rostow, soon to be second in command at 
the National Security Council, elaborated upon the point and linked it to the Cold War:  
I cannot emphasize too strongly that the capacity of the new Administration to 
do what it wants to do at home and abroad will depend promptly on breaking 
the institutional basis for creeping inflation, notably in the key steel and 
automobile industries….If we do not evoke American effort and sacrifice for 
communal goals at home, we run the danger of being forced by the balance of 
payments position and inflation into substituting rhetoric for action abroad.30 
 
Walter Heller agreed. Although unemployment stood at well over 6 percent in the summer of 
1961, it was down from its 7 percent peak earlier in the year and Kennedy’s CEA, feeling the 
worst was behind them, used the occasion to beat the drum on the balance of payments as 
well. Changing economic conditions, Heller instructed the President, made it “important to 
watch price developments closely, lest excessive price increases imperil the recovery or add 
to our balance of payments difficulties.” And like both Rostow and the members of the task 
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force on the balance of payments, Heller understood which price developments were most 
important to monitor: “Steel is the major threat to price stability over the next several 
months,” he added, because “it can upset the price applecart all by itself.”31  
 
*** 
 
THE CONTRACT ACHIEVED after the 1959 steel strike was set to expire in early 1962, 
and the Kennedy administration saw that collective bargaining round as central to their 
efforts to stabilize the price level going forward. Moreover, 1959 marked the first year that 
steel imports exceeded exports; the trend would not be reversed, but at the time Kennedy saw 
reversing it as a vital part of the balance of payments struggle. Although UAW negotiations 
with GM began first, in the summer of 1961, then, steel was the priority. Heller advised 
Kennedy that publicized “efforts to hold steel prices in check should be helpful in appealing 
to Reuther to accept a reasonable settlement and to get [USWA President David] McDonald 
in a reasonable frame of mind” for the upcoming negotiations.32 But if the CEA devised the 
strategy, Kennedy would have to rely on other members of his administration to broker the 
deal. And in particular he turned to Secretary of Labor Arthur Goldberg. 
 Goldberg was a product of the labor movement born through the New Deal, and he 
exemplified both its promise and its limitations. A child of working-class Russian Jewish 
immigrants, Goldberg grew up in Chicago and worked his way through night classes at local 
colleges and Northwestern Law School before establishing a small legal practice during the 
Depression. Swept up by the CIO upsurge later that decade, he began providing his services 
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to Illinois unions and soon caught the eye of SWOC head Philip Murray, who recruited him 
into the inner-circle of the industrial union brain trust. Following a stint with the OSS during 
World War II – where he collaborated with a number of other left-liberal intellectuals – 
Goldberg rose the ranks of labor’s legal community, replacing Lee Pressman as CIO general 
counsel after the removal of the former AAA official for Communist ties. In fact, Goldberg 
himself coordinated the legal work for that post-Taft-Hartley Communist purge. He also 
helped to broker the AFL-CIO merger in 1955, provided regular counsel to the new 
federation, and continued to work for the USWA through the 1959 strike. Kennedy’s 
selection of Goldberg as Secretary of Labor no doubt attested to the respect even this new-
style Democrat still had to pay to the trade union movement.33 
  And Goldberg hoped to cash in on the opportunity. His first goal was to establish a 
Council of Labor-Management Advisors, a body that would parallel the CEA and be charged 
with overseeing a process of tripartite bargaining modeled on European co-determinism. Part 
of his rationale in calling for a new executive advisory group was his belief that the CEA had 
failed to make good on its obligation to 1946 Employment Act. In addition to the Labor-
Management Council, Goldberg proposed an Employment Act of 1961 which would 
redouble the federal government commitment to full employment. Harshly critical of the 
CEA’s decision to publicize a specific unemployment figure, he argued that it created “the 
impression that a 4 per cent rate is a desirable norm consistent with the meaning of full 
employment.”34 And his frustration ran deeper than the number itself. The problem, 
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Goldberg felt, was almost epistemic: the CEA had accepted a definition of full employment 
as the maximum level at which prices would remain stable – this is what neo-classical 
economists would later call the non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment (NAIRU). 
But that definition was by no means universally accepted. The idea of a tradeoff between 
prices and employment, upon which the definition rested rested, was more a political and 
ideological project than a reflection of an empirical reality. As they had just seen during the 
late 1950s, inflation could proceed even in times of rising unemployment! As such, Goldberg 
wrote to Heller, “I feel very strongly that the [Economic Report of the President] should not 
adopt a definition of full employment cast in terms of avoiding inflation” and “that nothing 
should be included here which even permits the interpretation that the President is accepting 
4% (or any other specific figure) as a measurement of full employment.”35 He also, for good 
measure, countered the tax cut arguments emanating from within the CEA with pleas that the 
administration commit to direct government spending on public works. This was the legacy 
of Institutional Keynesianism in the Kennedy administration, and its steward Arthur 
Goldberg failed on all counts. His proposed Council of Labor-Management Advisers became 
a toothless Labor-Management Advisory Committee (LMAC).36 
 And he failed largely because the Kennedy’s advisers stopped him. As CEA member 
Kermit Gordon later commented, Goldberg’s “real efforts to extend the range of authority of 
the secretary of labor came very, very early.” He was, Gordon continued, “quite 
obviously…making a move through the [LMAC] to extend his concerns to the whole range” 
of economic policy issues. But the CEA stymied that maneuver in the drafting of the 
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executive order that established the body.37 The LMAC’s mandate was accordingly limited: 
it would “study,” “advise,” and “make recommendations to the President with respect to 
policies that may be followed by labor, management, or the public” (emphasis added).38 The 
fate of the LMAC spoke to Goldberg’s minimal influence on Kennedy, at least in comparison 
to the CEA, and his time in the Cabinet was in any event short-lived. In 1962, Kennedy 
appointed him to the Supreme Court. 
 But even if LMAC never became the proto-social democratic body Goldberg had 
hoped to lead, it still had a role to play in the 1962 steel bargaining round. And Heller and the 
CEA were concerned with dictating the terms of that role. In preparation for Kennedy’s 
appearance before the first LMAC meeting in July 1961, the CEA Chairman encouraged the 
President to start by highlighting the tenuous “international position of the dollar” and 
emphasizing that its future “depends on our ability to compete internationally,” which in turn 
“depends in large part on the course of prices in the United States.” Heller suggested that 
Kennedy open the inaugural meeting of the LMAC, that is, with a warning about prices and 
the balance of payments, and not, say, employment or purchasing power. He did go on to talk 
about full employment, but not in the way the Institutional Keynesians had done so. Only if 
“the price level is held in check,” Heller added, will it “be possible to move ahead vigorously 
to achieve full recovery and more rapid growth.” This was yet another avowal of the 
conviction that price stability was the precondition for reform. And the best way to ensure 
price stability was to link wage- and price-setting to the rate of productivity of the national 
economy: “In industries where the increase in productivity is less than the national average, 
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prices may have to increase. Hence stability of the price level requires offsetting price 
reductions in industries where productivity is growing more rapidly than the national 
average.”39 In practice, this would reduce to identifying which rate was lower, industrywide 
productivity or economy-wide productivity, pegging wages to that figure, and calling for 
restraint on prices.40 
 Heller was well aware of the two most immediate drawbacks of this approach: that it 
froze the preexisting distribution of income between employees and employers and that it 
depended on introduction of labor-displacing machinery that would contribute to 
unemployment. “When wages rise proportionally to productivity,” he noted, “the share of 
wages in total income remains unchanged, so that wages and profits divide the productivity 
increment in the same proportion as they divided the earlier total.”41 And although Heller 
disputed those conservatives who asserted that automation was producing a kind of structural 
unemployment that everyone would simply have to get used to, he did concede that in the 
immediate term higher productivity would put people out of work. But he felt that it was a 
price worth paying, and as a growth liberal par excellence was convinced that the “economy 
should continue to yield an ever-increasing level of real wages and salaries for our labor 
force” and that its very boundlessness would mitigate whatever friction the new productive 
capacity caused.42 He would have a hard time accounting for the great productivity 
slowdown that began less than a decade later. 
 But of greatest importance was how Heller understood productivity itself, and 
especially how he made sense of its relationship to labor costs and prices. The sources from 
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which the CEA drew are instructive in this regard. While the Subcommittee on Antitrust and 
Monopoly was orchestrating its investigation into administered prices and advancing an 
argument, backed by thousands of pages of empirical data, about how the new inflation 
stemmed from corporate profits, the Paul Douglas-led Joint Economic Committee was at 
work propagating a different explanation. Douglas, again, was the famous University of 
Chicago economist turned Illinois Democratic Senator whose first actions in that chamber 
were in defense of the 1951 Fed-Treasury Accord. His reputation as a liberal 
notwithstanding, he was in a sense among the first of the new-style Democrats. Douglas 
assumed the Chairmanship of the JEC in early 1959, and the investigation into inflation he 
spearheaded that year – Employment, Growth, and the Price Level – shed further light on the 
differences between his wing of liberalism and Institutional Keynesians like John Blair. They 
were differences that Walter Heller and the CEA shared.43  
 Douglas’s investigation did not match Kefauver’s in terms of pages produced, but it 
came close. It began in early 1959 with appearances by Sumner Slichter, Leon Keyserling, 
and Marriner Eccles who each presented a distinct perspective on the challenges confronting 
the U.S. economy. The JEC then held focused hearings on the main issues: wages, prices, 
and production; fiscal and monetary policy; concentration at home and competition from 
abroad. In the process the Committee heard from economists across the ideological spectrum 
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– from Hyman Minsky to Milton Friedman – along with a few representatives from business 
and labor. In addition to the ten volumes hearing transcripts, the JEC also commissioned 
twenty-three independent study papers and produced a sweeping, 500-plus page staff report 
summarizing all the findings and offering policy recommendations.44 
 Like John Blair in the Kefauver-led Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly, the 
Douglas JEC had its own influential behind the scenes economist. Harvard economist Otto 
Eckstein served as the Technical Director for the study and was principal author of the 
enormous staff report. Born to a German Jewish family in 1927, Eckstein had quite a life. At 
age eleven, he and other family members fled the Nazis, first emigrating to England and then 
settling in the United States. He attended Princeton before earning a doctorate in economics 
at Harvard, at which point he joined the faculty of that esteemed department. In 1964 he 
joined Lyndon Johnson’s CEA, and after returning to private life helped to found Data 
Resources Inc., the world’s largest private purveyor of economic data and macroeconomic 
modeling which in 1979 he sold to McGraw Hill for more than $100 million. When he 
succumbed to cancer at age fifty-six he was among the wealthiest professional economists in 
America.45 
 And like Blair, Eckstein brought a particular view to the JEC. Strong productivity, he 
felt, could dissolve the tensions placing strain on the U.S. economy. The Staff Report was an 
extensive and sophisticated meditation on each aspect of economic policy which repeatedly 
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returned to the conclusion that responsible fiscal and monetary management along with 
targeted efforts to harness increasing productivity would allow for growth with price 
stability. This insight, however, was not particularly new. Of greater consequence was how 
Eckstein made sense of productivity itself. In this regard, the JEC Study Paper he prepared 
concurrent to his work on the Staff Report was perhaps his most influential contribution to 
the investigation. In Steel and the Postwar Inflation, Eckstein and his associate, Gary 
Fromm, entered into the debate the the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly had begun 
two years earlier. And they arrived at a very different conclusion. 
 In one sense Eckstein and Blair were on the same page: steel industry pricing 
contributed directly to the new inflation. “[T]he extraordinary behavior of steel,” Eckstein 
and Fromm wrote, “accounted for 40 percent of the rise” in the price level over the previous 
decade.46 On this point Blair had to admit that Eckstein’s research was “ingenious.”47 But 
that was about the only point of agreement. To understand that “extraordinary behavior” of 
steel prices, Eckstein and Fromm started with labor. The ability of the USWA to bargain with 
the whole industry, the authors asserted, “is probably best characterized as a bilateral 
monopoly.”48 And their principal conclusion resulted from this insight: “Bargaining between 
a strong union and a management with strong market power in the product market, persuaded 
of their ability to pass higher employment costs on in higher prices and being pressured by 
Government to settle their differences on favorable terms are the major explanations of wage 
movements.”49 This would not have been a problem had productivity growth been strong. 
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But steel productivity had through the 1950s been below average, Eckstein and Fromm 
observed, and this “in combination with wage increase above the average, has made for 
larger than average increases in employment costs per unit of output.”50 That is, steel labor 
costs were outpacing productivity growth in the industry, the exact opposite of what the 
Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly investigation had concluded.  
 In spite of the technical terms in which Eckstein and Fromm made their argument, its 
implications were clear. Steelworker wages rather than corporate profits were responsible for 
the new inflation. Trade unionists and Institutional Keynesians responded accordingly. The 
day after the release of the Study Paper, AFL-CIO researcher Nat Goldfinger wrote an 
acerbic letter to Eckstein, and sent a copy to Douglas for good measure:  
I have been painfully shocked and surprised by the poor quality, superficial 
nature and distortions of your [paper]. The publication is certainly not worthy 
of either you or the Joint Economic Committee. Its effect is harmful and 
damaging, not only to the United Steelworkers and the entire trade union 
movement in a most trying period, but this publication by a reputable 
Congressional committee sets back the attempt to study and analyze the 
causes of the slowly rising price level of recent years.51 
 
 Goldfinger note wasn’t all vitriol. He dissected the report, identifying five glaring 
weaknesses that left it “studded with bias and, for a study paper, shockingly dependent upon 
erroneous concepts and unsupported opinions for its conclusions.”52 Three of the points were 
technical assessments of Eckstein and Fromm’s faulty use of temporal relationships – 
Goldfinger argued that they drew on data from unrepresentative time periods since 1947, that 
they were imprecise with chronology in drawing causal conclusions regarding wages, prices, 
																																																						
50 Ibid, 21. 
51 Nat Goldfinger to Otto Eckstein, Nov. 6, 1959, Box 80, Joint Economic Committee, 1947-70, Office Files, 
Research Department, USWA. 
52 Otis Brubaker to Arthur Goldberg, Nov. 16, 1959, Box 80, Joint Economic Committee, 1947-70, Office Files 
Research Department, USWA. 
 199 
and productivity, and that they used too early a terminal date and ignored more recent data. 
Compounding these methodological errors, their sample was biased – the report included 
many firms “which are not even a part of the Steel Industry” in its calculation of profit 
margins, dragging down the “average” rate. Had the study limited itself to the twelve major 
producers, the “sharp upward movement of steel profit margins” would have been obvious. 
Finally, Goldfinger concluded that the flawed methodology was not the product of 
carelessness, but of outright bias as “evidenced by the choice of ‘prejudice’ words, uncritical 
acceptance of Steel Industry allegations, and conclusions which are unsupported and 
unsupportable.”53 
  John Blair was equally dismayed. “Because of the attention given it,” the Chief 
Economist wrote to another Subcommittee staffer, “and also because it presents both 
explicitly and implicitly findings and conclusions different from those reached by us in our 
steel report,” it could not be ignored. The compulsively thorough Blair found “particularly 
annoying” Eckstein’s “lack of footnotes indicating source materials” as well as his “insertion 
of gratuitous editorial comments which are neither part of nor supported by the analysis,” and 
concluded that “the staff study falls short of those accepted standards usually associated with 
scholarly works.”54 
 Their frustrations did extend beyond Eckstein. The Harvard economist drew on BLS 
data about which these critics were deeply suspicious. Of particular interest in this regard 
was a change in how the BLS calculated steel productivity in the late 1950s. Through that 
decade, administrative – largely salaried, white-collar – employment in the industry 
increased, far outpacing the growth of production workers who had to contend with the 
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displacing effects of whatever investment into new technology the industry made during that 
time. The rise of this new class of workers raised questions about the measurement of labor 
productivity in the industry. Should non-production workers, who were not members of the 
bargaining unit, be included or not? The BLS determined that they should, but the question 
was more than academic. Better paid, and, in contrast to production workers, paid year 
round, inclusion of white collar workers tended to bring the total productivity number down. 
“The collective bargaining implications” of the all-employee productivity figure, USWA 
Research Director Otis Brubaker noted, “are obvious and cannot be avoided.” “This new 
series in Steel,” he continued, “will give the employers yet another tool to try to use in their 
efforts to prevent the sharing of productivity gains with their employees thru collective 
bargaining.”55  
 But the BLS’s new methodology stood, and Eckstein only rose in prominence. In 
1961, Kennedy’s CEA made Eckstein its point person on steel.56 He was dispatched to push 
the administration’s steel wage-price line before Congress; his work would inform how 
Heller and his associates understood the productivity-labor cost relationship in the industry; 
and Lyndon Johnson would later ask him to join his Council of Economic Advisers. Given 
the choice between the two major congressional investigations into the new inflation, that is, 
the incoming Kennedy administration sided with Douglas and Eckstein over Kefauver and 
Blair. That one choice shed substantial light on the changing class politics of liberalism in the 
United States at the start of the 1960s.  
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THE STORY BEHIND the 1962 steel crisis is well known, if perhaps apocryphally so.57 
Early in the year, Walter Heller informed Kennedy that 2.5 to 3 percent should be the target 
wage increase in the steel round, and after tireless mediation by Secretary of Labor Goldberg 
the USWA and industry leaders settled at the lower end. The President hailed the settlement 
as one that was “obviously not inflationary” and which should “provide a solid base for price 
stability,” while Washington Post corresponded Bernard Nossiter called it a “stunning 
triumph for the Kennedy administration.”58 But the victory was short lived. A week later, 
U.S. Steel head Roger Blough visited the White House to hand deliver a mimeographed 
statement announcing a 3.5 percent price increase – that is, 3.5 percent higher than the 
administration had expected. Outraged, the President is said to have remarked that “my father 
always told me that all steelmen were sons of bitches, and I did not realize until now how 
right he was.” Whether or not that actually happened at least USWA President David 
McDonald recalls him calling to say that “you’ve been screwed and I’ve been screwed.”59 
Arthur Goldberg reacted more perceptively. “Mr. President,” the Secretary of Labor averred, 
“this industry cannot be tamed, they rule this country, and even Mr. Truman couldn’t take 
them on.”60And although Kennedy made a quick show of trying to take them on – in what 
Walter Heller called the “Battle of Blough Run” – the President took his labor liaison’s 
words seriously. Maybe too seriously.  
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 Kennedy did issue a forceful statement to the press the following day in which he 
announced that the “facts of the matter are that there is no justification for an increase in steel 
prices.” He also instructed his Department of Justice and the FTC to explore the possibility of 
pursuing antitrust prosecution and called on the Department of Defense to halt orders from 
complicit steel firms. Heller even quietly convened a group of economists and industrial 
organization specialists to look into “long-rage” solutions to the steel problem, and they 
discussed ideas ranging from regulation of steel like a public utility and construction of 
government plants to serve as “yardsticks” to tariff reductions and outright dissolution of 
U.S. Steel and Bethlehem Steel.61 At the same time, Estes Kefauver, Albert Gore, and others 
in Congress kicked their legislative bodies into gear for yet another round of investigations 
into steel industry.62 
 Faced with mounting pressure from the federal government and wary of smaller 
firms’ ability to hold the price line, U.S. Steel soon thereafter notified the public that it was 
rescinding the price increase.63 Writing in the Washington Post, Drew Pearson concluded that 
the episode marked the end of the “JFK-Business Honeymoon,” and the Wall Street Journal 
editorial lamented how “business is back in the doghouse.”64 If the steel standoff provided 
the opportunity for Kennedy to adopt a more antagonistic stance towards the corporate elite, 
however, he did not take it. The President praised the industry for its responsibility in taking 
back the price hike, and within weeks Kennedy invited Blough to the White House to make 
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amends. More importantly, he would look away later in the year when the industry covertly 
raised prices on selected products.65 
 The olive branch did not come out of nowhere. Kennedy had made establishment of 
healthy relationships with business a top priority from the outset. By the summer of 1961, 
Walter Heller was holding regular meetings with Roger Blough himself in the hopes of 
building “a good two-way channel to business, which will help reduce the feeling that the 
Kennedy Administration is unfriendly to business.” Heller felt that “we can get something 
useful from business through this relationship,” even if “business will try to get some quid 
for its quo.”66 Blough, Heller admitted in October 1961, even “seduced me into speaking 
before the Business Council,” an opportunity he hoped “could be a good deal more than just 
a bridge-building exercise.”67 And after the meeting he was even more optimistic. The 
“collective reception of my talk seemed quite decent and friendly,” he reported to President, 
and the “newer generation in the Business Council is much more receptive” to the growth 
liberal policies the administration was trying to advance. “Economics,” Heller wrote in the 
subject line, “makes strange bedfellows.”68 He might have qualified the statement by 
specifying which kind of economics he meant. 
 A sharp drop in the stock market around the time of the steel standoff only heightened 
Kennedy’s anxiety over the state of business confidence, and allaying investor jitters soon 
became his principal concern. In advance of an appearance before the Chamber of 
Commerce, which was celebrating its fiftieth anniversary, Paul Samuelson advised the 
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President to give a “sophisticated and non-apologetic statement concerning your recognition 
of the vital role of the Private Sector of the economy and of the fundamental importance that 
competitive profits play in economic life and growth.” Aware of the drawbacks of cozying 
up to business in such a climate, Samuelson added that “care must be taken to avoid 
sounding corny, platitudinous, hypocritical and obsequiously apologetic,” and Kennedy did 
his best to walk the line.69 “It is easy to charge an administration is anti-business,” the 
President intoned to the Chamber, “but it is more difficult to show how an administration, 
composed we hope of rational men, can possibly feel they can survive without business.” “I 
assure you,” he continued to the business representatives, that the administration “shares your 
concern about the cost-profit squeeze on American business” and understands that “there can 
be no growth without the investment that is inspired and financed by profit.” The “primary 
challenge,” Kennedy closed, “is not how to divide the economic pie, but how to enlarge it.”70 
If Heller did not say it, there was a reason why Business Council members were sympathetic 
to their economics. Growth liberalism was a liberalism they could live with, especially when 
compared to what it had displaced. 
 
*** 
 
THE GUIDEPOST PROGRAM was one of many things Lyndon B. Johnson suddenly 
inherited from John F. Kennedy in November 1963. It was one he kept, and it forced him to 
deal with the challenges seen in that opening steel round. But if the structural policy 
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remained the same, the larger political economy underwent a tremendous change during his 
presidency. Johnson’s escalation of the conflict in Vietnam did more to jumpstart the 
economy than any of Kennedy’s technocratic fiscal measures, and between 1966 and 1968 
heavy federal spending drove unemployment down and growth up. Only military 
intervention in Southeast Asia, that is, succeeded in reducing unemployment to below 4 
percent, a fact that should make the “golden age” shine a little less bright in our historical 
memory.  
 In any event, improving economic performance brought with it demand inflationary 
pressure, and labor’s enhanced bargaining power also increased the risk of additional 
structural inflation. The Johnson administration sought to limit both by strict adherence to the 
productivity guideposts, but their failure to hold business in line on prices only further 
discredited the program.  In 1966, a closely watched national collective bargaining round in 
the airline industry resulted in an above guidepost settlement, and that same year the steel 
industry ratcheted up tonnage rates, and by 1967 the five year-old system was in disarray.71 
Still, at least until that point trade unionists like Walter Reuther and the new USWA 
President I.W. Abel committed their organizations to collaborating with the Johnson 
administration on improving the program. In particular, they proposed that the CEA revise 
the guidepost to be a sum of the productivity figure and the rate of increase in the CPI, 
thereby deterring immediate price increases and shielding their members from those that did 
go through. As USWA Research Director Otis Brubaker commented to Gardiner Means in 
1970, “We lost this battle with all of the members of the [CEA], both old ones and their 
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replacements. This spelled the death knell of the guideposts.” “Needless to say,” Brubaker 
added, “it would be inordinately more difficult to revive them under today’s unsettled 
economic circumstances than it would have been to have made the necessary revision to keep 
them functioning.”72 
 But just a year later the Nixon administration tried to revive the idea behind the 
guideposts, and he did so in what was in a sense a way more befitting of Institutional 
Keynesianism: wage-price controls. And while Brubaker was correct to note that it would be 
inordinately more difficult to address the new inflation in the 1970s than it would have been 
in the 1960s, that he continued to express faith in the principle underlying the program – the 
promise of productivity – spoke to just how much ground Institutional Keynesianism had 
ceded to growth liberalism by that point. Nixon’s wage-price control program did what the 
Kennedy-Johnson guideposts did not: it directly regulated price setting. But while the 
absence of such public authority was in the last instance responsible for the failure of the 
guidepost program, the logic upon which it was founded was its most important feature. That 
logic continued in the Nixon administration, and its continued failure served to undermine 
whatever support remained for a structural solution to the problem of inflation.
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Chapter Five: Inflation and the Political Economy of the Silent Majority 
 
RICHARD NIXON INHERITED his predecessors’ war in Southeast Asia and ran with it, 
and he did the same with their approach to the price level. Productivity, he felt, was the way 
to cut through the contentious distributive issues involved in the politics of inflation, and 
Nixon like Johnson and Kennedy before him placed it at the center of his economic program. 
But the only president to be forced out of office in the twentieth century took this reasoning 
further than the voluntary wage-price guideposts upon which the preceding administrations 
relied. This was a man who jumpstarted his political career by opposing the OPA in 1946. 
His first presidential term was defined by just the opposite. 
 Nixon in August 1971 took the unprecedented step of imposing wage-price controls 
in peacetime, or at least what passed as peacetime in the United States. A ninety-day wage 
and price freeze was followed by the introduction of an administrative body devoted to 
keeping wage growth within the bounds of productivity, and demanding that employers hold 
the line on prices. At the same time, Nixon suspended the dollar’s convertibility to gold, 
which had served as the foundation of the Bretton Woods Accord. 1971 was the first in what 
would become a chronic U.S. trade deficit; Kennedy and Johnson had fought the balance-of-
payments deficit and failed, and Nixon understood that structural forces made it unwise even 
to try. The fixed exchange rate regime that had prevailed since the end of World War II 
crumbled in short order, and by the middle of the decade just about all currencies in the 
capitalist world would be floating. Together, this made for the biggest economic news in the 
postwar period.1 
																																																						
1 See the very useful volumes, Lester Sobel, ed., Inflation and the Nixon Administration (New York: Facts on 
File, 1974). See also Neil de Marchi, “The First Nixon Administration: Prelude to Controls,” in Craufurd 
 208 
 Nixon was a conservative, but he was made in a New Deal world, and the New 
Economic Policy he announced that August expressed all the contradictions he embodied. 
This was especially so given that the material conditions which had undergirded that New 
Deal world were disintegrating just as he took office. By the early 1970s, productivity growth 
had slowed markedly, and the figure would never again achieve the extraordinary dynamism 
is showed during what Robert Gordon called the “special century” from 1870 to 1970. With 
steady inflation resulting from the increased federal spending on Vietnam and the Great 
Society, the demand that wages be linked to a declining productivity would be a difficult one 
to impress upon the labor movement. The industrial unions in particular had by the turn of 
the decade lost all faith in the guidepost logic, mainly because it did not account for the rising 
cost-of-living. 
 And while Nixon’s refusal to honor dollar holders’ claims to gold was driven by an 
anxiety about U.S. financial hegemony, the action had the effect of vastly increasing the 
power of international financial institutions, most of which had their headquarters in New 
York. Almost overnight, an enormous futures market in foreign exchange emerged and the 
age of derivatives was upon us. These financial instruments could serve something like a 
productive function: they were effectively insurance against the prospect of volatile currency 
fluctuations which would otherwise deter investment. But they could also take on a life of 
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their own, and that they did. The spark that led to the explosion of the financial sector came 
in August 1971.2 
 But as Leo Panitch and Sam Gindin have demonstrated, that financial spark could not 
catch unless inflation had been tamed.3 And that brings us back to the wage-price controls. 
The controls were an expression of what the historian Kristoffer Smemo has in another 
context called “conservative statism.”4 They did evoke the tripartism central to the New Deal 
order, but they were designed to bear most acutely on labor. The hope of keeping wages 
below productivity and prices stable was increasingly untenable as productivity fell, and it 
became clear through the operation of the controls that the competing claims over income 
shares at the heart of the politics of inflation could no longer be elided. Labor refused to 
participate within six months of the August 1971 announcement, and while the control 
program continued for another two years by the time Nixon left office it was universally 
reviled. The OPEC embargo in late 1973, after which energy prices soared, ushered in a new 
wage of inflation, and from there on nothing that smelled like the New Deal would used to 
address it. The monetarists were on the march. 
 This chapter examines the period leading up to the announcement of the controls and 
demonstrates how the contradictions inherent in “conservative statism” doomed it from the 
outset. The analysis offered by the rising Republican operative Kevin Phillips in his 1969 
best-selling book, The Emerging Republican Majority, which asserted that Nixon’s election 
“bespoke the end of New Deal Democratic hegemony and the beginning of a new era in 
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American politics,” is a useful distillation of the administration’s political outlook. Reflecting 
on how nearly sixty percent of the popular vote went either to Nixon or to the segregationist 
former Alabama governor, George Wallace, Phillips predicted that a partisan realignment of 
historic proportions was at work. A sizeable contingent of the Democratic Party’s traditional 
constituency was ready to defect, due to their frustration with its “ambitious social 
programming” and “inability to handle the urban and Negro revolutions.” Winning their 
allegiance, Phillips exclaimed, could ensure Republican electoral supremacy for the 
foreseeable future. Nixon saw an ideological fissure within the American working-class – 
that between the disaffected white working class and the rest – and he sought to exploit it, 
above all by cultivating ties with conservative craft unions. But the politics of inflation 
prevented him from doing so. In the last instance, his conservative statism left him no choice 
but to attack labor.5 
   
WHEN NIXON ENTERED the White House in January 1969, inflation was at its highest 
rate in almost two decades. Just one week after his inauguration, Nixon made his first official 
remarks on the issue, the control of which would soon become his principal domestic 
priority, suggesting that, “Unless we do control inflation, we will be confronted, eventually, 
with massive unemployment,” and that the administration would attempt, “to have some fine 
tuning of fiscal and monetary affairs in order to control inflation.” Informed by the precepts 
of the Samuelson inflected Phillips Curve, which posited a tradeoff between price stability 
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and economic growth, the administration at first opted for a policy of “gradualism.” This 
rather traditional approach involved tempering the economy, and thus relieving the upward 
pressure on prices, through planned budget surpluses and monetary restraint.6  
 Nixon’s affinity for gradualism reflected two features of the administration’s 
understanding of and approach to inflation in 1969, both of which began to change in 
response to new economic conditions by the end of that year. First, guided by a conventional 
interpretation of the Phillips tradeoff, they located the source of inflationary pressure in 
excess demand, a product, they deemed, of federal deficit spending on Johnson’s foreign and 
domestic initiatives. Second, from the outset they ruled out economic controls, emphasizing 
that government involvement in the issue would be confined to fiscal and monetary “fine 
tuning,” a term reminiscent of the Kennedy and Johnson era experiments with wage and 
price guideposts. Government, they deemed in 1969, was a culprit that could offer few 
solutions.7 
 On the monetary front, the task initially fell to Federal Reserve Chairman William 
McChesney Martin, a Truman appointee and an old Nixon foe, who refused to step down 
before his term expired in January 1970. The tension between the two began in 1960, when 
then Vice President Nixon blamed the Fed Chairman’s tight monetary policy in 1958 and 
1959 for triggering a recession that he believed cost him the presidential election. Seeking to 
“disinflate without deflating,” that spring Martin tightened the monetary spigot by raising the 
central bank’s discount rate, the amount charged on loans to member banks, to 6 percent, its 
highest point since October 1929, and increasing banks’ reserve requirements by $650 
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million.8 It brought about the pain of “deflating” with none of the pleasure of “disinflating.” 
While the economy contracted and unemployment rose, the administration’s gradualism had 
no effect on inflation, as consumer prices continued to increase, at an annualized rate of more 
than 6 percent during the last few months of the year, producing the first instance of what 
would come to be known as stagflation.9  
 By the year’s end, Martin’s contractionary monetary policy had ignited a chorus of 
opposition. In the first week of the New Year, Secretary of Labor George Shultz – a 
confidant of Milton Friedman and former Dean of the University of Chicago School of 
Business – became the first prominent administration official to criticize the Fed’s approach 
and to call for an easing of monetary policy. Noting that, “the nation’s money supply had 
shown no growth at all for a number of months,” Shutlz emphasized that a continuation of 
the policy could send the economy into a “tailspin.”10 Nixon, ever anxious about recessions 
since his 1960 defeat, had showed his hand a few months prior, when in October 1969 he 
appointed his economic adviser Arthur Burns to succeed Martin at the Fed. As John Bates 
Clark Professor of Economics at Columbia University, Chair of Dwight Eisenhower’s 
Council of Economic Advisers (CEA), and former director of the National Bureau of 
Economic Research, Burns’s credentials were impeccable. Nixon, however, had his own 
expectations of the nominee, and he went “about as far as he could, lecturing – even 
scolding” Burns about his task. At the helm of the central bank, Burns was to loosen the 
monetary spigot and steer the economy away from recession.11 
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 Nixon further indicated his frustration with the gradualist approach in the way he 
began to reframe the inflation predicament by the end of the year. Asserting that his 
administration had taken monetary and fiscal action – the latter involving an income surtax 
along with $7 billion in federal budget cuts – to rein in inflation, he noted in an October 1969 
letter to more than two thousand business and labor leaders that, because “government’s 
house is now in order, we can turn to business and labor to remind them that inflation is 
everybody’s problem and fighting inflation is everybody’s business.”12 Foreshadowing the 
supply-side diagnosis of inflation the administration would publicly advance beginning in 
1970, the letter marked a turning point in its approach to both labor and management on the 
question. If in early-1969 government was the culprit, with its budget deficits and loose 
money, by the end of the year it had at least an accomplice in the institutional structure of the 
economy. 
 Outside the administration, criticism of the federal government’s stringent 1969 
monetary policy, as well as of Nixon’s new posture, came from the labor movement. Soon 
after receiving the President’s letter, UAW president Walter Reuther, in discussing his 
union’s upcoming round of contract negotiations, made clear that the autoworkers planned to 
go “to the bargaining table in 1970 to get our equity, and we don’t care what business’s 
attitude maybe be or what the attitude of the Nixon Administration may be.”13 He continued 
in January 1970, just weeks after the Senate had confirmed Burns’s appointment, by 
excoriating Fed Chairman Martin’s financial stewardship in a similar tone. Arguing not only 
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that the central bank’s tight money was sure to hamper growth, as conventional economic 
reasoning suggested and as the uptick in unemployment demonstrated, Reuther went on to 
assert that, ironically, it was “most inflationary,” as increasing borrowing costs manifested as 
higher consumer prices.14 Later that summer, after Reuther’s untimely death, United 
Steelworkers of America president I.W. Abel carried on the torch, testifying before the Joint 
Economic Committee that, “These interest rates are a major factor…as these peak rates are 
passed on, through the economic system, to consumers.”15 Moreover, Abel noted, echoing an 
argument John Kenneth Galbriath made in the 1950s, the interest rates had little impact on 
“big, blue chip corporations” who had unfettered access to “preferred lines of credit at the 
banks” and “pay the lowest available rates.”16  
 Carrying this critique onto Capitol Hill, in December 1969 Wisconsin Senator 
William Proxmire muscled a bill through Congress, which Nixon “reluctantly” signed on 
Christmas Eve, granting the President the authority to implement credit controls at his 
discretion. While he feared, in public, that credit controls would put the country on the road 
“toward a directly controlled economy,” and, in private, that the legislation provided 
Congressional Democrats with a means by which to direct the blame for inflation back to the 
White House, Nixon endorsed the bill because of the “overwhelming urgency” of 
maintaining the federal government’s power to limit interest rates on savings deposits, an 
important tool for limiting the potentially “destructive competition” between commercial 
banks, savings banks, and savings and loan associations.17 The critique of tight money was 
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not confined to the liberal-left, however, as by February 1970 even Milton Friedman was 
“hopeful about a decline in interest rates.”18 Tight money, it was clear to all a year into 
Nixon’s presidency, could not alone alleviate the inflationary pressure. Indeed, it seemed by 
early-1970 that the economic reasoning upon which that monetary approach was founded 
was itself inadequate for making sense of this peculiar price instability. 
 
 
BY THE EARLY MONTHS of 1970, the center-of-gravity in the Nixon administration’s 
anti-inflation program began to shift in response to these criticisms. Alarmed by the 
durability of inflation even as unemployment surpassed their 4 percent benchmark, which 
CEA Chairman Paul McCracken indicated to the Joint Economic Committee was likely to 
persist for the duration of the year, the administration began to admit publicly that their 
experiment with tight monetary policy had proven unworkable and to suggest that a new 
approach to the price question was necessary.19 In its annual study on the health of the 
economy, the Economic Report of the President, the CEA acknowledged that, “the highly 
restrictive stance of monetary policy after mid-1969,” was, “too severe.”20 At the central 
bank, Burns responded to these calls, as well as to anxieties within the Federal Reserve 
System about a potential financial panic, hastened by the summer 1970 bankruptcy of Penn 
Central Transportation Company, by lowering the influential Federal Funds Rate, from 9 
percent in January 1970 to close to 4 percent by the beginning of 1971.21 Monetary 
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adjustments aside, however CEA Chairman McCracken did not offer an alternative anti-
inflation proposal, noting that he not only opposed overt federal intervention in wage and 
price decisions, but also was cool even to presidential exhortations for voluntary restraint 
from business and labor, a not so subtle gibe at the wage-price guideposts relied upon by the 
Kennedy and Johnson administrations.22 Nixon’s remark in the October 1969 letter to labor 
and business that “Economic policy needed backbone rather than jawbone,” still, for the 
moment, guided the administration’s public approach.23 
 While McCracken and the CEA sounded the official White House line, one reflecting 
their ambivalence over how to proceed, dissent began to percolate among more autonomous 
economic policymakers. That May, Fed Chairman Burns became the first administration ally 
to indicate amenability toward an “incomes policy,” or government regulation of wage and 
price decisions, as a potential solution to the novel supply-side inflation. In a speech before 
the American Bankers Association, Burns noted that, “We are in a transitional period of cost-
push inflation, and we therefore need to adjust our policies to the special character of the 
inflationary pressure that we are now experiencing,” and that, consequently, “we should not 
close our minds to the possibility that an incomes policy…might speed us through this 
transitional period.”24 Although CEA Chairman McCracken, in attendance at the ABA 
meeting, did not hesitate to counter Burns, noting that incomes policies had been ineffective 
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in foreign economies, he too modified his rhetoric, stressing that he harbored no 
“theological” opposition to such a program.25  
 The new fault lines in the inflation control debate clarified the next month when, in an 
“Address to the Nation on Economic Policy and Productivity” in mid-June, Nixon began to 
proactively respond to the new economic atmosphere. First, he established a tripartite 
National Commission on Productivity charged with studying and proposing solutions to the 
productivity slowdown that began in the late-1960s. In 1969, the annual rate of productivity 
growth was a meager 0.2 percent, the second lowest in the postwar period, thus making 
almost any increase in wages, by the administration’s logic, inflationary.26  
 Second, the President instructed the Productivity Commission to develop a system for 
alerting the public to “outstanding cases of price or wage increases,” a Nixonian expression 
of the “jawboning” that characterized anti-inflation politics in the Kennedy and Johnson 
administrations and that until the end of 1969 the administration had publicly eschewed.27 
Nixon’s call for “Alerts” responded most immediately to what his administration deemed the 
most inflationary sector of the economy: construction.28 In a statement on price increases in 
the construction industry issued earlier that spring, Nixon stressed the need to expand the 
building trades’ workforce, through apprentice training and equal opportunity hiring 
practices – his first swipe the industry’s racial inequities that would become a bone of 
contention between the administration and otherwise sympathetic craft union leaders – in 
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order to place limits on skyrocketing construction wages.29 Taken together, the establishment 
of the Productivity Commission and the inflation alert system, along with his call for an 
increased supply of construction labor, reflected Nixon’s acknowledgement that the new 
inflation was driven, above all, by labor costs. 
 
 
TRADE UNION OFFICIALS did not hesitate to offer a sharp rebuke to the wage-push logic, 
sharpening the fault lines in the inflation debate that would become ever more pronounced 
during the subsequent two years. Testifying before the Joint Economic Committee in July 
1970, USWA president and AFL-CIO Economic Policy Committee Chairman I.W. Abel 
expounded on the class bias in Nixon’s price politics, noting that, “Too many are too anxious 
to single out trade unions as the villain in this picture” because they “ignore completely the 
role of corporate greed.”30 He proceeded to offer labor’s interpretation of price instability, 
arguing that it was, “a profit inflation – combined with a dangerous credit inflation,” the 
product of robust corporate earnings for most of the 1960s coupled with the high interest 
rates – which Nixon had been authorized to cap since the previous December – enabled by 
the Fed’s strict 1969 monetary policy.31 
 A seventy-four year-old Gardiner Means also made an appearance before the JEC that 
summer, and he said what he had been saying since his thirties. The “Nixon game plan,” 
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Means began, “is bound to fail unless it is radically altered.”32 And it was bound to fail 
because it did not consider administered pricing and the administrative inflation it generated. 
This was the last gasp of Institutional Keynesianism, and it was no without some effect. 
Frustrated with the Nixon administration’s “bankrupt policies” for controlling inflation, the 
Abel led AFL-CIO Economic Policy Committee earlier that spring unveiled its own proposal 
for stabilizing the price level. And they followed Means’s lead – as USWA Research 
Director Otis Brubaker complimented to Means after his testimony, he demonstrated “a grasp 
of the economic realities of our pricing system which most economists seem to lack.”33  
 First, because Nixon had proved unwilling to employ the powers granted to him, the 
labor committee exhorted Congress to “direct the Federal Reserve System to establish 
selective credit controls.” Second, it encouraged the federal government to use all measures 
at its disposal to place downward pressure on home mortgage interest rates, an implicit 
suggestion that construction industry inflation was less about wages than the cost of credit. 
Finally, it called for governmental efforts to “curtail the continuing high rate of business 
mergers” which lent “the dominant corporations” monopoly pricing power.34 As for whether 
the AFL-CIO would cooperate with the Nixon administration were it to eventually propose 
an incomes policy, Abel emphasized that trade unions’ acceptance of wage restraint would be 
conditional on controls being “equitably placed on all costs and incomes – including all 
prices, profits, dividends, rents, and executive compensation.”35  
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 The Democratic-controlled Congress took notice, and in mid-August 1970 passed the 
Economic Stabilization Act, which granted the president the authority to stabilize wages, 
prices, and rents. The policy was attached to a measure to renew the two decade-old Defense 
Production Act, a strategic amendment that forced the control powers upon Nixon and 
offered the Congressional Democrats a tool with which to prod the administration towards an 
incomes policy. Allowing the President to set wages and prices at levels not below those of 
May 25, 1970 – the date was set retroactively so as to preempt reactive wage and price hikes 
– the authority was to expire after six months. For the first time in Nixon’s presidency, an 
incomes policy was on the table, and the imminent expiration date promised that it would be 
an immediate, and likely recurrent, subject of debate.36  
 Nixon’s labor challenges were not confined to AFL-CIO reports or trade union 
leaders’ testimonies in Washington, however. They came from below, as well. Measured by 
strike activity, 1970 ranked among the most militant years in postwar labor history. Indeed, 
more worker-hours were lost to strikes in 1970 than in any single year in U.S. history.37 
National strikes by letter carriers, truck drivers, and railroad workers crippled important 
communication and distribution networks, serving as a constant reminder to policymakers of 
the powerful counterpunch their wage-based inflationary accusations might invite.38 
Complicating matters, many of these stoppages were wildcat strikes, unsanctioned by the 
official trade union establishment, which signaled a militant and, from Nixon’s perspective, 
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dangerous level of working-class self-activity uncharacteristic of the routinized postwar labor 
relations system.  
 Capping a year of labor insurgency, in September 1970 355,000 autoworkers walked 
out at General Motors, the UAW’s first major work stoppage in the post-Reuther era and one 
that brought the labor politics of the new inflation to the fore. Seeming to respond directly to 
Nixon’s new wage-push posture, the central issue in the GM strike was the extent to which 
the inflationary tides of previous years had eroded autoworkers’ purchasing power. In 1967, 
during the last contract dispute of his life, Reuther’s fealty to the Johnson administration led 
him to a grave miscalculation, one that set the terms for the 1970 strike. Believing assurances 
from Johnson that the war in Southeast Asia was in its last throes, Reuther sought to resolve a 
protracted strike at Ford by betting that the late-1960s inflationary pressure would subside by 
the turn of the decade. In exchange for a hefty wage hike and a marked increase in 
Supplemental Unemployment Benefits, Reuther agreed to sixteen cent-an-hour ceiling on 
cost-of-living adjustments, a settlement GM quickly matched. As the violence in Vietnam 
intensified, however, so too did domestic price instability, and consequently the “COLA cap” 
resulted in an effective pay deduction for the average autoworker of more than eight hundred 
dollars.39 Resolving the cost-of-living crisis was thus at the heart of the GM strike, a sticking-
point that flung Reuther’s successor as UAW president, Leonard Woodcock, into the politics 
of inflation from the moment he took office. How the autoworkers fared, Fortune predicted 
as the strike loomed, would “forecast, in large measure, the coming climate of labor-
management relations.”40 
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AS THE UAW began to paralyze the industrial Midwest, Nixon charged one of his chief 
political advisers, Charles W. Colson, with spearheading an administration effort to appeal to 
the labor vote.41 In accepting, “with real delight,” responsibility for their “political battle plan 
of winning over the union leadership and the rank and file,” Colson straightforwardly noted 
that his objective was “to make them part of our ‘New Majority.’”42 By stressing that, 
“romancing the union leadership is only part of the task” because of the extent to which, in 
certain unions, “the rank and file are especially independent,” Colson highlighted the fissures 
inside the House of Labor, rife with racial undertones, that the administration sought to 
exploit. The key union officials he identified – including the heads of “all of the construction 
trades” – came from craft unions historically associated with the AFL, most of whom had a 
less than sterling record on racial equity.43 His lone reference to specific rank-and-file union 
members, however, came in a discussion of the CIO, when, after dismissing UAW president 
Leonard Woodcock as “a socialist who will never support us,” he described autoworkers as 
“among the most conservative in the union movement” who were “keenly aware of the race 
question.”44 
 A self-proclaimed “hard hat partisan”, Colson’s labor outreach program thus 
consisted of two prongs.45 First, the administration would make genuine, if modest, 
concessions to the building trades’ and other craft unions’ leaderships. For instance, one of 
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his first accomplishments in the new post was when, after the AFL-CIO lambasted Secretary 
of Commerce Maurice Stans for establishing a twenty-one member advisory committee on 
regional economic development without a single labor representative, Colson successfully 
persuaded Nixon that “representatives of organized labor (not those who are labor experts; 
actual representatives of organized labor) be appointed to every Commission that we 
announce.”46 In the first set of appointments after Stan’s flap, when Assistant Secretary of 
Labor Rocco Sciliano proposed appointing two USWA officials to a National Public 
Advisory Committee, Colson responded that, “it seems to me that maybe there should be a 
third person named who represents a different element of labor.”47 By “different element,” 
Colson meant, simply, a craft unionist. Second, through racialized overtures to what he 
perceived to be a large pool of conservative white industrial workers, like those, he believed, 
in the UAW, the administration would seek to drive a wedge into the tenuous electoral 
coalition between organized labor and African Americans. 
 Colson’s racialized strategy for reaching out to conservative unionized male workers 
encountered, from the outset, an obstacle in one of the administration’s own policies, its 
equal opportunity employment program, designed to target the almost homogenously white 
construction industry. In June 1969, Assistant Secretary of Labor for Employment Standards 
Arthur Fletcher unveiled the Philadelphia Plan, a revision on Lyndon Johnson’s 1965 
Executive Order 11246, which established minority employment targets on federal 
construction projects in Philadelphia. Soon after he signed it, the courts struck down 
Johnson’s edict on the grounds that, by establishing employment quotas, it violated Title VII 
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of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibited employment discrimination on racial and 
gendered lines.48 The notion of “quotas,” then, became the issue upon which debate over the 
Philadelphia Plan centered. In a Senate testimony on the revised Plan in October 1969, 
Secretary of Labor George Shultz stressed that “it is important to understand that the plan 
does not require, nor does it allow, discriminatory hiring practices as implied by the use of 
the word ‘quota.’ Instead, the plan establishes a range of desirable hiring within which the 
contractor must set his goal.”49 
 Considerable scholarly debate has raged over why Nixon threw his weight around a 
program – affirmative action – that would come to be a jewel in the social liberals’ policy 
crown. Some have argued that it was a Machiavellian ploy by the administration to fragment 
a heavily unionized industry along racial grounds, while others locate its origins in a long 
movement by rank-and-file African Americans for an anti-discrimination employment policy 
in this historically racially exclusive industry.50 While both of these factors, to be sure, 
played a role in the decision, the fact that it was implemented in the industry that, first, the 
administration sought to win over and, second, that was understood as most inflationary, 
suggests that a strictly material motive was also at work. The Plan, it seems in this vein, was 
designed in large part to increase the supply of construction labor and, consequently, to push 
down wages in the industry. In a September 1969 statement on the construction industry, 
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where he lamented that the “cost of building a home has become exorbitant,” Nixon detailed 
five proactive measures he hoped would alleviate the upward price pressure. Four of the five, 
including the formation of a Cabinet Committee on Construction, were designed to assess, 
with the hope of scaling back, federal and state construction products, so as to reduce public 
sector demand for building trades labor. The final step, and the one most relevant to the 
Philadelphia Plan, was to direct the “Secretaries of Labor and Health, Education, and Welfare 
to move promptly to provide for manpower training and vocational education in order to 
achieve a major increase in needed skilled labor for the construction industry.”51 Though he 
didn’t mention affirmative action or the Philadelphia Plan by name, and indeed would not 
until December of that year, given the timing of his statement, some two months after 
Fletcher announced the program and one month before the Congressional hearings on it, it 
seems safe to conclude that, “manpower” meant, in Nixon’s lexicon, equal opportunity 
employment. 
 If progressives in the twenty-first century still reminisce about this moment of 
Republican racial liberalism, the contemporary building trades were less enthused, as were, 
indeed, most African Americans, who deemed it insufficient. Arguing that it violated a 
sacred tenet of their internal operations, the privilege of seniority, in a Statement of Policy on 
Equal Opportunity Employment, the Building and Construction Trades Department of the 
AFL-CIO proclaimed that while “We support the right of the Negro to justice,” 
[I]t must also be recognized that there is a correlative right in the existing 
members of the organized work force regardless of their color or race. Many 
of them have fought during their working lives to preserve and advance their 
unions against the attack of strong anti-labor forces….We are convinced that 
the goal of increasing Negro and other minority worker participation in the 
building and construction trades can be accomplished with due regard to the 
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rights of the existing organized workforce. We think such an approach is 
preferable to unthinking actions which tend to pit one part of the population 
against the other.52  
 
Racial equality, they maintained, was important, but they were “unalterably opposed to the 
quota system.”53 Indeed, they emphasized, they had worked to diversify their ranks at least 
since the Supreme Court’s 1944 Steele decision, and had been among the leading advocates 
for inclusion of Title VII in the Civil Rights Act.54 Moreover, challenging the very figures 
with which Fletcher and others criticized the demographic composition of their workforce, 
which stated that only 1.6 percent of non-laborers – that is, everyone above the most 
unskilled, and lowest paid, ranks – were minorities, the Department asserted that, “Even with 
the deduction of the laborers from the calculation, the ratio of black participation among the 
remaining crafts was 12%.” Whatever disproportionate white presence in the construction 
industry there was, the building trades suggested, stemmed not from union racism but from 
structural inequalities that prevented African Americans from acquiring the “higher 
educational requirements” needed to secure such employment.55 
 By 1971, as it had become clear that the equal opportunity measure had met little 
success in controlling construction industry wages, the program’s political costs began to 
register within the administration. That spring, the hard-hat partisan Colson wrote to Nixon’s 
chief advisor on domestic social issues, John Ehrlichman, that continued enforcement of the 
policy is “the most critical political question that we face with respect to our relationships 
with the building trades unions.” He continued by lamenting how the administration had “not 
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been even-handed in our treatment of the minority-hiring problem” and that it was likely to 
be “the straw that broke the camel’s back and put us in a position from which I am positively 
confident we could not recover. On the other side of the coin, I have never seen a shred of 
evidence that our efforts in the area have gained us any support from the black community 
nor in my judgment is it likely that our efforts will.” The culprit inside the administration, he 
concluded, was Fletcher himself.56 Colson’s concerns appear to have been heard, as by mid-
summer he conveyed to the President that he was “trying to work out a ‘transfer’ of 
Fletcher,” pressure that likely contributed to the latter’s resignation that December to assume 
the executive directorship of the United Negro College Fund.57  
 Two years after implementing it, then, the administration deemed the Philadelphia 
Plan an utter defeat. Not only had it failed to make even a dent in the construction industry’s 
soaring wage inflation, by incorporating sufficient numbers of African Americans into the 
workforce and so increasing the labor supply, but also it had the adverse effect of deeply 
alienating the key to its “New Majority.” The episode, above all, shed light on the ostensibly 
unresolvable dilemma Nixon faced in pursuing his ambitious electoral strategy. Conservative 
white male workers were central to his plan, but they were also the material cause of his most 
acute domestic problem: inflation. Confronting them on it, whether by tight money, 
jawboning, or racial integration, was sure to draw ire. Their unions themselves, it was 
increasingly clear, were the administration’s fundamental obstacle. 
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IN NOVEMBER 1970, in the wake of the GM strike as well as an unfavorable midterm 
round of elections, a debate emerged inside and outside the administration over their labor 
strategy. Namely, whether or not they should draw a line in the sand and initiate an overt 
offensive on the trade unions. Fortune captured the essence of the dispute, arguing that there 
was something “disturbingly unreal about the President’s hopes for a détente” with the labor 
movement, because he has “studiously avoided facing up to the one issue that counts the 
most today: organized labor’s relentless pressure for inflationary wage settlements.”58 Closer 
to home, Undersecretary for Treasury, and conservative former Vice President of the 
American Bankers Association, Charls Walker directly challenged Colson’s agenda, arguing 
that, “for economic and political reasons, the time has come for this Administration to begin 
shifting its stance vis-à-vis organized labor.”59 Walker noted that this “tough stance should 
not be aimed at the ‘working man’ as such, but those institutions and leadership postures 
which…damage the stability of the economy” and encouraged the president to present this 
new position, along with a “clear ‘course’ on the economics of cost-push inflation,” in his 
annual address to the National Association of Manufacturers.60 
 Nixon ignored the advice. In addition to Colson, his new Secretary of Labor James 
Hodgson, a former executive and labor relations chief of Lockheed Martin, and George 
Shultz, then Director of the Office of Management and Budget, ridiculed it, and his Chief of 
Staff, Robert Haldeman, noted that they “have to get Walker out.”61 In their first meeting 
after the midterms, Nixon made his commitment to the labor strategy clear, stressing to AFL-
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CIO President George Meany that “the recent election and attendant activities did not alter 
the Administration’s intention to maintain communication with organized labor.”62 Indeed, 
after Meany expressed to Jay Lovestone, a Communist turned Cold Warrior and Colson’s 
leak inside AFL-CIO headquarters, his outrage with Nixon’s CEA, the President ordered 
Paul McCracken to hold periodic meetings with Meany and his staff economists to keep them 
“apprised of the Administration’s economic views.”63 The invitation, McCracken noted as he 
prepared for the first get together, had been “extremely well received at the AFL-CIO.”64 To 
whatever extent Nixon’s political strategists sought to maintain their “détente” with 
organized labor, and with the conservative craft union leaderships in particular, however, the 
inflation trap continued to interrupt their efforts.  
 By the last months of 1970 and the first of 1971, the center-of-gravity in the wage-
push discourse had settled firmly within the construction industry. As was becoming the 
norm, Fortune again helped to define the terms of the inflation debate, arguing, in a piece 
entitled, “The Building Trades Against the People,” that, through “an unabashed and perhaps 
unique display of monopoly power” the building trades unions were “exploiting consumers 
on a grand scale.” Turning the AFL-CIO’s critique of blue-chip corporations’ administered 
pricing on its head, the business organ asserted that the building trades were “able to do this 
because they control the labor supply and have created an artificial labor shortage.”65 It went 
on to urge the administration to terminate the “prevailing wage” system on federally 
sponsored construction projects – which required federal contractors to match the going 
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union wage rate in their specific region – mandated by the New Deal era Davis-Bacon Act, 
an argument that would soon become scripture in the Republican book of labor politics. 
These calls gained greater purchase after the CEA released their second “Inflation Alert” on 
December 1, which highlighted the average 22 percent first year wage settlement in 
construction industry collective bargaining agreements negotiated during the preceding three 
months, contracts that covered more than 300,000 workers.66 Though Meany was “incensed” 
by the CEA’s statement “strong anti-labor bias,” which neglected the fact that “ten years ago 
over 30 percent of the cost of a home was labor; today it is 18 percent, which reflects…more 
worker productivity,” the “Alert” had its intended effect of reinforcing the wage-push logic.67 
The Alert also took issue with the UAW’s November agreement with General Motors which, 
by reinstating cost of living escalators, put an end to the two month strike at the world’s 
largest corporation, noting that if the autoworkers’ pact was “generalized throughout the 
economy” it would press further upward “costs per unit of output and, therefore, the price 
level.” Unless productivity improved, the Council asserted, neither could wages. Leonard 
Woodcock’s cry that the Alert made “no comment whatsoever on the ability of GM to absorb 
the cost of the settlement out of its excessive profits without raising prices” fell on deaf 
ears.68 Woodcock, they might have suggested, should have known better, given his 
predecessor’s role in institutionalizing a direct relation between productivity and wages. 
 After the trends documented in the Alert manifested in another grim report on 
consumer prices, showing an annualized increase in December of 6.6 percent, which, 
McCracken lamented, continued “the string of disappointing news that we have had 
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regarding that index during recent months,” the White House, early in 1971, began crafting a 
more assertive plan of action.69 In mid-January, the tripartite Construction Industry 
Collective Bargaining Commission (CICBC), which had been established at the urging of 
George Shultz in September 1969, established a working group to devise stabilization 
machinery for the industry, the beginnings of what became, through an Executive Order that 
March, the Construction Industry Stabilization Committee.70 To the CICBC’s proposal that 
the stabilization committee would oversee voluntary negotiations between construction 
employers and unions, and intervene in the case of inflationary settlements, the building 
trades responded that their cooperation was conditional on two criteria: first, that the 
administration ease their enforcement of equal opportunity hiring policies, and second, that 
they maintain Davis-Bacon protection of prevailing wage standards.71 Having already 
snubbed the building trades’ leadership on the former with their Philadelphia Plan, the 
administration took their next shot at the ostensibly inflationary construction workers, who 
they still desperately sought to woo, on prevailing wages. 
 On February 23, with no voluntary agreement between contractors and the building 
trades on how to restrain inflationary wage settlements on the horizon, Nixon suspended the 
1931 Davis-Bacon Act, noting in his statement that, “the operation of this law at a time when 
construction wages and prices are skyrocketing only gives Federal endorsement and 
encouragement to severe inflationary pressures.”72 The building trades’ leadership, 
unsurprisingly, publicly blasted the decision. At a meeting of the AFL-CIO’s Building and 
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Construction Trades Department in Bal Harbour, Florida, George Meany denounced the 
president’s move as “an open invitation to unscrupulous employers to exploit workers by 
competitive undermining of fair wages and labor standards,” and asserted that it would in 
fact “have no real effect on halting inflation.” Even one of administration’s closest labor 
allies, Peter Brennan, president of the Building and Construction Trades Council of Greater 
New York, whom Nixon appointed as Secretary of Labor in 1973, condemned the move as 
using construction workers as a “patsy.” 73  
 Indeed, though the administration anticipated the shrill response, their action on 
Davis-Bacon represented a moderation of their initial plan to freeze construction wages and 
price entirely. Debate as to which route to pursue persisted until the day before Nixon’s 
announcement, when Secretary of Labor Hodgson proposed an immediate “wage-price-profit 
freeze” in the construction industry, though he acknowledged that the building trades “union 
presidents will not voluntarily accept” it.74 Charles Colson, ever concerned with “keeping the 
‘hard hats’ in our corner politically,” indicated that the “opinion is widespread that, if we 
force controls, the responsible building trades leaders will not be able to keep locals under 
control and there will be a serious rash of wildcat walkouts and disputes.”75 William Safire, 
Nixon’s acclaimed speechwriter and political adviser, also chimed in, arguing that if he went 
ahead with the freeze, “the President will be most pleasing to those academic price 
controllers who will never support him in the end, and most irritating to the hardhats who 
could possibly support him in 1972.”76 Nixon’s reluctance to unilaterally impose a freeze 
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indicated his awareness of the limits on how far he could push the building trades on 
inflation, especially as his administration continued to press them on the racial front, without 
alienating them entirely. It also suggests the extent to which he suspected that his decision, 
six months later, to freeze all wages and prices might alienate the entire labor movement. 
 In fact, though the building trades leaders issued a harsh condemnation of the Davis-
Bacon suspension, most breathed a sigh of relief that the administration had not gone ahead 
with the controls. Their public posture was due in large part to an anticipated upheaval 
among rank-and-file construction workers, a prediction that was realized in a major 
demonstration in New York City, ultimately endorsed by the AFL-CIO, that the 
administration’s “contacts within the building and trades unions are doing what they can” to 
contain, but over which “they have no control.”77 Taking a pulse on sentiment within the 
union leadership toward the decision, Colson phoned more than a dozen prominent leaders, 
and all but one indicated that they understood the measure, and some even expressed 
support.78 Indeed, Jack Lyons, president of the International Association of Bridge, 
Structural, and Ornamental Iron Workers, who publicly cried that the move would have an 
“extremely important” impact on workers, was “very understanding” in his private 
correspondence with Colson.79 The union brass’s tolerance of the Davis-Bacon move may 
have exposed the disconnect between the leadership and the rank-and-file – and, indeed, the 
undemocratic structures in the craft unions – but it also suggested to the administration that 
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they may have some powerful allies in their efforts to impose wage restraint, even if the 
workers themselves were far from understanding. 
 Beyond the awareness that they dodged a bullet on wage controls, the building trades 
leaders’ private openness to the Davis-Bacon suspension was rooted in their widespread 
understanding that it amounted to little more than political bluster on the inflation front and 
that, for two reasons, it would in fact have little material impact on unionized construction 
workers. First, from the outset the administration indicated that the suspension would be 
temporary. In his statement announcing the suspension, Nixon concluded by stressing that 
the “purposes of the Davis-Bacon Act can once again be realized when construction 
contractors and labor unions work out solutions to the problems which have created the 
emergency.”80 Reacting to a draft of the speech, Paul McCracken complained that the line 
suggested that Davis-Bacon was a “sound instrument” and that by concluding with it, it 
appears “as if the Administration, having taken an action, is now scared.”81 Second, most 
urban markets, the source of construction industry inflation, were thoroughly unionized, and, 
thus, private sector wages would continue to be set at prevailing rates regardless of what the 
federal government did. Indeed, the industry’s peak organization, the Associated General 
Contractors, publicly opposed the Davis-Bacon suspension, as it was composed almost 
entirely of union contractors who felt they would be “unsuccessful now in bidding on 
government contracts.”82 
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 235 
 Ultimately, notwithstanding the political theater that unfolded around it, the 
administration’s suspension of Davis-Bacon, which lasted just over a month, was little more 
than an attempt to win political capital on the inflation issue while sidestepping a further 
confrontation with the building trades, who were already miffed by the affirmative action 
protocols they had been forced to swallow. Nixon could not forever, however, have his cake 
and eat it too, and by mid-1971 he could no longer evade his labor dilemma. Starting that 
summer, the contradictions in his attempt to reconcile his overtures to conservative craft 
unionists with his commitment to a wage-push interpretation of inflation began to unravel, a 
process that came to a head beginning on August 15, 1971. 
 
THE STRUGGLE OVER CONSTRUCTION provided the context in which the Nixon 
administration finally adopted formal controls. Given that that struggle was over the wage-
productivity link, and because productivity was slowing, this meant that the purpose of the 
controls would be to effect a reduction in wage growth. Two developments in the summer of 
1971 pushed Nixon over the edge. On the domestic front, the labor upheaval that raged 
through 1970 continued into mid-1971, with strikes in copper, communications, and railroads 
indicating that the wage-price spiral had no end in sight.83 Even more fundamental, however, 
was the one strike that, after being anticipated with dread for the preceding six months, was 
averted. On August 1, the USWA and the major steel companies reached a settlement, on a 
contract that had expired the previous night, guaranteeing a thirty percent wage increase for 
steel workers over three years. That U.S. Steel announced an 8 percent price hike the next 
																																																						
83 Matusow, Nixon’s Economy, 108-115. 
 236 
day came as little surprise, but to Nixon it did underscore the wage-push threat of the 
summer’s wage settlements.84 
 Internationally, the threat of a run on the dollar in foreign money markets signaled the 
need for preemptive action. Here, Undersecretary of Treasury for Monetary Affairs Paul 
Volcker led the charge, convincing the new Treasury Secretary John Connally that 
immediate steps were needed to prevent an immediate depletion of U.S. gold reserves.85 This 
concern, though distinct, was intimately related to the administration’s anxieties on the 
domestic scene. The thread connecting the two was a commitment within the administration 
to maintaining the stature of the dollar, the material lynchpin of American international 
economic supremacy. Had inflation persisted with no action on convertibility, a run on the 
dollar was likely; had the link between the dollar and gold been severed with no action on 
wages and prices, even greater inflation would have erupted. Action on one was unthinkable 
without the other, and, consequently, Nixon’s announcement packaged the two together in 
his NEP. 
 If the business community would ever go along with economic controls, it was under 
these circumstances. In 1969, Roger Blough of U.S. Steel along with other corporate leaders 
founded the Construction Users Anti-Inflation Round Table (CUAIR), which sought to use 
the example of the construction industry to drive home the wage-push argument. They 
advocated for training programs to chip away at the control the building trades wielded over 
the labor supply, and they especially railed against Davis-Bacon. Although CUAIR, along 
with the leaders of the National Association of Manufacturers’ and the Chamber of 
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Commerce, had voiced tremendous opposition to wage and price controls, they kept their 
skepticism to themselves once Nixon announced the program and actually came to support it 
as it became clear that public frustration through the ninety-day freeze mainly focused on 
labor. In 1972, Blough spearheaded the merger between CUAIR and two other corporate 
lobbies, and the Business Roundtable was born. For the remainder of the decade it would 
play an important role in moving the politics of inflation to the right.86  
 But by the time the Business Roundtable came on the scene, they were facing a much 
embattled labor movement. Indeed, structurally the trade unions – and Institutional 
Keynesianism more generally –had already suffered its most fundamental defeat. The 
panacea of productivity had eclipsed their imagined planning state in the 1960s, and Nixon 
only doubled down on that idea by imposing formal controls. And, again, the productivity 
slowdown that began just as the new wage-price policy was implemented only intensified the 
pressures on labor. It surprised few, then, that almost the entire labor movement abandoned 
the effort just months after November 1971 implementation of Phase II of the program. 
When the Wage Board nullified a substantial wage increase the International Longshore 
Workers’ Union (ILWU) had just won through a west coast dock strike. All labor members 
except the Teamsters’ conservative leader Frank Fitzsimmons quit.87 
 This only made it easier for forces like Rouger Blough’s Business Roundtable frame 
the problem in terms of union driven wage-push. In spite of the controls, inflation began to 
pick up over the course of the next year, and when the OPEC embargo began in the fall of 
1973 it shot through the roof. At that point Nixon was mired in scandal, and he would soon 
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be out the door. So too would his wage-price control program. His successor, the Republican 
Gerald Ford, would make inflation control his principal domestic objective – Whip Inflation 
Now buttons circulated far and wide – yet he intended to achieve that goal through more 
orthodox means. Milton Friedman, who won the Nobel Prize in Economics the year Ford lost 
the presidency to Jimmy Carter, provided one alternative. And in a testament to how far 
Institutional Keynesianism had fallen by the latter half of the 1970s, the Democrat Carter too 
turned to the monetarists on the march. 
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Conclusion 
 
WHEN THE COLLAPSE of the U.S. housing market precipitated a global financial crisis in 
2008, one institution did more than any other to prevent an economic apocalypse: the Federal 
Reserve System. And if the financial crisis still matured into the worst and most protracted 
general downturn since the Great Depression even in spite of the central bank’s herculean 
monetary efforts, one can only wonder how bad things would have become without them. 
Fiscal stimuli were wanting in the years after the crash with the exception a one-time shot in 
the arm soon after Barack Obama took office, leaving the Fed’s program of “Quantitative 
Easing” (QE) as about the only macroeconomic stabilization measure adopted after the 
infamous Wall Street bailouts. Indeed, rather than leading Congress to prime the pump, the 
precipitous decline in federal revenues that came with the recession gave way to calls for 
budget slashing. At the city and state levels, as well as across the Atlantic, the stampede 
toward austerity was even more intense. A half decade into the crisis, then, Fed Chair Ben 
Bernanke, who had been appointed by the Republican George W. Bush, could not help but 
lament how “tight fiscal policy [restrained] economic growth.”1 
 With the federal government more or less paralyzed by what pundits liked to call 
gridlock, it was the Federal Reserve’s political independence that enabled it to play the 
leading role. And what a reversal that role was. After absorbing gobs of toxic assets from the 
financial system and replenishing it with enormous infusions of fresh money, the central 
bank has as of this writing kept interest rates near zero for upwards of a decade. This is 
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unprecedented in the era of independence, and can only be compared to the Depression and 
wartime emergencies during which Marriner Eccles voluntarily subordinated his authority to 
that of the Treasury Department. Nor has it been without controversy. Much to Bernanke and 
later Janet Yellen’s chagrin, the inflation hawks were not silenced by the crisis. But whereas 
the Fed once provided a home to such monetary conservatives, its leadership after 2008 
simply ignored them; and given that inflation is as yet below the Fed’s 2% target while labor 
markets remain slack, they had good reason to do so. Now it is the Republican platform that 
calls for political control of Fed policymaking – GOP congressional officials would like to 
legislate benchmarks for monetary policy, one of Milton Friedman’s famous proposals – 
while many liberals hope that central bank independence will allow for continued monetary 
ease. One could not have made this alignment up in 1951. 
 Still, both sides today miss the point. It is the case that the Fed’s actions likely averted 
an even greater disaster. And it is also the case that the complete absence of price inflation 
has allowed Bernanke and Yellen to takes these steps without much fear on that front. But 
many observers have noted how the remarkably low cost of capital has once again lubricated 
speculation and driven an asset inflation different from that which preceded the Great 
Recession only in degree. What is more, the Fed’s loose monetary policy has failed to 
achieve its singular aim: to induce investment. Profitable investment opportunities are so few 
and far between, the financial sector appears to have concluded, that bankers would prefer to 
sit on savings – to the tune, now, of almost $2 trillion – which generate no return than to risk 
sinking that capital into anything less liquid. The real problem for the Fed is that this problem 
is not new. Net private business investment as a ratio of capital stock has been plummeting 
since the early 1970s, just about the time productivity growth began to slow and the New 
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Deal order began to fall.2 The declining rate of investment, that is, is a structural and 
historical development, one against which the Fed’s stopgap measures have been nothing 
more than that. The problem, in other words, is not that business is unable to invest. It is that 
only business can decide when and how much investment will take place, and over the past 
four decades they have felt it less and less worthwhile to commit resources. 
 This crisis of investment is the most serious threat to the U.S. and the global economy 
in the early twenty-first century, but the issues involved are not new. The Great Depression 
brought similar challenges, and for a half century they were negotiated by a much different 
balance of class forces and on much different terms. The New Deal order, however, came 
with the cost of inflation, and this dissertation has sought to assess the political struggle that 
resulted. Inflation raised questions no less significant than the distribution of the national 
income, the uses of profit, and the control of the investment function. A coalition of activist-
intellectuals that I have called Institutional Keynesians used the opportunity to advance a 
vision of social democracy for the United States: public control over industries that provided 
the basic necessities of life, price and profit control in the private sector, and full 
employment-driven economic growth. They made their greatest strides in the 1930s and early 
1940s, and continued to push their agenda from the labor movement and farmers’ 
organizations, consumer organizations and various parts of the federal government well into 
the postwar period. They failed at what they set out to achieve, but not for lack of will. The 
Institutional Keynesians failed because of the incredible opposition they faced from forces so 
powerful and with so much to lose. 
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 Inflation was not a serious problem before the 1930s. From the late-nineteenth 
century onwards, farmers were the ones most concerned about the price level, and the 
Department of Agriculture became the central site of struggle over these questions. 
Institutional Keynesianism was born in the New Deal USDA, when those surrounding 
Rexford Tugwell made their most influential calls for national economic planning. World 
War II brought economic recovery, and the years immediately following V-J Day witnessed 
the most consequential struggles over the fate of Institutional Keynesianism. The 
progressives lost on every front – labor, agriculture, and finance – and these defeats 
combined with the McCarthyist witch hunts threatened to send this New Deal tradition into 
the wilderness for good. 
 But the popular constituencies that made the New Deal, above all the industrial union 
movement, would not be so quick to disappear. For more than two decades after the war, 
trade unionists and their allies in government continued to advance the kind of anti-corporate 
politics that animated Institutional Keynesianism. Their efforts were felt during the recession 
of 1957-58, which served as something of a dress rehearsal for stagflation. But the 
Institutional Keynesians were also victims of their success. Throughout the postwar era they 
succeeded at harnessing the fruits of productivity and distributing them with a measure of 
equity. This became more or less institutionalized during the Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon 
administrations. Equitably distributing the fruits of productivity, however, was not the same 
as controlling the investment that produced those gains. And in any case, productivity would 
not continue to grow so rapidly forever. By the late-1960s, what Robert Gordon has called 
the special century was coming to an end. The class struggle at the heart of the politics of 
inflation could not be papered over any longer.  
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THE PERILS POSED by a dependence on productivity growth did not, however, emerge de 
novo in the 1960s and 1970s. Two additional factors contributing to the decline of 
Institutional Keynesianism had long existed, both growing out of the historical context 
surrounding in which it emerged – the transition to corporate capitalism. First was their faith 
in the productive potential of the industrial economy, one that just about everyone at the turn 
of the twentieth century shared. Trade unionists and progressive intellectuals early in the 
twentieth century regularly pointed to the remarkable growth in industrial productivity and 
demanded that labor’s share of the total income be tied to it, and they had very 
understandable reasons for doing so. To the eyes of someone familiar with the world that 
existed before corporate capitalism arrived, the new businesses seemed capable of achieving 
the infinite. And although Institutional Keynesians did feel that corporate officials’ search for 
steady profits together with their power over the investment function had the potential to 
drive this industrial engine into the ground, they were equally firm in their belief that proper 
state planning in the then existing industrial economy could deliver more and more for all. At 
the time it could. But the extraordinary industrial expansion that began after the Civil War 
and lasted for a century would not continue forever. As Robert Gordon has demonstrated, 
some of its greatest strides were made through one time events, like enormous investment in 
basic infrastructure, and technological advances like railroads and automobiles do not often 
come around. By 1970 the special century was ending. And if had been one thing to demand 
an increasing share of a rapidly growing pie, it would be altogether more difficult to take 
more of a fixed, or even shrinking, sum.  
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 Related to this was how Institutional Keynesians and most everyone else thought 
about income itself during the special century. If the distribution of income between capital 
and labor could be crudely put as that between profits and wages, wages were narrowly 
understood as those earned by the male head of a nuclear family for the productive labor he 
performed outside the home. Most women did not receive wages – about of quarter of 
women were in the paid labor force in the late 1940s – but that of course was not because 
they were not working. They shouldered the overwhelming burden of reproductive labor 
without remuneration, and that was more than a social injustice. It had structural 
consequences. Having never had to pay for so much of the work women did, and therefore 
having never been forced to account for it, the rate of “labor productivity” always appeared 
higher than it really was, or should have been. In other words, part of the reason the great 
boom from 1870 to 1970 looked so good quantitatively is because women got nothing in 
return for their contribution to it. Had they been compensated, that figure would not have 
shined so bright.3 
 This began to change in the postwar period. Feminist social struggles that linked 
organically to the labor and civil rights movements along with strong public investment in 
higher education enabled increasing numbers of women to gain access to the kinds of 
employment from which they had previously been excluded. The growth of an industry in 
household appliances, together with rising working-class wages, made it possible for families 
to purchase things like laundry machines and dishwashers, thus emancipating many women 
from those old, back-breaking tasks. And a rising, public-private industry of care provision 
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alleviated some of their affective responsibilities, especially those pertaining to the elderly, 
while also providing quite a few jobs, albeit not terribly well paying ones. 
 As more women began to get paid for more of the work they did – if not for all of it, 
and if not as much as they deserved – the aggregate economic indicators responded 
accordingly. The crisis of stagflation began just as productivity was slowing down, and we 
will see the two were not unrelated. Productivity slowed, moreover, just as the presence of 
women in the formal labor force was started to register. The simplest way to define 
productivity is the amount of output produced by the amount of labor put in. When half of 
the population suddenly started getting some compensation for the work they did, the 
denominator – labor input – could not but rise, and total productivity could not but fall. The 
gendered division of labor and the explosive growth of industrial capitalism were mutually 
constitutive, and they began to end together. 
 This is not to indict Institutional Keynesians as sexists. They functioned within the 
ideological limits of their times, and indeed they had more progressive gender politics than 
most. They were heirs to what scholars have called the “maternalist” tradition of progressive 
reform, and the creation of Aid to Dependent Children (later Aid to Families with Dependent 
Children), what people meant when they spoke of welfare until Bill Clinton terminated it in 
1996, was one legacy of that commitment.4 As several historians have demonstrated, 
moreover, women as “housewives” and “consumers” organized politically and continued to 
shape the character of New Deal liberalism during its rise and until its fall.5 And as we will 
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see, Institutional Keynesians worked closely with these organizers, and many of these 
organizers were as well pedigreed Institutional Keynesians as any men. But the presence of 
women would not on its own dispel the gendered ideology that grew out of corporate 
capitalism and the family wage system upon which it was built.6 The task before them had 
they taken it on would have been immense. It would have involved nothing less than 
socialization of reproductive labor through public provision of child and elderly care, 
cooperative housing that facilitated shared work on cooking and cleaning, and the like.7 The 
Institutional Keynesians were imaginative, but not that imaginative. 
  
BUT IF INSTITUTIONAL KEYNESIANISM failed, its failure is still instructive. Corporate 
control over the investment function remains the single most important feature of the modern 
political economy. Indeed, today that control is more concentrated than ever, resting in a 
handful of international financial institutions possessing of awesome reach. By subjecting 
this small number of institutions to public control, as the Institutional Keynesians sought to 
do in their time, the enormous resources they have heretofore hoarded could conceivably be 
pumped back into the otherwise sclerotic economy. And perhaps the most important lesson to 
draw from the Institutional Keynesian experience is for how that process should proceed. 
True democratic control over the investment function would render the older imperative of 
productivity growth obsolete; given the ecological challenges facing the planet, there may be 
no alternative to that. Instead of automobiles and electronics, planners might direct 
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investment towards public goods like mass transit and renewable energy, education and care. 
No doubt all of this is today far fetched. But I hope that this history of Institutional 
Keynesianism and inflation can contribute to our thinking about how we might get from here 
towards there.
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